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ABSTRACT 
The tension between power and democracy is crucial for understanding the nature and 
outcomes of marine and coastal fisheries governance processes. However, this thesis 
argues that prominent contemporary approaches to fisheries theory tend to promote a 
neoliberal vision of ‘politics without politics’, in which emphasis is placed on inclusive, 
de-centred and collaborative interaction between multiple and divergent state and non-
state actors. By doing so, this perspective is likely to predispose the observer to 
underestimate the primacy of power as a factor determining the engagement between 
multiple actors in fisheries governance processes. This thesis seeks to address this 
apparent oversight by exploring some of the crucial power dynamics that are understated 
or overlooked by contemporary approaches to fisheries governance theory. It presents an 
ethnographic study of power and micro-politics in public participation and community-
based representation among small-scale fishing communities on South Africa’s Cape 
Peninsula. The study is filtered through the theoretical framework of Pierre Bourdieu 
and other critical scholars, so as to reveal the material and symbolic forms of power and 
strategic practices that manifested through processes of representation and participation. 
This thesis demonstrates that community-based representation and public participation 
can serve as mechanisms for dominant actors to exercise and increase their power, while 
undermining rather than supporting the democratic interests and efforts of small-scale 
fishers. Drawing on this research on the Cape Peninsula, and on the theorising of 
Bourdieu and other critical scholars, this thesis concludes by suggesting how power can 
be brought into the analysis and theorisation of fisheries governance. In particular, this 
thesis proposes a real politik perspective as a means to understand how structural and 
micro-political power dynamics constrain the possibilities for democratic small-scale 
fisher representation and participation in fisheries governance processes.  
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CHAPTER ONE  
POWER AND DEMOCRACY IN FISHERIES GOVERNANCE: 
AN INTRODUCTION  
 
 “So what we ask is: what is the value of the constitution … where they exclude the poor fishermen, from their resources. 
Now is the time, since the democratically elected system, the wheel should turn …”   (Cape Peninsula fisher, April 
2012). 
1.1. Introduction: background and focus of research 
The idea that people have a right to influence political processes which affect their lives 
resonates as strongly today as it did over two millennia ago. Yet the realisation of this 
basic democratic principle in practice remains elusive: established regimes of power 
continue to exert a disproportionate influence over societal decision-making and action 
from the local to the global scale, fundamentally constraining the democratic efforts of 
those who occupy relatively disempowered positions in society1.  
The tensions between power and democracy manifest with stark clarity in political 
processes associated with the control and use of the natural commons. Coastal and 
marine fisheries are particularly fraught, with a multiplicity of actors competing to access 
and control what is essentially an open-pool resource. In fisheries and other natural 
resource governance contexts, there is a strong likelihood that those actors who are more 
empowered will exploit this advantage when engaging with actors who are relatively 
disempowered, as a means to reproduce established patterns of power and benefit 
distribution. However, prominent theoretical approaches to fisheries governance tend to 
promote a vision of political engagement that emphasises inclusive, collaborative 
partnership between multiple and divergent state and non-state actors (see Ostrom 1990, 
Berkes et al. 2001, Pomeroy 2001, Bavinck et al. 2005, Jentoft et al. 2007, Kooiman et al. 
                                                 
1 The concept of ‘power’ can be understood in many different ways, and attempts to define this concept 
will inevitably be incomplete and contested. A detailed discussion of power will be presented in Chapter 
Two, but at this point it should suffice to indicate that I am conceiving of power broadly as: the capacities, 
structures and practices through which individual and institutional actors influence the thought and action of other 
actors. From this perspective, power has a ‘visible’, ‘concrete’ - or material - dimension that manifests 
through physical force, economic coercion and other empirically verifiable social phenomena (Wolf 1990, 
Isaac 1992). The material dimension of power exists in dialectical relation to the ‘invisible’, ‘intangible’ - or 
symbolic - dimension of power, which manifests through language, ideology, and other non-empirical 
social phenomena (Bourdieu 1989, Foucault 1990, Lukes 2005).  
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2008, Mahon et al. 2009, Pitcher et al. 2009). Yet some scholars argue that these 
theoretical approaches largely omit power from view (Bene and Neiland 2006, Davis and 
Ruddle 2012). There is therefore a need to address this lacuna by bringing power to the 
centre of analysis and theorising of fisheries governance.  
In an attempt to address this important theoretical gap, this thesis explores the tensions 
between power and democracy in the context of fisheries governance in South Africa, 
where the post-apartheid transition has signalled the opening of democratic space for 
disenfranchised small-scale fishing communities to be included in, and to influence 
fisheries policy and management processes. In particular, this thesis focuses on the 
manifestations of power in this newly opened democratic space through a study of 
community-based political representation and public participation - two of the central, 
intertwined mechanisms presumed to facilitate democratic fisheries governance 
processes in South Africa. Based on ethnographic research conducted in three coastal 
communities on the Cape Peninsula, this thesis explores how community-based political 
representation and public participation unfold in practice, with a view to demonstrating  
how fisheries governance processes are shaped by asymmetrical power relations and 
strategic practices. 
This research therefore draws attention to some of the possible tensions between power 
and democracy that are underestimated or concealed by contemporary approaches to 
fisheries governance theory. In an effort to confront this theoretical gap, the power 
dynamics and micro-politics of representation and participation on the Cape Peninsula 
will be viewed through the theoretical lens of Pierre Bourdieu (1986, 1989, 1998) and 
other critical scholars such as Bent Flyvbjerg (1998) and Stephen Lukes (2005), who 
have grappled extensively with the material and symbolic dimensions of power. By 
distilling the ethnographic evidence from the Cape Peninsula through this critical 
theoretical filter, this thesis brings power to the centre of analysis and theorisation of 
fisheries governance, and in so doing, seeks to contribute towards addressing the lacuna 
evident in prominent contemporary approaches to fisheries governance theory.  
1.2. Politics without politics? Orthodox theoretical approaches to 
fisheries governance 
3 | P a g e  
 
There has been a marked shift over the last two decades in the theorisation of how 
fisheries should be governed and managed. A growing number of scholars have argued 
for a re-configuration of the systems through which fisheries are governed - one that is 
better able to respond to the increasingly vast and complex anthropogenic pressures 
being placed upon coastal and marine fisheries species (Holling 1986, Ostrom 1990, 
Ludwig et al. 1993, Berkes and Folke 1998, Bavinck et al. 2005, Garcia et al. 2005, Pauly 
et al. 2005, Ward et al. 2002, Mahon et al. 2009). One of the guiding metaphors for this 
reconfiguration is that of a shift from governing to governance. In the context of fisheries, 
the term ‘governance’ has come to refer to a progression from centralised, state-centric 
fisheries policy and management processes based on scientific knowledge, towards 
polycentric horizontally-networked processes based on the knowledge and active 
involvement of actors beyond the state (Bavinck et al. 2005, Kooiman et al. 2008, Mahon 
et al. 2009).   
Social science scholars working in the field of fisheries have tended to theorise this 
engagement between multiple state and non-state actors in terms of inclusive, 
collaboration and partnership, while de-emphasising the power dynamics that are 
fundamental to governance processes. These theoretical approaches within fisheries 
closely resemble a wider discourse disseminated by global political, economic and 
academic institutions. This ‘new governance’ discourse valorises collaborative 
engagement between actors from the state, private sector and civil society, while 
omitting crucial concepts such as “‘capitalism’, ‘class’, ‘exploitation’, ‘domination’, and  
‘inequality’”, which “are conspicuous by their absence ...” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 
2001: 1). Put another way, the ‘new governance’ discourse posits a form of governing 
from which politics - understood in the broad sense of unequal power relations, strategic 
contestation and conflicting interests - have been effectively expunged.  The ‘new 
governance’ discourse has been promoted vigorously by influential scholars of 
management science, public administration, international relations, development and 
natural resource management (Rhodes 1999, Kooiman 1999, Sowman and Wynberg 
2014). This approach to societal regulation has also been advocated by global 
organisations such as the United Nations, multinational corporations, and the World 
Bank (Guhan 1998, Weiss 2000). As a result, this conception of governance has risen to 
the status of orthodoxy (Marinetto 2003). 
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By applying this apolitical orthodox conception of governance to the fisheries arena, 
contemporary theoretical approaches have the effect of predisposing the observer to 
underestimate the fundamental role of power dynamics in determining the nature and 
outcomes of representation and participation in fisheries policy and management 
processes. It should be noted that many leading fisheries governance theorists 
acknowledge explicitly the presence of competing capacities, interests and agendas 
among individuals and institutions in a particular regime of governance (Kooiman 1999, 
Rhodes, 1999, Jentoft 2007, Bavinck et al. 2013). Yet their theoretical approach seems to 
rely heavily on an apolitical assumption that contemporary modes of societal regulation 
have an inherent potential to foster inclusive and democratic political engagement. They 
recognise that “governance is often conflictive, particularly when interests collide”, yet 
they conclude that “in modern society, governance is mostly interactive” (Jentoft and 
Chuenpagdee, 2009: 554). While this statement accurately reflects the objective 
emergence of new structures and processes of governing, the claim that ‘governance is 
mostly interactive’ seems to imply that relations of power and domination have 
somehow decreased in significance. 
However, doubts remain about the degree to which the ‘new governance’ approach to 
making decisions and taking action is (or could be) a break with the politics of the past - 
in practice, some actors benefit from the nascent institutional arrangements associated 
with this governance approach, while others lose out (Beck 1999, Bourdieu 1999, Weiss 
2000, Bourdieu and Wacquant 2001, Marinetto 2003, McCarthy and Prudham 2004, 
Brand 2005, Harvey 2005, Swyngedouw 2005, Davis and Ruddle 2012). Processes of 
representation and participation in fisheries policy and management processes continue 
to be defined by contestation, negotiation and conflict between socially-stratified actors, 
with the multiple and divergent actors using strategies and tactics to position themselves 
favourably in relation to particular material and symbolic benefits. Yet, by emphasising 
an apolitical conception of politics, prominent contemporary theories of fisheries 
governance risk concealing the primacy of power in determining the nature and 
outcomes of fisheries governance processes. Developing a more rigorous understanding 
of fisheries governance requires a direct confrontation with the tensions that emerge in 
practice between power and democracy. 
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1.3. The democratisation of fisheries in post -apartheid South Africa: 
a new governance paradigm?  
The global influence of the ‘new governance’ approach is clearly evidenced in South 
Africa, where the engagement between multiple state and non-state actors is viewed as 
the basis for facilitating the post-apartheid democratisation of environmental and natural 
resource law, policy and management. Prior to 1994, South Africa’s natural commons 
were effectively controlled by, and in the interests of the white minority, while the 
majority of the population were formally excluded from full participation in natural 
resource use and management. However, the first democratic elections in 1994 signalled 
the opening of political space for those citizens who had been excluded during apartheid 
to gain access to South Africa’s natural resources, to be actively included in policy and 
management processes through political representation and public participation 
(Hersoug and Isaacs 2001, Isaacs 2006, Van Sittert 2006, Isaacs et al. 2007, Sowman et al. 
2014).   
Today, environmental policy and law-making in post-apartheid South Africa is guided 
by the national Constitution (1996), which guarantees the rights of all citizens to have 
equitable access, representation and participation in relation to the use and governance 
of the natural commons2. In the context of fisheries, post-apartheid policy and legislation 
requires state management agencies to engage directly with fisheries resource user 
groups, to ensure that include fisheries governance processes are equitable and 
democratic. These statutory mechanisms include the National Environmental 
Management Act (NEMA) (1998) (which is the overarching environmental legislation in 
South Africa), the Integrated Coastal Management Act (ICMA) (2009), the Marine 
Living Resources Act (MLRA) (1998), and the new Small-scale Fishing Policy (2012).  
New theoretical approaches to fisheries governance have also been introduced which 
provide alternative perspectives to the top-down, exclusionary approach that defined 
fisheries management and policy-making in the apartheid era.  Drawing on the ‘new 
governance’ discourse, these theoretical approaches articulate a vision of fisheries 
governance that emphasises collaborative partnership between small-scale fishing 
communities, state management agencies, and fisheries scientists. Examples of these 
approaches include ‘Co-management’ and ‘Interactive Governance Theory’ (IGT), 
                                                 
2 Republic of South Africa. 1996. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No. 108 of 1996. 
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which have been applied to small-scale fisheries governance by social science researchers 
(Isaacs 2012), as well as the ‘Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries’ (EAF), which has been 
applied to large-scale commercial fisheries governance by a number of fisheries scholars 
working primarily in the natural sciences (Cochrane et al. 2004, Moloney et al. 2004, 
Paterson and Peterson 2009).  
However, despite the post-apartheid reforms of South Africa’s fisheries law and policy, 
and the introduction of alternative theoretical approaches to fisheries governance which 
promote collaborative engagement between multiple state and non-state actors, fisheries   
continue to be governed largely according to a centralised, top-down approach (Van 
Sittert 2006). In practice, fisheries in South Africa are characterised by profound 
structural inequalities of power between small-scale fishing communities, the state and 
industrial fishing companies. These radically unequal power relations constitute a 
significant barrier to the implementation of post-apartheid fisheries legal and policy 
reforms, and to the application of new theoretical approaches to fisheries governance. 
In South Africa, the state has retained ultimate decision-making authority, and operates 
within a neoliberal (or free-market) macro-economic policy framework that hinders the 
state’s ability to enact the democratic reforms mandated by the national Constitution, 
NEMA, the ICMA, and the MLRA (Sowman et al. 2014). At the same time, industrial 
fishing companies exercise considerable political and economic power in the governing 
of fisheries in South Africa. Despite post-apartheid fisheries reforms, these companies 
have retained a dominant position in terms of the allocation of fishing rights, and the 
formulation of fishing law, policy and management (Van Sittert 2006, Ponte and Van 
Sittert 2007). In addition, fisheries science has played a key role in providing ideological 
support for the dominance of the state and industry, and continues to legitimise the 
maintenance of existing relations of power and benefit distribution (for example, through 
the promotion of the of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ discourse) (Van Sittert 1995). 
There are also significant asymmetries of power within coastal communities themselves. 
In many communities, local elites (defined here as people who occupy positions of 
relative political, economic or cultural power within a specific geographic area or 
community) have monopolised the role of fisher representatives as a means to capture 
the political space and economic opportunities that have emerged for disenfranchised 
small-scale fishers after 1994 (Hersoug and Isaacs 2001, Isaacs 2013).  
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Consequently, the ability of relatively less empowered groups - such as small-scale 
fishing communities - to engage as collaborative partners with the state, capital and 
science is inhibited (Hara and Nielsen 2003, Hauck and Sowman 2003, Isaacs et al. 2007, 
Isaacs 2012). While the post-apartheid dispensation has opened political space for small-
scale fishing communities to exercise their democratic rights to equitable access to 
fisheries resources, and to participation and representation in fisheries governance 
processes, these communities have been forced to pursue these rights from a position of 
significant disadvantage in terms of political and economic power.  
Despite their position of disadvantage, it should be stressed that small-scale fishers have 
achieved some historic successes post-1994, (Sowman et al. 2014). In 2007, they won a 
court case that compelled the national state fisheries department to accommodate their 
interests by providing them with immediate material assistance (through the allocation of 
‘interim relief’ fishing permits), and through the formulation of a national policy 
specifically for small-scale fishers3. Another significant success came in 2012 with the 
gazetting of the small-scale fishing policy (SSF policy), which was initiated and shaped 
to considerable extent by extensive fisher representation and participation4. Nevertheless, 
the basic balance of forces that prevailed in the fisheries arena during apartheid appears 
largely intact, with the state, capital and science occupying a dominant position, and 
small-scale fishing communities continuing to struggle to meet their basic needs.  
There is thus a fundamental tension between the democratic reform of fisheries policy 
and law in South Africa, and the profound structural inequalities of power that shape 
how fisheries governance processes unfold in practice. Yet, the significance of this 
tension between democracy and power in South African fisheries governance appears to 
be obscured when viewed through the lens of contemporary theoretical perspectives such 
as co-management, IGT and EAF. This can be argued to the extent that these theoretical 
perspectives emphasise both the possibility and desirability for relatively disempowered 
groups such as small-scale fishers to engage as collaborative partners with more 
empowered groups within the state fisheries department, industrial fishing companies, 
and the fisheries science community. However, this apolitical perspective does not 
adequately confront the strategic practices and radically unequal relations of power that 
                                                 
3 K. George and Others versus the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (EC1/05). 
4 Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF). 2012.  Policy for the small-scale fisheries 
sector in South Africa. Pretoria: Government Gazette 2012. 
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continue to shape fisheries policy and management processes, and thus appears to be an 
insufficiently critical basis for understanding how fisheries are governed in South Africa. 
 
 
1.4. Rationale for studying power and democracy in fisheries 
governance 
Prominent international developments in fisheries governance theory (such as co-
management, IGT and EAF) have tended to  reflect the ‘new governance’ discourse, and 
in so doing, these new theoretical perspectives appear to under-emphasise the role of 
power dynamics in shaping the nature and outcomes of fisheries governance processes 
(Bene and Neiland 2006, Davis and Ruddle 2012). By emphasising apolitical notions of 
inclusivity, collaboration and partnership, these theoretical approaches predispose the 
observer to underestimate the continued primacy of asymmetrical power relations and 
strategic practices. In South Africa, the role of power in fisheries governance processes 
has not been studied as an explicit research focus, and remains largely unexplored, 
except for a few exceptions such as Hersoug and Isaacs (2001), Van Sittert (1995, 2002), 
Crosoer et al. (2007) and Hauck (2009). At present, there is no body of fisheries 
governance literature on this subject in South Africa or internationally. There is thus a 
limited understanding of how power dynamics actually manifest through processes such 
as political representation and public participation, and how these dynamics may conflict 
with efforts to realise more inclusive, equitable and collaborative forms of fisheries 
governance. 
Yet power dynamics are undeniably fundamental to fisheries governance processes in 
South Africa. Developing a deeper understanding of the tensions between power and 
democracy that emerge through political representation and public participation in 
fisheries governance processes is therefore critical for at least two reasons. The first 
reason is political: the tensions between power and democracy have a direct implication 
for the Constitutional imperative in South Africa to ensure that small-scale fishing 
communities have equitable access to the marine commons, and that they are able to 
actively influence policy and management processes that directly affect their lives. The 
second reason is theoretical: there is a need to address the oversight in contemporary 
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theories of fisheries governance regarding how power manifests in ostensibly inclusive 
and equitable (or democratic) processes of engagement between the multiple and 
divergent actors involved in fisheries use and management.  
 
1.5. Research question, aims and objectives 
The collection and analysis of field data on the Cape Peninsula was guided by the 
following research question, aims and objectives. 
Research question: 
How do power dynamics impact on the democratic engagement of small-scale fishers in 
processes of fisheries governance on the Cape Peninsula? 
Research aims:  
a) To explore how power dynamics manifest through political representation and 
public participation in fisheries governance processes on the Cape Peninsula; and 
b) based on this exploration, to suggest ways of bringing power into the theorisation 
of fisheries governance. 
Research objectives:  
a) Investigate how community-based political representation is practiced among 
small-scale fishers in three coastal communities on the Cape Peninsula; 
b) Investigate how public participation in fisheries policy and management 
processes unfolds in practice on the Cape Peninsula; 
c) Draw on the critical literature and theory of Pierre Bourdieu and other scholars 
to analyse how material and symbolic power dynamics manifest in the context 
of community-based representation and participation in fisheries governance 
processes in South Africa; 
d) Draw on the critical literature and theory of Bourdieu and other scholars to 
analyse community-based representation and participation within broader 
structures and processes of material and symbolic power in South Africa; 
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e) Use the empirical research from the Cape Peninsula, and the critical scholarship 
of Bourdieu and others as a basis to reveal some of the crucial material and 
symbolic power dynamics that are overlooked by prominent theoretical 
approaches to fisheries governance. 
f) Contribute to strengthening the understanding and the theorisation of power in 
fisheries governance processes 
1.6. Research scope and limitations  
To explore the problematic of power and democracy in fisheries governance processes, 
this thesis draws on research conducted from September 2010 until August 2013, in three 
case sites located on the Cape Peninsula. The primary case site was the coastal 
community of Ocean View, where the majority of research was conducted. This was 
supplemented by the secondary case sites of Hangberg and Imizamo Yethu, two coastal 
communities situated in Hout Bay (see Chapter Four). The study of community-based 
representation presented in this thesis is largely drawn from research conducted in the 
case sites with small-scale fishers, non-fisher residents, and local fisher representatives. In 
the case of public participation, research was conducted during participatory events held 
in the case sites, as well as in a range of locations throughout the broader Cape Town 
area. Research on participation focused on a wide range of actors, including small-scale 
fishers, community-based fisher representatives, high-ranking state officials, commercial 
fishing company representatives, fisheries scientists and conservationists.  
The three case sites on the Cape Peninsula, and the participatory events that form the 
focus on this study can be seen as nexuses where a number of interlaced governance 
processes manifest and become ‘real’, thus lending themselves to empirical investigation. 
The key governance processes include the allocation of commercial fishing rights, the 
interim relief system, the SSF policy, and the formation of fishing co-operatives. It is 
within the context of these processes that community-based political representation and 
public participation were studied as a means to explore the tensions between power and 
democracy in fisheries governance. This research will also be situated within the broader 
field of coastal and fisheries governance in South Africa, and within the national and 
global political-economic and ideological system of capitalism, in which local processes 
of fisher representation and participation are embedded.  
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While Ocean View, Hangberg and Imizamo Yethu provide considerable insight into the 
manifestations of power in fisheries governance through the ostensibly democratic 
processes of political representation and public participation, it should be noted that 
these coastal communities are not representative of other communities in South Africa. 
Simply put, they are located in a highly urbanized environment, with relatively large 
populations, and multiple and diverse groupings making competing claims on the local 
marine commons.  Consequently, the political dynamics unfolding in the case sites are 
particularly complex and conflicted when compared with coastal communities located in 
rural areas, where the populations are relatively smaller and more homogenous. For this 
reason, the case sites on the Cape Peninsula should be viewed as ‘extreme cases’ (see 
Flyvbjerg 2005). Extreme cases are not representative, but their ‘extremeness’ means that 
the social phenomena being studied manifest with particular intensity, making these 
cases valuable for generating insights into these phenomena. As extreme cases, the case 
sites bring into stark relief the workings of power relations and strategic practices in 
representation and participation, and as such they shed light on the basic antagonisms 
between power and democracy in fisheries governance processes. 
1.7. Chapter outline 
This thesis will chart the following course. Having provided a basic introduction to this 
study of power and democracy in fisheries governance in South Africa (Chapter One), 
the thesis moves to Chapter Two, which situates this study within the relevant literature 
and theory. More specifically, Chapter Two draws on critical theories of power to argue 
that prominent approaches to fisheries governance appear to overlook the role of power, 
and present Bourdieu’s theoretical framework as a basic point of departure for exploring 
power in fisheries governance. Chapter Three discusses the research approach that was 
employed on the Cape Peninsula, and describes the field of study, the ontological 
orientation of this research, and the methodology and methods used to conduct 
fieldwork. This chapter concludes with a reflexive discussion of the research process. 
Chapter Four introduces the three coastal communities on the Cape Peninsula, which 
served as empirical case sites for exploring power dynamics among small-scale fishers.  
The next two chapters present the findings of this study on the Cape Peninsula. Chapter 
Five describes and analyses the empirical data on power dynamics in community-based 
political representation among small-scale fishers in the primary case site. This is 
12 | P a g e  
 
complemented by Chapter Six, which describes and analyses the empirical research of 
power in participatory processes associated with coastal and fisheries governance. The 
thesis concludes with Chapter Seven, which discusses the power dynamics uncovered in 
this empirical research in relation to both the critical and orthodox literature presented in 
Chapter Two, including a consideration of what this research might mean for prominent 
contemporary theories of fisheries governance. Chapter Seven closes by proposing a 
critical, real politik perspective as a means to bring power into the analysis of fisheries 
governance processes, with the aim of contributing towards a more accurate and 
rigorous understanding of the tensions between power and democracy in these processes. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
POLITICS WITHOUT POLITICS? THEORISING 
GOVERNANCE, PARTICIPATION, REPRESENTATION AND 
POWER IN FISHERIES  
2.1. Introduction: governance, participation, representation and 
power in theoretical perspective  
The democratisation of fisheries governance in post-apartheid South Africa has signalled 
the opening of political space for disenfranchised small-scale fishing communities to be 
included in, and to actively influence policy and management processes via mechanisms 
such as political representation and public participation. Viewed through the lens of 
recent theoretical approaches to fisheries governance, there is an assumption that small-
scale fishers can and should engage collaboratively as partners with a divergent range of 
actors, many of whom are relatively more politically and economically empowered than 
small-scale fishers are. However, this theoretical lens predisposes the observer to 
overlook the extent to which processes of fisheries governance in post-apartheid South 
Africa have been defined by strategic practices and structural inequalities of power, and 
that these political dynamics have constrained the democratic engagement of small-scale 
fishers. This suggests that recent theoretical approaches are insufficiently equipped to 
grapple with the tensions between democracy and power that have been seen to manifest 
in South Africa, and in fisheries governance contexts around the world.  
This chapter will discuss the inter-related themes being explored in this research of 
fisheries governance on the Cape Peninsula, namely: ‘governance’, ‘public participation’, 
‘political representation’, and ‘power’. The literature on each of these concepts is vast 
and intertwined, and for this reason, the following discussion is by no means 
comprehensive or definitive. Attention will be focused on ‘governance’, ‘public 
participation’ and ‘political representation’ as analytical concepts that describe empirical 
political phenomena, while at the same time addressing the genealogy of these concepts 
as fetishes that have emerged from specific political-economic and ideological processes, 
and which have specific political-economic and ideological effects - principal among 
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which is the concealment of power dynamics5. Drawing on wide range of disciplinary 
perspectives, including sociology, social anthropology, and critical geography, it will be 
argued that an apolitical conception of ‘governance’, ‘participation’ and ‘political 
representation’ has become increasingly dominant in theory and policy-making in the 
contemporary period. This orthodoxy promotes a form of governance without politics, 
in the sense that it emphasises notions of inclusive, horizontal and collaborative 
engagement towards shared goals, while de-emphasising the dynamics of power 
relations, strategic contestation and conflicting interests. Following Bourdieu and 
Wacquant (2001), it will be argued that the orthodox conception of politics constitutes a 
global ‘lingua franca’ that de-politicises the structures and processes of neoliberal 
capitalism6.  By so doing, the orthodox view obscures the realities of power in political 
processes of governance, participation and political representation.  
It should be noted that this critique of the apolitical assumptions and de-politicising 
effects of this neoliberal orthodoxy have already been convincingly made by a number of 
scholars working in a range of contexts (Bourdieu 1998, Jessop 1998, Brand 2005, 
Marinetto 2003, McCarthy and Prudham 2004, Swyngedouw 2005, Castree 2008). 
However, besides notable exceptions such as Bene and Neiland (2006), and Davis and 
Ruddle (2012), relatively few scholars have explored this critique in the context of 
participation and political representation in fisheries governance processes. To begin to 
address this gap, it will be argued in this chapter that the neoliberal vision of 
                                                 
5I use the hyphenated term ‘political-economic’ to counter the modernist assumption that politics and 
economics are distinct spheres of social life: in practice, politics and economics are fundamentally 
interwoven (see Nitzan and Bichler 2009).  
6 ‘Neoliberalism’ is understood here as the contemporary ideological and political-economic incarnation of 
global capitalism, and is conceptualised as a complex, contradictory and contested social phenomenon 
which manifests in geographically-specific ways through the interweaving of ideological, discursive, 
political and economic practices and processes (Castree 2008). The term ‘neoliberalism’ means the ‘new 
liberalism’, with ‘liberalism’ taken from its original Western European context, in which it referred 
specifically to ‘free market economics’ (Harvey 2005, Harman 2008). Emerging in 1970s, the ideology of 
neoliberalism represents “a resurrection of the orthodox ‘laissez faire’ economic ideology that prevailed 
until the great slump of the 1930s”, and rests on the premise that capital should be free from “state 
intervention” because this is assumed to undermine the proper functioning of the economy, and 
consequently, the state’s role should be limited to “defending private property, national defence and ... 
overseeing the money supply” (Harman 2008: 7). Neoliberal ideology is supported by flawed ‘neoclassical’ 
economic theory, which employs a reductionist sociology and pseudo-mathematical equations to 
demonstrate the utopian claim that in a free market, “all labour will be employed producing goods that are 
all sold” (Harman 2008: 7). In practice however, the free-market operates in fundamental contradiction of 
neoliberal ideology - a fact most plainly illustrated by the continued reliance of capital upon state 
intervention in the economy (Harvey 2005, Harman 2008).  
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collaborative politics has penetrated the field of fisheries theory, policy and management, 
leading dominant approaches to fisheries governance to underestimate the role of power. 
This chapter brings power back into the equation by situating the contemporary 
discourses of governance, participation and political representation in broader political-
economic context.  The concept of power itself is also discussed to provide a theoretical 
basis for exploring its material and symbolic role in fisheries governance processes, and 
how power is overlooked in dominant approaches to fisheries policy and management. 
This chapter concludes by presenting the theoretical framework of Pierre Bourdieu, 
which serves as a general guide for studying both the material and symbolic 
manifestations of power in participation and political representation in fisheries 
governance processes. 
2.2. The ‘New Governance’: collaborative governing beyond the state  
As with any field of social endeavour, coastal and fisheries management draws on 
powerful images and ideas to motivate, guide and justify particular forms of organisation 
and intervention. These images and ideas constitute a symbolic system that is shared by 
those working in donor agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and 
governmental agencies (Cohen 1976, Abrahamsen 2000). As these ideas become 
institutionalized, they assume a principal position in policy-making and implementation, 
acting as a guiding orientation (Escobar 1995; Williams 2009). We could thus view these 
ideas as “commonplaces -- in the Aristotelian sense of notions or theses with which one 
argues but over which there is no argument” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2001: 1). 
‘Governance’ is one such idea, occupying a central position in the lexicon of 
contemporary coastal and fisheries management, and environmental theory and policy 
more broadly. The voluminous and ever expanding body of literature on governance 
points to its rise as a dominant concept, intellectual paradigm, and political programme 
(Jessop 1998, Marinetto 2003, Brand 2005, Swyngedouw 2005).  
What does the term ‘governance’ mean? There are different shades of meaning attached 
to the term ‘governance’, which partly accounts for its pervasiveness in theory and policy 
- as sociologist Bob Jessop (1998) argues, “it is becoming a ubiquitous ‘buzzword’ which 
can mean anything or nothing” (Jessop 1998: 29). However, despite this semantic 
malleability, the term ‘governance’, at its most basic level, refers simply to the 
“…formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate the public 
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realm, the arena in which the state as well as economic and societal actors interact to 
make decisions” (Hyden et al. 2004: 16). In contemporary theory and policy-making, the 
term governance is also used in to refer more specifically to the dramatic re-configuration 
of the structures and processes of governing - from forms of governing that are state-
centric, towards polycentric institutional structures and processes that include the active 
participation of non-state actors (Swyngedouw 2005). Most interpretations of 
‘governance’ in the political science literature are based on the premise that the state is 
no longer at the centre of policy-making and decision-taking, a shift that is encapsulated 
by the distinction between government and governance.  
The notion of ‘governing without government’ is closely associated with the ‘Anglo-
governance school’ of the British political scientist Rod Rhodes. This school’s 
interpretation of governance exemplifies what could be described as a theoretical 
“orthodoxy” (Marinetto 2003: 539). The far-reaching influence of this theoretical 
orthodoxy is evidenced by its reflection in the policy discourse of, for example, the 
United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European 
Union (Guhan 1998, Weiss 2000, Bourdieu and Wacquant 2001). Rhodes’ contention is 
that “central government is no longer supreme. The political system is increasingly 
differentiated. We live in a centreless society, in the polycentric state characterized by 
multiple centres” (Rhodes 1996: 657). There is general agreement in the literature 
regarding the existence of a global shift towards new forms of governing characterised by 
de-centred networks constituted by state and non-state actors. As Thomas Weiss (2000) 
observes: “economic and social policy is no longer the exclusive preserve of 
governments” (2000: 800). From this dominant perspective, the basic structure of 
governance is commonly understood through the concept of “self-organizing, inter-
organisational networks that are typically interdependent while enjoying significant 
autonomy from the state” (Rhodes 1997: 15 in Marinetto).  
Orthodox conceptions of ‘governance’ propounded in mainstream theory and policy-
making emphasise a shift away from a political forms and processes that are defined by 
hierarchical power relations and the use of strategies and tactics; towards inclusive, 
collaborative political engagement, characterised by win-win scenarios, horizontal power 
relations, and rational deliberation – in other words, the ‘new governance’ is valorised as 
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a form of politics without politics7. Swyngedouw argues that, “the idealised normative 
model … implies a common purpose, joint action … shared values … and the wish to 
achieve collective benefits that cannot be gained by acting independently … This model 
… considers the mobilisation of resources … from actors operating outside the state 
system as a vital part of democratic, efficient and effective government” (Swyngedouw, 
2005: 1994). The orthodox assumption of governance as a new form of ‘politics without 
politics’ is neatly illustrated by the idealism of the following quote: “In today’s shared 
power, no-one-in-charge, interdependent world, public problems and issues spill over 
organisational and institutional boundaries … no one person, group or organisation has 
the necessary power or authority to solve these problems. … organisations and 
institutions must share objectives, resources, activities, power … in order to achieve 
collective gains or minimize losses” (Bryson and Crosby in Kooiman 1999: 74).   
Ulrich Brand (2005) describes the assumption of a break with the old way of ‘doing 
politics’ as “naïve wishful thinking”, that makes it possible for the new governance 
approach to overlook the continued primacy of power and real politik (defined here as 
strategic, self-interested, zero-sum politics) (Brand 2005: 168). Through the seemingly 
neutral discourse of ‘stakeholders’, ‘networks’ and ‘interaction’, governance theory 
obscures the dynamics of power, and therefore de-politicises processes that are highly 
political. Indeed, part of the appeal of the term ‘governance’ is that it “avoids the 
unequivocally political connotations of ‘government’, ‘power’ and ‘authority’. It 
provides a non-emotive language in which major issues of societal rule can be 
deliberated by experts and officials without making explicit what is implicit … 
governance is safe, balanced and neutral” (Sinclair in Brand 2005: 168). As Swyngedouw 
puts it: “such an idealised-normative model of horizontal, non-exclusive and 
participatory (stake)holder-based governance is symptomatically oblivious to the 
contradictory tensions in which these forms of governance are embedded. These new 
practices are riddled with all manner of problems, particularly with respect to their 
democratic content” (2005: 1993).  In concert with this wider critique, I argue that the 
contemporary orthodox conception of ‘governance’ pre-disposes the observer to adopt an 
overly-optimistic conception of political relations. Yet it is this view of governance that 
has become increasingly dominant as a model for societal regulation.   
                                                 
7 Among the most notorious expositions of this flawed premise were Francis Fukuyama’s ‘The End of 
History’, and the ‘Third Way’ political ideology of Anthony Giddens and Tony Blair (see Rose 2000, 
Callinicos 2001). 
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2.2.1. Orthodox conceptions of governance in the fisheries field   
The increasing ubiquity of this orthodox conception of ‘governance’ in academic and 
policy circles is clearly reflected by its application to the field of fisheries management. 
Scholars and policy-makers have “not been insensitive to, or uninfluenced by” the 
broader orthodoxy (Bene and Neiland 2006: 36)8. As a consequence, ‘governance’ has 
become established as “a prominent part of the discourse on how best to manage 
fisheries” (Chuenpagdee and Sumalia 2010: 234). From the perspective of leading 
fisheries scholars, governance is conceived in terms of the expansion of processes of rule-
making and decision-taking to include actors beyond the state such as fishers, fishing 
companies, fisheries scientists, social researchers, NGOs and conservationists, who 
engage on issues relating to the use and management of marine and coastal species, with 
the aim of facilitating more equitable, sustainable and efficient resource management 
(see Ostrom 1990, Berkes et al. 2001, Pomeroy 2001, Bavinck et al. 2005, Jentoft et al. 
2007, Kooiman et al. 2008,Mahon et al. 2009, Pitcher et al. 2009).  
In accordance with the broader orthodox discourse on governance, a review of dominant 
fisheries theory and policy also reveals a tendency to overlook the primacy of power. The 
interactions between and among state management agencies, fishing communities, 
scientists and industrial fishing companies are often promoted for their potential to 
facilitate collaborative, win-win processes of policy-making, decision-taking, and 
regulatory implementation. However, while this idealised, orthodox view of fisheries 
governance entails the opening of political space for marginalised groups to participate in 
policy-making, decision-taking and implementation, it pays insufficient attention to the 
relations of political-economic and ideological power that structure the field of fisheries 
governance, and the ways in which these power relations undermine the position of 
marginalised groups, while empowering and reinforcing the position of elite groups.  
The application of orthodox conceptions of governance to coastal and fisheries 
management is illustrated by the highly prominent and influential ‘Interactive 
Governance Theory (IGT)’ approach (Symes 2006).  According to its proponents, this 
theoretical perspective “proceeds from the assumption that … interacting is often a more 
effective way of governance than ‘doing things alone’” (Kooiman et al. 2008: 2). In the 
                                                 
8 However, Bene and Neiland emphasise how these ideas also emerged from an “internal maturation 
process” within the field of fisheries itself (Bene and Neiland 2006: 36). 
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application of IGT to the field of fisheries, it is argued that the process of ‘interaction’ 
allows fisheries management systems to draw on a wider and deeper body of information 
and experience, as Jentoft and Chuenpagdee (2009: 558) explain: the “advantage of 
partnership arrangements as governing interaction modes is that they widen the source 
of knowledge, including tapping local knowledge, and provides opportunities for 
interactive learning”.  
The application of an IGT approach to fisheries makes the valuable contribution of 
extending analysis beyond the conceptual boundaries of conventional state-based 
scientific fisheries management. It also provides a necessary counter-narrative to 
modernist assumptions of the infallibility of state-based scientific environmental 
management by arguing for the importance of knowledge and capacity outside of 
specific management agencies. According to Jentoft et al., (2007) governance theory 
constitutes a “deeper and more extensive discourse than the one usually pertaining to 
fisheries and coastal management”. One of the key insights of governance theory 
(indicated by the suffix ‘ance’) is that governing is a process. Instead of fixating on static 
structures of government (as embodied by departmental organograms), governance 
theory urges us to consider the processes whereby different societal actors interact to 
create, reinforce or challenge rules and norms in the public sphere. This brings attention 
to the dynamic nature of governing, and thus to its complexity. Another way that 
governance theory ‘deepens’ the analysis of social relations of governing is that it 
encompasses both the symbolic and material aspects of fisheries (Jentoft, et al. 2007: 
612). Using the heuristic device of ‘meta-governance’, interactive governance theory 
points to the importance of the dialectic between values and management practice. For 
instance, the choice of regulatory measures in a particular fishery is underwritten by 
symbolic configurations (or ideologies) that are usually implicit (Jentoft & Chuenpagdee, 
2009). As Jentoft and Chuenpagdee plainly state: “management tools come with 
ideologies, they are not value-free” (Jentoft and & Chuenpagdee 2009: 556).  
These theoretical progressions are useful for our understanding of fisheries legislation, 
policy and management processes. However, as with the orthodox fetishization of 
‘governance’ and ‘participation’ in other fields, there is an ideological and analytical 
oversight regarding the primacy of power. Despite its strengths, I contend that orthodox 
conceptions of ‘governance’ and ‘participation’ in mainstream theory and policy (such as 
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IGT) predispose one to underestimate the primacy of power relations by promoting what 
appears to be an apolitical view of new, inclusive and de-centralised forms of fisheries 
governance. To illustrate this claim, consider the IGT perspective on ‘co-governance’, 
the form of governance that most closely resembles the political and organisational 
principles promoted by IGT scholars. Co-governance is presented as an approach to 
fisheries governance in which “societal parties join hands with a common purpose in 
mind, and yield some of their identity and autonomy in the process” (Bavinck et al. 2005: 
43). The morass of real politik does not go unnoticed by IGT scholars, who recognise 
explicitly the potential for “negative interactions and exclusiveness”, and the “rejection 
of co-operation”, and therefore, that “appropriate institutional arrangements are needed” 
(Bavinck et al. 2005: 44). However, their portrayal of co-governance could ultimately be 
described as normative, rather than strictly analytical, and appears to elide the issue of 
asymmetrical power relations, as the following quote suggests:  
“A key assumption is that … parties co-operate … without a central or dominating governing actor … 
Inclusiveness lies at the heart of co-governance. This style of governance is only effective when all actors 
are seen as equally represented and are transparently engaged in … open dialogue, communication and 
negotiation. These then result in conflict resolution and collaboration” (Bavinck et al. 2005: 44). 
This apparently idealised, apolitical portrayal of new forms of fisheries governance 
seems to echo the broader orthodox discourse on governance, which is depicted as a 
paradigm shift from conventional forms of self-interested political action, towards 
collaborative partnerships characterized by the suppression of conflict and the expression 
of mutual compromise, with the shared objective of responding to the increasing 
complexities and challenges of contemporary society. Such a view of political reality 
appears to predispose the observer to misjudge the role of power in small-scale fisheries 
governance. According to Davis and Ruddle (2012): “Failure to locate power 
relationships, particularly those associated with economic exploitation and 
appropriation, at the very centre … means that recent governance approaches are not 
empowering for small-scale fisheries” (Davis and Ruddle 2012: 251).  
These recent approaches to fisheries governance are clearly reflected in the South African 
context, where fisheries law, policy and theory promotes inclusive and equitable political 
engagement between state and non-state actors.  In accordance with international trends 
in fisheries governance theory, small-scale fishing communities in South Africa are 
envisioned as partners who can and should collaborate with relatively more powerful 
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actors such as state management officials, fisheries scientists, and fishing company 
directors.  
However, this apolitical theoretical and policy approach to fisheries governance in South 
Arica appears to underestimate the primacy of structural asymmetries of power, and the 
strategic practices which reinforce these power imbalances. The singular focus on 
partnership and collaboration does not allow for a sufficient consideration of the ways 
that small-scale fishing communities (such as those on the Cape Peninsula) are 
constrained in their ability to influence fisheries governance processes. In terms of 
theory, the apolitical orthodox approach to fisheries governance does not adequately 
confront the fact that small-scale fishing communities in South Africa occupy a position 
of radical disadvantage within local, national and global processes of capitalist 
production and exchange, while other social actors such as industrial fishing companies 
occupy a position of relative strength within this system. Yet from the perspective of this 
theoretical approach, small-scale fishing communities in South Africa are expected to 
collaborate with industrial fishing companies as social ‘partners’, regardless of profound 
disparities between their respective positions within the structures and processes of 
capitalism. Furthermore, this de-politicised orthodox theorising of fisheries governance 
seems to overlook the extent to which democratic engagement can be overwhelmed by 
strategic practices that are employed by powerful political and economic actors to 
reinforce and legitimise existing distributions of power and benefits. 
These apparent oversights of contemporary fisheries governance theory suggest a need to 
focus greater attention on the manifestations of power through mechanisms and 
processes formally constituted to facilitate democratic fisheries governance. In South 
Africa, the primary mechanisms harnessed to facilitate the post-apartheid 
democratisation of fisheries governance are political representation and public 
participation. Political representation and public participation are also key mechanisms 
through which asymmetrical power relations and strategic practices manifest with 
particular vigour and clarity. Put simply, representation and participation often serve to 
disempower small-scale fishing communities, rather than empower them. The following 
two sections present a critical discussion of public participation and political 
representation in terms of their dual potential as a means to facilitate democratic politics, 
and as a means to reinforce existing imbalances of power and benefit distribution. 
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2.3. Public participation  
The concept of ‘public participation’ is central to the changing dynamics between state, 
capital and civil society that are symbolised by the theoretical and policy shift towards a 
‘governance’ approach - as Bene and Neiland (2006) argue, “the strong support which 
has been given to ‘participatory approaches’ stems from the same paradigmatic shift that 
supported the governance shift” (Bene and Neiland 2006: 25). Public participation is 
seen by orthodox scholars and policy-makers as a primary means to implement a 
governance approach,  in which “institutional arrangements of ‘governing’ … give a 
much greater role in policy-making, administration and implementation to private 
economic actors … and civil society” (Swyngedouw 2005: 1992). Although defined in 
many ways, public participation is generally understood as “a means of bringing a 
broader section of a given population into public decision-making processes - in a role of 
informing and/or controlling those processes” (Ribot 1999: 1). In practice, participation 
occurs in a multiplicity of forms, ranging along a continuum from: indirect and passive 
participation, where those involved have little ability to influence decision and action; to 
direct participation, where citizens are involved as active agents who initiate engagement 
with government officials, and who have the capacity to influence the outcomes of 
governance processes.  
Salient in this regard is Sherry Arnstein’s (1969) classic typology of citizen participation9. 
She argues that there are “significant gradations of citizen participation”, according to 
the relative level of power that citizens are able to exercise in participatory processes. In 
her typology, the highest degree of participation is termed ‘citizen power’, and refers 
participatory processes in which citizens exercise some level of power over decision-
making and action. However it is the lower degrees of participation that are of particular 
relevance when considering how participation can serve to reinforce unequal relations of 
power and benefit distribution. Arnstein uses the term ‘tokenism’ to refer to participatory 
processes where citizens have the space to “hear and be heard”, without having the 
necessary power to influence the outcomes of these processes (Arnstein 1969: 217). 
Token participation ranges from the unidirectional dissemination of information from 
                                                 
9 While Arnstein’s typology (like any typology) tends to oversimplify the complexities inherent in 
participation (see Connor 1988, Tritter and McCallum), it remains useful as a hermeneutic lens, not only 
for viewing the basic forms of participation, but also for viewing how power dynamics fundamentally 
determine  the nature and outcomes of participation. 
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powerful political and economic actors to citizens (‘informing’); to the “inviting of 
citizen’s opinions” without necessarily allowing these opinions to influence outcomes 
(‘consultation’); and the inclusion of citizen’s input in planning and decision-making, 
subject to the authority of powerful actors who “judge the legitimacy or feasibility” of 
this input (‘placation’) (Arnstein 1969: 220). The most minimal degree of participation is 
‘non-participation’, where powerful actors exploit participation as a “public relations 
vehicle” to legitimise pre-determined decisions (‘manipulation’) (Arnstein 1969: 218). 
Arnstein observes that there is:  
“a critical difference between going through the empty ritual of participation and having the real power 
needed to affect the outcome of the process …participation without redistribution of power is an empty 
and frustrating process for the powerless. It allows the powerholders to claim that all sides were 
considered, but makes it possible for only some of those sides to benefit. It maintains the status quo” 
(Arnstein 1969: 216). 
The potential for participation to either facilitate or undermine democratic practices 
should be kept in mind when considering the fetishization of participation in the 
contemporary period. While the theoretical origins of public participation can be traced 
to the democratic traditions of Ancient Greece, it is only over the last 30 years that 
participation has risen as a central mode of political practice. Today, participatory 
processes constitute “one of the key terrains on which battles over the form of 
governance and the character of regulation are currently being fought out” 
(Swyngedouw 2005: 1993). Public participation has become a guiding metaphor for 
implementing more inclusive and equitable governance processes: there is broad 
consensus in the critical literature that participation tends to be viewed as a universal 
remedy by funders, policy-makers, researchers and practitioners who operate from global 
centres of power in the North. According to Bene and Neiland (2006), participation “has 
become a key element in the rhetoric concerning almost every major issue … Today, the 
concept has taken on the characteristics of a panacea; academic studies, policy 
statements, NGOs or international organization recommendations … that promote the 
benefits of (good) governance, make ‘participation’ one, if not the core element of 
development” (Bene and Neiland 2006: 24). White also observes that “these days… a 
commitment to ‘participation’ … is trumpeted by agencies right across the spectrum, 
from the huge multi-laterals to the smallest people’s organisations. Hardly a project, it 
seems, is now without some ‘participatory’ element” (White 1996: 6). For this reason, 
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“No respectable project can not use this word, nor can get funded without some 
reference to this concept” (Michener 1998: 2105).  
In their analysis of public participation, Rowe and Frewer argue that it “would be too 
simplistic to attribute the growth of interest in participation entirely to greater respect by 
institutional actors for public views on policy issues. There is undoubtedly a certain 
amount of pragmatism involved in endorsing public participation, with institutions 
recognizing that a non-consulted public is often an angry one and that involving the 
public may be one step toward mollifying it” (Rowe and Frewer 2004: 514). The 
symbolic power inherent in the concept of public participation makes it a valuable 
resource for those who seek to legitimise - and thus de-politicise - particular governance 
decisions, distributions of costs and benefits, and relations of authority and control. Bene 
and Neiland point to the “inherent goodness of the notion of participation”, whose 
symbolic potency enables it to pass as “a substitute” for the “true structural reforms 
needed …” (Bene and Neiland 2006: 34). White concurs with this argument, describing 
the term participation as “a ‘Hurrah’ word, bringing a warm glow to its users and 
hearers”, and asserts that this symbolic power “blocks” the “detailed examination” of 
participation processes and outcomes (White 1996: 7).  To the extent that participation 
can be used to legitimise (and thus de-politicise) decision-making and action, it can thus 
be argued that participatory processes serve as potential “instruments for reinforcing 
domination and control” (Gaventa 2004: 34). For these reasons, John and Jean 
Comaroff (1999) conclude that in many instances, participation is a “hollow fetish” 
(1999: 33). 
2.3.1. Orthodox conceptions of participation in the fisheries field 
Public participation has become established as a guiding metaphor in the field of 
fisheries management (Hersoug et al. 2000, Bavinck et al. 2005, Bene and Neiland 2006). 
Participation in fisheries management is mandated by multilateral institutions and 
regulatory frameworks such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Code of 
Conduct on Responsible Fisheries (1995), the Convention on Biological Diversity, the 
Ramsar Convention (1971), the Rio Declaration (1992) (see Raemaekers and Sunde 
2010). In this context, participation is generally understood as a means for non-state 
actors to influence decisions and actions regarding the utilisation and management of 
marine and coastal resources - according to Mikalsen and Jentoft (2008), participation in 
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fisheries management essentially refers to “the inclusion of stakeholders in policy-
making and implementation … it is generally accepted that user groups … should be 
involved in management” (2008: 171).  
In keeping with the wider discourse of participation, the participatory shift in the field of 
fisheries has a strong normative dimension - participation is perceived to facilitate 
collaborative, democratic, and therefore legitimate fisheries governance. For example 
Bavinck et al. (2005) argue that: “Active participation by those affected will make 
management systems more legitimate, in part because it provides them with a sense of 
ownership of the system” (2005: 39 - emphasis added). Kooiman et al. (2008) promote 
“an understanding that broad societal participation in governance is an expression of 
democracy and therefore a desirable state of affairs … we are advocating broad 
participation in governance from a normative as well as from a practical standpoint” 
(Kooiman et al. 2008: 3). Mikalsen et al. (2007: 208) sum up the enthusiasm for 
participation in recent fisheries governance:  
“user-group involvement has largely been justified by pointing to the benefits - in terms of legitimacy, 
responsibility and effectiveness … There has been less concern for the access limitations and political 
biases that may result from a possible ‘mischief of factions’. The underlying premise for much of the debate 
has been a perception of … some kind of formal partnership between government and user-groups … as 
something unequivocally good”. 
This normative conception of participation is evident in recent theoretical and policy 
approaches to fisheries management in post-apartheid South Africa, such as ‘co-
management’ and ‘the Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries’ (EAF). These approaches have 
are based on a governance approach characterised by participatory engagement between 
divergent social actors such as fisheries resource users, state management agencies, and 
fisheries scientists (Ward et al. 2002). Both of these theoretical and policy paradigms 
have been endorsed by the FAO (2003), and the World Bank (2004)1011. In brief terms, 
the EAF paradigm proposes the idea of managing the various social and biological 
elements of fisheries as an integrated whole. According to proponents of an EAF: 
“Stakeholder participation is critical … to the successful implementation of an EAF” 
                                                 
10 FAO. 2003. ‘The ecosystem approach to fisheries’. Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries 4. 
Rome: FAO.  
11 World Bank. 2004. ‘Saving Fish and Fishers Toward Sustainable and Equitable Governance of the 
Global Fishing Sector’. Report No. 29090-GLB. May 2004. 
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(Paterson and Peterson 2007: 11). It is argued that participation “is beneficial for the 
resource, the ecosystem and society, despite the many trade-offs that are likely to be 
required to balance the often contrasting objectives of ecological wellbeing, human 
wellbeing and good governance” (Paterson et al. 2007: 1066). However, the EAF 
perspective relies on an apolitical conception of politics, and does not offer a means to 
grapple with the power imbalances and strategic practices that characterise fisheries 
governance processes in South Africa.  
A similar argument can be made for the co-management approach, which also promotes 
an apolitical conception of participation as a means for small-scale fishing communities 
to share power, and work collaboratively with state management agencies in regulatory 
decision-making and implementation (Davis and Ruddle 2012, Isaacs 2012). Yet like the 
EAF approach, co-management overlooks the ways that participation by small-scale 
fishers is compromised by asymmetrical relations of power. In developing countries such 
as South Africa, the experience of co-management has demonstrated that the 
participatory efforts of fishers have been consistently undermined by unequal power 
relations, a lack of support from government management agencies, and an inequitable 
rights allocation system (Sowman et al 1997, Hara and Nielsen 2003, Hauck and 
Sowman 2003, Isaacs et al. 2007, Isaacs 2012).  
The apolitical orthodox conception of participation which is evidenced in the discourse 
of prominent fisheries management approaches such as EAF and co-management fit 
neatly into the category of ‘mutual gains’ or ‘win-win’ approaches, in which participants 
“are imagined as partners, working towards an optimum solution for both. Harmony is 
valued, while confrontation is seen as disruptive or antisocial” (Fay 2007: 83). However, 
Davis and Ruddle (2012) observe that this as “an ill-defined philosophical and advocacy-
academic approach … for designing … fisheries governance” (Davis and Ruddle 2012: 
245). In practice, it is often more accurate to view participation in fisheries governance, 
not as a form of inclusive and collaborative politics, but as a form of strategic political 
engagement through which fishers, fisher representatives, state officials, fisheries 
scientists, company directors and other actors seek to contest or reinforce established 
patterns of power and benefit distribution. From this perspective, participation in 
fisheries governance is ultimately about political processes in which “each side is aiming 
to get as a large a piece as possible of a fixed pie”, and participants “are imagined as 
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fundamentally opposed, aiming to cut their losses and maximize their gains. Conflict is 
part and parcel of the process as each party works towards its own interests” (Fay 2007: 
83). 
In summary, the concept of public participation has become a guiding metaphor for 
democratising fisheries governance processes (both in South Africa and internationally), 
and has informed some of the most prominent and influential developments in fisheries 
theory and management. Yet, as with the orthodox conception of governance, 
participation has been widely conceived by fisheries scholars and policy-makers with 
insufficient reference to structures and processes of power. In the context of participation 
in fisheries governance processes, one the most important ways in which power 
dynamics manifest is through political representation. Like participation, political 
representation is a key mechanism for facilitating inclusive and equitable fisheries 
governance processes, but representation also has a dark side associated with its potential 
to serve as a mechanism for powerful actors to reinforce unequal relations of power. The 
following section describes the political representation concept in the broad context of 
democratic political theory and practice, and then hones in on its central position in 
recent approaches to fisheries governance.   
2.4. Political representation  
Any discussion of governance and participation must inevitably confront the question of 
political representation. Political representation is born from the axiom that it is not 
practically possible for every individual citizen to participate directly in all societal 
decision-making processes, and therefore some form of representational mediation is 
necessary to facilitate the indirect participation of citizens in decisions that affect them 
(Hobbes 1968, Green 1993, Ribot 1999). As with public participation, the idea of 
political representation has a long history. Its origins are usually traced to the 
development of democratic theory and practice in Ancient Greece, where political 
representation was seen as a primary means for realising the “democratic ideal” (Petit 
2009: 61).  
The notion of political representation as an inherently democratic phenomenon 
characterises the contemporary fetishization of political representation in the discourse 
of orthodox theorists and policy-makers working in the political, development and 
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natural resource management fields. It is on the basis of this close association with 
democratic politics that political representation has become a guiding metaphor. The 
contemporary fetishization of democratic political representation has been traced to the 
wave of de-colonisation in Asia, Latin America and Africa after the Second World War, 
as well as to the Cold War, when it was used by Western countries as a symbolic 
weapon against the ideology of Soviet Communism. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
democratic political representation has become increasingly synonymous with the 
development agenda being imposed on the South (Friedman 1999, Paley 2002). At the 
same time, the end of the Cold War also signalled the increasingly global association of 
democratic political representation with free-market capitalism (Comaroff and Comaroff 
1997, Bourdieu 1998, Paley 2002). Yet, despite the symbolic association of political 
representation with democracy, it can be argued that “political representation is not a 
particularly democratic phenomenon at all” (Rehfeld 2006: 2). Rather, political 
representation is about the making and contesting of claims (Saward 2006).  From this 
perspective, political representation is a practice that is essential, not only to democracy, 
but to all forms of political activity and organisation.  
Political representation has been conceptualised in many different ways (Mansbridge 
2011). According to Andrew Rehfeld (2006), political representation at its most basic 
level is constituted by: someone who is represented; and someone who represents.  In the 
political context, the act of political representation is conventionally understood as the 
act of mediation by a third party, between a constituency and external actors in processes 
of societal decision-making (Brennan and Hamlin 1999, Rehfeld 2006)12. For centuries, 
Western political theory has conceptualised between the representative and their 
constituency in terms of the transformation of a multitude of individuals (constituency) 
into a single social actor (the representative) (Saward 2009)13. Yet the process of 
embodying a constituency is ultimately symbolic, and thus dynamic and contested - 
there is always the potential for misrepresentation between the representative and the 
individual constituents.  
                                                 
12 The term ‘constituency’ is used advisedly here. In practice, a constituency is not a homogeneous group 
who necessarily share the same views and interests, but rather, a constituency is constructed through the 
process of political representation (Bourdieu 1989).   
13 As Thomas Hobbes wrote in the 17th Century: “a multitude of men are made one person when they are 
by one man, or one person, represented” (Hobbes in Petit 2009: 77). 
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We could distil political representation into three basic relationships: constituency-
representative; representative-external actors; and constituency-external actors. In the 
context of this research, the ‘constituencies’ were composed of various sets of actors, 
from industrial fishing companies, to fisheries scientists, conservationists and small-scale 
fishers. The ‘representative’ category was composed of individuals who acted on behalf 
of these constituencies based on varying forms of authorisation. This research focused 
specifically on small-scale fisher constituencies residing in the coastal community of 
Ocean View on the Cape Peninsula, and the individuals who represent them at the 
community level. The ‘external actors’ category was primarily composed of fisheries 
management officials from national fisheries authority, but also included members of 
parliament, fisheries scientists, conservationists, and NGO staff.  
In the case of the constituency-representative relationship, there are a number of critical 
factors that should be considered, including the extent to which the representative is 
similar or different to the people they represent; and the extent to which the 
representative’s interests align or conflict with those of their constituency. The 
constituency-representative relationship is also shaped by the dynamics of power 
between them, which are usually framed in political science in terms of the tension 
between a representative’s responsiveness to, and independence from the constituency they 
represent (Mansbridge 2003, Rehfeld 2006). This tension brings into focus the 
mechanisms and procedures which determine the constituency’s authority and control 
over the representative, and through which the representative can be held accountable. 
Another key relationship is that between the representative and external actors, who can 
be understood as the set of people with whom the representative interacts on behalf of 
their constituency14. The representative-external actors relationship is also shaped 
fundamentally by the extent to which the representative is autonomous from, or 
responsive to the external actors; the ways in which the representative’s interests are 
aligned or in conflict with those of the external actors; and the relations of similarity or 
difference between them. Though the constituency and the external actors generally 
interact indirectly through the mediation of the representative, their relationship is 
fundamental to processes of political representation.  
                                                 
14 The term ‘audience’ is usually used to designate external actors, but I argue that the use of the term can 
be misleading because, in certain moments, representatives and constituencies also become audiences. For 
this reason, I use the term ‘external actors’ to denote “the relevant parties before whom the representative 
claims to stand in for the represented …” (Rehfeld 2006: 6). 
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One of the most critical factors shaping political representation is the extent to which the 
representative is recognised as such. In the context of the ‘representative-constituency’ 
relationship, recognition can be granted through formal procedures such as elections, but 
recognition can also be actively generated through a number of strategies and tactics. It 
should be emphasised here that the constituency is not the only source of recognition - 
although “the represented play a role in choosing representatives”, it is equally the case 
that “representatives ‘choose’ their constituents” (Saward 2006: 301). There is also the 
matter of recognition granted by the external actors to the representative.  Of particular 
relevance for this research is the claim that recognition from the external actors (when 
they are the audience) is ultimately “what matters”, because they are “the relevant 
parties before whom a particular case of representation needs to be accepted …” 
(Rehfeld 2006: 8). In cases where there are significant power asymmetries between the 
external actors and the constituency, and a lack of institutional mechanisms and 
procedures to address these asymmetries, then it is often the case that when the external 
actors accept “John as the representative of some group, he is their representative” 
(Rehfeld 2006: 11). We could view the context of fisheries governance in South Africa as 
just such a case, where the recognition of relatively disempowered small-scale fisher 
constituencies can potentially be over-ruled by external actors such as fisheries 
management officials, because they hold greater political power in relation to fisheries 
governance processes.     
From this elementary configuration of ‘representative-constituency’ and ‘representative-
external actor’ relationships, we arrive at the actual activity of representation. In the 
formalistic conception of political representation, the representative acts as a mediator on 
behalf of their constituency, transferring information transparently between that 
constituency and external actors. According to the influential theorising of Hannah 
Pitkin (1967), the main “function” of political representatives is “to supply information 
…” (Pitkin 1967: 83). However, it is this very process of representational mediation that 
has posed an eternal challenge for democratic theory and practice because the 
constituency, the representative and the external actors are not neutral and transparent 
automatons through which mediation seamlessly occurs, but rather, they are active 
agents operating with their own capacities, values, beliefs, interests and agendas.  
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In his critique of Pitkin (and the orthodox view of political representation that her work 
has informed), Michael Saward (2006) argues that her notion of the transparent 
transmission of information overlooks the extent to which representatives “… are 
actively engaged in constituting certain ideas or images of their constituents … which are 
inevitably partial and selective … The intentions of the maker of the symbol … are either 
ignored or reduced to merely informational impulses” (2006: 300). Yet according to 
Saward, it is these very activities that constitute “… a central aspect of political 
representation - the active making (creating, offering) of symbols or images of what is to 
be represented” (Saward 2006: 301).  
At the heart of political representation is the act of depicting, or ‘representing’ people 
and things in specific ways, in order to convince others of a particular view of reality. In 
the political context, the act of representing someone or something involves an element 
of active construction - it is thus an assertion of fact, rather than the transparent 
presentation of fact. From this perspective, the “world of political representation” can 
thus be seen as “a world of claim-making rather than fact-adducing” (Saward 2006: 302). 
It should be pointed out that the notion of making claims does not negate the fact that 
political representation can enable democratic engagement in policy processes by 
facilitating the communication of particular facts, views and concerns between 
constituencies and external actors. Instead, the notion of making claims seeks only to 
widen the analytical focus to include the aesthetic dimension of political representation, 
and the critical ways that the practice of communicating information through political 
representation is shaped by creativity and performance.  
The process of making claims in political representation involves: i) a claim-maker; ii) 
someone or something that is represented; iii) the claim itself; iv) and an audience who 
receives a claim. An infinite number of permutations can result from this simple 
formulation, thus unsettling the conventional, static model of an active ‘agent’ 
(representative), and a passive ‘principal’ (constituency): through the claims making 
process, constituencies and external actors also become active agents, and 
concomitantly, representatives can play the passive role of an audience (Thompson 
2012). This perspective also reveals the creative element which is inherent in the act of 
political representation: these “representations (depictions, portrayals, encapsulations) of 
self and others in politics do not just happen. People construct them …” (Saward 2006: 
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301). However, these claims are not entirely constructed. Rather they are drawn from 
“familiar contextual frameworks” to be able to “create something new” (Saward 2006: 
303).).  
The point here is that representative claims are necessarily imperfect: all claims carry 
within them the possibility for contestation, which is at the heart of political activity. As 
Saward insists, “facts may be facts, but claims are contestable … there is no claim … that 
does not leave space for its contestation” (Saward 2006: 302). This contestation between 
“competing significations” is “precisely what political debate and dispute is all about” 
(Saward 2006: 311). 
The goal of any claim is to be recognised by an audience or acknowledged as being an 
accurate depiction of fact. Indeed, it could be argued that “claims only work, or even 
exist, if audiences acknowledge them in some way” (Saward 2006: 303). Audience 
recognition is itself constructed, contingent and contested, and is shaped by the relation 
between the audience and claim maker, the content of a particular claim, and the context 
in which it is made. Recognition also depends crucially on the ‘dramatic performance’ 
involved in communicating a particular claim, in which specific linguistic and bodily 
techniques are used to convince an audience of a particular representation of reality, as 
Saward argues: “to an important extent, representation is not something external to its 
performance …” (Saward 2006: 302). From this perspective, we should view political 
representation among small-scale fishers on the Cape Peninsula in terms of the strategic 
communication of a partially constructed picture of reality, and not only in terms of the 
transmission of factual information.  
2.4.1. Orthodox conceptions of political representation in the fisheries 
field  
As with the orthodox conception of participation, political representation is widely seen 
in contemporary fisheries policy and theory as a means to facilitate democratic (inclusive 
and equitable) governance and management processes. Mikalson and Jentoft (2003) 
observe that “Transparency and inclusiveness are currently being hailed as core values of 
the ideal management process, and there are demands for broader representation in 
management decision-making” (Mikalson and Jentoft 2003: 397). In a clear reflection of 
Pitkin’s theorising on representation, this orthodox approach focuses on political 
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representatives as mediators of the interface between fishers, state management officials, 
fisheries scientists and actors from industry, providing an effective means for democratic 
engagement in relation to fisheries governance-related issues.  
However, as Jentoft and McCay (1995) explain “in many countries user groups have … 
broad representation … in the regulatory decision-making process. How this works in 
practice and to what extent it has increased the proficiency of fisheries management is an 
interesting question …” (Jentoft and McCay 1995: 228). Indeed, we should remain 
critical of the widespread promotion of political representation in fisheries as a means to 
facilitate democratic management and governance processes. Davis and Ruddle (2012) 
make a strong argument that the “… state and its cognate international bodies should 
not be confused with an image of benevolent … purveyor of the public interest, fairness, 
and democratic representation; yet, this perspective pervades the assumptions underlying 
the recent approaches to fisheries governance in social science research” (Davis and 
Ruddle 2012: 247).  
In the South African context, political representation is a central component of the 
democratisation of fisheries governance processes. Crucially, political representation 
constitutes a primary mechanism for facilitating the democratic engagement of small-
scale fishing communities in fisheries policy and management processes. There has, 
however, been little explicit research and theorising of political representation in the 
context of fisheries governance in South Africa, and representation is usually subsumed 
implicitly within the theorisation of public participation15.  As with public participation, 
South Africa’s statutory framework is founded on an apolitical assumption regarding the 
potential of political representation as a mechanism to facilitate democratic fisheries 
governance processes, while neglecting to account adequately for the potential of 
representation to undermine the democratic efforts of small-scale fishers, and to reinforce 
the positions of already empowered actors. It is this darker side of political 
representation that must be confronted when attempting to theorise the tension between 
power and democracy among small-scale fishers on the Cape Peninsula. However, by 
promoting an apolitical conception of politics, recent approaches to the theorisation of 
fisheries governance in South Africa (such as EAF, co-management and IGT) appear to 
underestimate the ways that political representation can potentially disempower small-
                                                 
15 McDaid’s (2014) research on the political representation of small-scale fishers in South Africa is a 
notable exception. 
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scale fishers. This suggests a need to focus greater attention on role of political 
representation as an obstacle to democratic fisheries governance, rather than an 
instrument to facilitate it.  
To understand why recent theoretical approaches to fisheries governance tend to 
underestimate the role of power dynamics in determining the nature and outcomes of 
political representation and public participation, it is necessary to situate these 
approaches within broader structures and processes of political-economic and ideological 
power in which they are embedded. In the following section, it will be argued that recent 
theoretical approaches to governance, representation and participation in fisheries (both 
South Africa and internationally) are part of the broader shift in orthodox theory and 
policy-making that has been driven not only by notions of democracy, but also by the 
exigencies of real politik.  The case will be made that the broader promotion of inclusive 
and collaborative forms of politics has emerged, in part because of the potential of these 
new forms of politics to defuse public dissent and legitimise established regimes of 
political-economic power.  Recent approaches to fisheries governance theory tend to pay 
insufficient attention to power dynamics because they are, to a significant extent, the 
product of this pragmatic (rather than purely democratic) shift towards inclusive and 
collaborative forms of politics.  
2.5. Situating orthodox conceptions of governance, participation and 
political representation in the context of power and real politik  
Theories always reflect the social conditions from which they emerge. The rising 
prominence of apolitical conceptions of governance, participation and political 
representation therefore begs the question of how these concepts came to achieve their 
status as guiding metaphors at this particular point in history. As Swyngedouw argues, it 
is crucial to interrogate the basis for the “proliferation and active encouragement (by the 
state and international bodies like the European Union or the World Bank) of 
institutional arrangements of ‘governing’ which give a much greater role in policy-
making, administration and implementation to private economic actors … and to parts 
of civil society …” (Swyngedouw 2005: 1992).  
From the perspective of orthodox policy and theory, there are two primary rationales for 
promoting greater involvement of citizens in governance processes, whether through 
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participation or political representation (or a combination of these). The first rationale is 
informed by utilitarian Public Choice theory, which presumes that governance processes 
can be more efficient and effective if citizens are actively involved in those processes 
(Bourdieu 1998, Ribot and Agrawal 2000, Gaventa 2004, Bene and Neiland 2006, Ribot 
et al. 2006, Mosse 2007). The second rationale for involving citizens in governance 
processes is based on democratic idealism, which aims towards “one of the central 
aspirations of just political governance - democratization, or the desire that humans 
should have a say in their own affairs” (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001: 488). When viewed 
through the lens of democratic idealism, political concepts such as participation and 
political representation have “a warm emotional pull” (Taylor in Blaikie 2006: 1943). 
These concepts are emotionally compelling because they symbolise political instruments 
through which people are empowered to influence processes that affect their lives, and 
through which they are able to hold those in power to account (Comaroff and Comaroff 
1997, Gaventa 2004, Batterbury and Fernando 2006, Blaikie 2006, Bene and Neiland 
2006, Mosse 2007).  
However, it is argued here that orthodox policy and theory promotes greater citizen 
involvement in political processes, not only on the basis of utilitarian and democratic 
rationales, but also as a means to reinforce existing structures of power. In this respect, it 
is critical to locate the promotion of apolitical orthodox conceptions of governance, 
participation and political representation in the context of widespread alienation, 
frustration and discontent with highly-centralised and exclusionary political processes 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 1997, Rowe and Frewer 2004, Gaventa 2004, Mosse 2007). 
Rowe and Frewer point to the “declining public confidence in the processes that develop 
policy decisions, and to reduced trust in those whom the processes have traditionally 
been conferred” (Rowe and Frewer 2004: 513). The politically-conservative World Bank 
has even recognised that: “from the perspectives of poor people worldwide, there is a 
crisis in governance. While the range of institutions that play important roles in poor 
people’s lives is vast, poor people are excluded from participation in governance …”16 In 
this context, there is a strong argument to made national governments, global 
corporations, multi-lateral financial institutions, and development funders seek to 
promote ostensibly inclusive and equitable political concepts as part of a strategic 
response to rising levels of popular discontent and mobilisation which increasingly 
                                                 
16 World Bank. 2001. ‘Attacking poverty: Development Report 2000/2001’.    
36 | P a g e  
 
threaten established relations of power (Comaroff and Comaroff 1999, Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 2001, Jessop 2002, Gaventa 2004, Swyngedouw 2005, Mosse 2007).  
Viewed from this critical perspective, it could be argued that citizen representation and 
participation are promoted, not only for their potential to facilitate inclusive and 
equitable -  in other words democratic - forms of governance, but also for their potential 
to defuse public dissent, and to legitimise the positions of powerful state and non-state actors. 
According to Mosse, these ostensibly inclusive and equitable forms of governing have 
the potential to minimise public opposition and generate ‘buy-in’, thus serving to “re-
affirm existing structures of power” (Mosse 2007: 33). Jean and John Comaroff (1997) 
concur with this guarded scepticism, and describe the rising prominence of these 
concepts as a response by state and corporate elites to widespread anomie among the 
citizenry of developed and developing countries in relation formal political processes. 
They argue that the fetishization of these concepts has to be understood as a defensive 
reaction by powerful actors to the “anomic bombs” that threaten to “explode 
everywhere” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997: 125).  
In addition to this broader defensive reaction, we should also view the rise of apolitical 
conceptions of politics among orthodox theorists and policy-makers as both a 
consequence of, and a factor contributing towards the global influence of neoliberalism 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 2001, Bourdieu 2002, Lemke 2002, Harvey 2005, Kovel 2005, 
Swyngedouw 2005, Bene and Neiland 2006). The contemporary theoretical trend of 
fetishizing collaborative, decentred forms of ‘governing beyond the state’ can be seen as 
a clear articulation of two core components of the neoliberal vision, namely an 
ideological antipathy towards “state interference”, and a valorisation of “collaboration 
and partnership” as “the new mantras of regulatory relations between capital and citizen  
... underpinned by the discursive re-birth of capital as citizen” (McCarthy and Prudham 
2004: 276). This articulation suggests that orthodox governance theory is both a 
reflection of, and a vehicle providing intellectual authority for the neoliberal vision 
promoted by global institutions and agencies of capital (such as the World Bank, IMF 
and WTO, as well as multi-national corporations, economic policy think-tanks and 
business schools). These institutions and agencies advance an apolitical conception of 
collaborative partnership between state, capital and citizen as a means to provide 
ideological legitimacy for the neoliberal project of shifting political processes beyond the 
37 | P a g e  
 
state - and thereby freeing capital and market - rather than as a means to facilitate 
democratic forms of political interaction (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2001, Bourdieu 2002, 
Lemke 2002, Peck and Tickell 2002, Harvey 2005, Kovel 2005, Bene and Neiland 2006).   
A consideration of the rising prominence of new forms of ostensibly inclusive, de-centred 
and collaborative politics should be thus be situated within the context of neoliberal 
ideology, and the political-economic structures and processes of global capitalism which 
the proponents of this ideology seek to legitimise. Following Bourdieu and Wacquant 
(2001), we could argue that orthodox conceptions of governance, participation and 
political representation are part of a broader ‘lingua franca’ (including ‘globalisation’, 
‘stakeholders’, and ‘empowerment’) that de-politicises the structures and processes of 
neoliberal capitalism.  Within this global neoliberal language, it can be observed that 
“the terms ‘capitalism’, ‘class’, ‘exploitation’, ‘domination’, and  ‘inequality’ are 
conspicuous by their absence, having been peremptorily dismissed under the pretext that 
they are obsolete and non-pertinent” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2001: 1)17.  
The intention here is not to argue against the potential value of de-centred, collaborative 
forms of governing beyond the state, but rather to highlight how orthodox theoretical 
approaches to governance, participation and representation are implicated in the 
reproduction of neoliberal ideology and discourse. In particular, we should interrogate 
the emphasis on collaborative engagement that underpins these theoretical approaches - 
most significantly, we should ask: what happened to power? In the field of fisheries 
governance, the influence of neoliberal ideology and discourse has led to a widespread 
oversight regarding the issue of power relations - as Davis and Ruddle (2012) assert: 
issues of power and domination “are ignored in the small-scale fisheries governance 
literature” (Davis and Ruddle 2012: 244). Davis and Ruddle argue that recent 
approaches to fisheries governance theory such as co-management and the human rights-
based approach “appear broadly positive”, however: 
                                                 
17 It should be noted that the glaring omission of such terms in the face of their continued presence as 
empirical realities has forced the hand of prominent orthodox economic scholars, who have recently begun 
to incorporate terms such as ‘inequality’ into their analysis and theorising (see Piketty 2014). However, it is 
contended here that the argument still holds because this recent work continues to be the exception to the 
rule,  and politically-incorrect terms such as ‘class’, ‘exploitation’ and ‘domination’ continue to be omitted 
from orthodox theoretical discourse. Indeed, it could perhaps be argued that such incorporation can be 
seen as a reflection of the co-option and de-politicisation of radical political terms and concepts by 
neoliberal theory and discourse. 
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an unintended side effect has been the acceptance of many assumptions that have neither been well 
researched nor proven … such proposals facilitate the penetration of neoliberal values and operational 
modes, thereby betraying the very people claimed as beneficiaries. Such key political-economic 
characteristics of small-scale fisheries as social class inequality, wealth appropriation, and class-based 
exploitation, which must be addressed to overcome poverty, inequity, and powerlessness, are ignored” 
(Davis and Ruddle 2012: 245).  
To the extent that prominent approaches to fisheries governance theory may tend to 
overlook the primacy of asymmetrical relations of political, economic and ideological 
power, there is a need for caution when considering whether to apply these approaches 
in a fisheries context such as South Africa. This thesis contends that the theorisation of 
political representation and participation among small-scale fishers on the Cape 
Peninsula has to go beyond these de-politicising theoretical approaches by placing power 
dynamics at the centre. To begin to explore in the dynamics of power that are concealed 
by prominent theories of participation and political representation in fisheries 
governance, it is necessary to address the concept of power itself. The following section 
presents a theoretical discussion of this nebulous concept, and its relation to the field of 
democratic fisheries governance in South Africa.   
2.6. Theories of power  
The notion of ‘power’ is the focus of increasing attention in contemporary social science. 
Within social anthropology for instance, “the god term ‘culture’ is being eclipsed by the 
new god term ‘power’” (D’Andrade 1996: 96). This has created a tendency towards 
functionalist reductionism, where power has become the new omnipotent concept to 
explain the underlying workings of all social life (Wolf 1989, Sahlins 2002). At the same 
time, the issue of power (however conceived), has been part of analysis and theorisation 
conducted by social thinkers from Plato and Thucydides, to Machiavelli, Nietzsche and 
Weber. 
While a mammoth amount of groundwork has been laid down for contemporary 
scholars to explore the idea of power, it remains an “essentially contested concept” 
(Gallie 1955: 6). This contestation applies to the theoretical, methodological, moral and 
political dimensions of any study of this elusive notion. In Stephen Lukes’ classic 
exploration of power entitled ‘Power: a Radical View’ (2005), he argues that a 
fundamental reason for this analytical and political slipperiness is that to “engage in 
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these disputes is itself to engage in politics” (Lukes 2005: 30). For this reason we should 
be reflexive as to our reason for imagining power to begin with, and that we should be 
aware of “the relationship between one’s motivation for imagining power and the image 
that one ends up with” (Said in Lukes 2005: 62). At the outset, we have to recognize that 
choosing to study power, and the ways in which we conceptualize power, are moral and 
political acts in and of themselves. As Lukes observes: “how much power you see in the 
social world and where you locate it depends on how you conceive of it, and these 
disagreements are in part moral and political, and inescapably so” (Lukes 2005: 12).  
There are a number of debates about how to conceptualise power. Many of these 
resonate with what Bourdieu (1990: 25) calls the most “fundamental” and “ruinous” 
dichotomy in social science: objectivism and subjectivism. A central debate emerging 
from this dichotomy is that between scholars who emphasize the tangible, objective 
material dimension of power, and those who emphasize its intangible, subjective and 
symbolic manifestations. These aspects of power exist in dialectical relation and do not 
constitute a dichotomy - the ultimate objective is to integrate these different perspectives. 
However, this research contends that the relatively one-dimensional view of political 
relations in mainstream fisheries management theory and policy requires that this thesis 
conceptualises power from both a material and symbolic perspective. This dual-
conceptualisation foregrounds the less visible manifestations of power in coastal and 
fisheries management. 
2.6.1. The material dimension of power 
The material dimension of power is conceptualised here principally in terms of the 
political-economic structures which constrain the agency of some actors and enable the 
agency of others, and which set the conditions for their involvement in political and 
economic processes.  For this reason, a study of power in participation and political 
representation in fisheries governance is incomplete without analysing what Jeffrey Isaac 
(1992) calls the “enduring powers … that are brought to bear in interaction” (Isaac 1992: 
41). Eric Wolf also emphasises “structural power” as being of primary significance 
because it shapes “the social field of action so as to render some kinds of action possible, 
while making others less possible or impossible … questions of political economy … 
touch on a lot of what goes on in the real world, that constrains, inhibits or promotes 
what people do or cannot do” (1990: 587).   
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A consideration of structural power in the contemporary era focuses attention on the 
global political-economic system of neoliberal capitalism which Patrick Bond (2003) 
describes as a form of ‘global apartheid’ founded on the ‘free market’. The prominent 
international investor George Soros observes that: “the global market, as it functions, is 
really an uneven playing field. The centre is much better situated than the periphery 
countries. And it is better situated not just because it is wealthy, but also because it 
controls the system” (Soros in Bond 2003: viii).  Following Kovel (2005), the structures 
and processes of capitalism constitute a global ‘force field’ to which local and national 
politics are increasingly subject. Though this global force field is not monolithic, 
omnipotent, or unchallenged by counterforces in society (Harvey 2005, Kovel 2005, 
Bond 2004), it has “placed real limits on the practical potential of localised or ‘bottom-
up’ political action… In the asymmetrical scale politics of neoliberalism … international 
institutions and actors” are “gaining power without responsibility” (Peck and Tickell 
2002: 386). 
Within this global political-economic system, there has also been a ‘scaling up’ of 
regulatory arrangements and processes to the level of global ‘multilateral’ governing 
institutions (in concert with the trend towards de-centralisation discussed earlier) 
(Dryzek 1992). The term ‘scaling-up’ has been used to analyse emerging forms of 
neoliberal governance which often involve “international institutions with little to no 
transparency or accountability” (McCarthy and Prudham 2004: 275). A range of global 
compacts, conventions and summits dealing with biodiversity, sustainable development 
and global warming bring together actors from civil society, states, international bodies 
(such as the UN), and the private sector. These voluntary global governance 
arrangements and processes have effects on national and local environmental policy and 
management practice. At the same time, global financial institutions have played an 
increasingly central role in processes of societal regulation. The structural power of 
global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), and the World Bank enable those who control these institutions to 
shape political-economic agendas on a global scale, with direct consequences for 
governing at the regional, national and local levels (Weiss 2000, Peck and Tickell 2002, 
Brand 2005). These institutions are ostensibly economic by definition - their primary role 
being to administer the global system of trade and production - yet they wield immense 
(but heavily contested) political influence over, for example, national environmental 
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policy arenas (Ibarra et al. 2000, Larner 2003, Hartwick and Peet 2003, Mansfield 2004, 
McCarthy and Prudham 2004, Harvey 2005, Kovel 2005, Swyngedouw 2005, Bene and 
Neiland 2006, Castree 2008, Hornberg 2009).  
In the view of McCarthy and Prudham (2004), the “connections between neoliberalism, 
environmental change, and environmental politics are all deeply, if not inextricably 
interwoven” (McCarthy & Prudham 2004: 275). South Africa provides a stark example 
of how the structural power of neoliberal capitalism shapes the possible range of action 
for nation-states (Fine and Rustomjee 1996, Bond 2003, Bond 2004, Bond 2005, Bond 
2009, Du Toit 2005). During the post-apartheid transition, the ANC-led government 
adopted a ‘voluntary’ structural adjustment program that has fundamentally constrained 
the role of the state today (Carmody 2002, Bond 2003, Bond 2004, Bond 2005). Bond 
(2003) observes that the process of neoliberal structural adjustment resulted in a 
“narrowing of national sovereignty” in South Africa (Bond 2003: viii). This was despite 
the ANC’s recognition in the (now-defunct) ‘Reconstruction and Development Plan’ 
(RDP) of 1994 that “relationships with international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund must be conducted in such a way as to 
protect the integrity of domestic policy formulation and promote the interests of the 
South African population and the economy”18. Yet these relationships have undeniably 
resulted in a narrowing of South Africa’s national sovereignty, as Soros famously 
observed in 2001: “South Africa is very much in the hands of international capital” 
(Soros in Bond 2003: viii).   
The South African government’s adoption of neoliberal macroeconomic policy was 
symbolised by the replacement of the redistributive-focused RDP with the ‘Growth, 
Employment and Redistribution Strategy’ (GEAR) in 1996, and more recently with the 
‘National Development Plan’ (NDP) in 201119. Both GEAR and now the NDP are 
characterised by many internal contradictions, but they share the same preference for   
economic growth and laissez faire principles over strong state intervention in the 
economy and in the provision of basic services.  
While the NDP acknowledges some of the weaknesses of past neoliberal policies such 
GEAR, it ultimately reproduces the same macro-economic vision, citing IMF 
                                                 
18 ANC. 1994. Reconstruction and Development Plan. White Paper 1994.  
19 Though Bond (2005) observes that neoliberalism had already begun to be “inexorably adopted as the 
basis for economic policy-making” by the apartheid government in the late 1980s (2005: 36). 
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economists to make the claim that the South African state should not seek to “replace 
mainstream economics or eliminate the benefits of globalisation ... rather than a policy 
lurch to another polar position, the call is for efficient market policies that also embrace 
social justice, empowerment, and the balance between rights and responsibilities” (2011: 
56)20. The NDP strongly emphasises the promotion of “exports and competitiveness” 
(2011: 93), increasing the “rate of investment” by implementing “measures to reduce 
business costs and ... enhance profitability”, and developing industrial modes of 
production (2011: 106). It defines labour relations in terms of “buyers and sellers (2011: 
111), and argues for the need to “reduce the regulatory burden in the labour market” 
(2011: 113), viewing the preferred role of the state as one of limited intervention, 
prescribing that all considerations about “direct state involvement in productive sectors 
should be informed by the ‘balance of evidence’, in relation to stimulating economic 
growth and competitiveness ...” (2011: 133). Crucially, the NDP acknowledges the 
importance of small-scale fisheries, but explicitly states that they “cannot be regarded as 
a way to boost employment. Industrial capital-intensive fisheries offer better salaries and 
better conditions of employment, and are more transformed than small-scale low-capital 
fisheries” (2011: 209).  
This neoliberal macro-economic policy approach has, in turn, shaped fisheries 
governance in South Africa. In the 1990s, the ‘triple bottom-line’ discourse of GEAR - 
which legitimised the equal valuation of people, nature and profit -  was reproduced in 
fisheries policy and legislation that ostensibly placed equal weight on the environmental 
sustainability, social justice, and economic growth, but in practice prioritised the 
profitability of capital-intensive export-driven industrial fisheries production at the 
expense of the sustainability and equity (Hersoug and Isaacs 2001, Van Sittert 2002, 
Crosoer et al. 2005, Van Sittert et al. 2006, Isaacs 2006).   Another example Similarly, the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) ‘Protocol on Fisheries’ (2001), the 
South African state is required to promote “sustainable trade and investment in fisheries 
and related goods and services by … reducing barriers to trade and investment”21. The 
influence of neoliberal policies is also clearly reflected in the national fisheries authority’s 
own internal policy documents, which argue that “the foundations for equitable growth 
                                                 
20 National Planning Commission (NPC). 2011. ‘The National Development Plan: Vision for 2030’. 
21 SADC Protocol on Fisheries. 2001. Article 16.1a): pp. 18. 
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in agriculture, forestry and fisheries must be created and strengthened by increasing the 
productivity, competitiveness and profitability of the sectors”22.  
Adherence to an orthodox neoliberal policy orientation, and the strictures imposed by 
global financial and trade institutions has constrained the scope for the South African 
state to enact post-apartheid fisheries reforms aimed at addressing historical inequalities 
inherited from colonialism and apartheid. As Van Sittert (2002: 300) has convincingly 
demonstrated, the outcome of fisheries reform for the state has been:  
“paradoxical: simultaneously consolidating its control over the maritime commons, while restricting its 
scope of action in this sphere. This closely reflects the type of interventionist state preferred by capital: one 
able to limit access and provide capital, infrastructure and research, but disabled from determining how the 
benefits of public control and investment are distributed. This constraint has enabled capital to confiscate 
the benefits of state intervention, while denouncing any redistributive impulses as ‘state socialism’ and a 
threat to ‘private enterprise’”. 
The re-distribution of fishing rights has been central to these post-apartheid fisheries 
reforms, and is a fundamental requirement for realising the Constitutional rights of 
disempowered coastal fishing communities’ to have equitable access to the marine 
commons. Yet industrial fishing companies have employed intensive and sustained 
political lobbying and legal campaigns to prevent any reforms that seek to significantly 
re-distribute fishing rights.  Van Sittert (2002: 301) observes that “capital moved 
decisively to delimit the boundaries of state action ... the historical moment was in its 
favour, both nationally and internationally, with democracy and globalisation providing 
constitutional and ideological protection against arbitrary state action ... The market, not 
the state, thus became the only legitimate mechanism for allocating access rights in the 
fisheries”. This observation is supported by Crosoer et al. (2007: 7), who posit that the 
political-economic constraints on the state, and the power of industrial fishing companies 
(as the vehicles of “big capital”) were reinforced “by the embrace of neo-liberalism in 
domestic economic policy, which severely circumscribed forms of state intervention and 
emphasised competition in the global market place as the most important criterion for 
judging industry. This effectively neutralised the threats of nationalisation or radical 
redistribution on large industry”. 
                                                 
22 DAFF. 2010. ‘Draft Integrated Growth and Development Plan 2011-2013’: pp. 47. 
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We should thus be cognisant of “the links between different socially constituted 
geographical scales in terms of logics, processes, and outcomes … so that one or other 
scale of environmental governance is not … fixated upon as if others can be conveniently 
bracketed out” (Castree, 2008: 133). To understand the material dimension of power in 
processes of participation and political representation in South African fisheries, it is vital 
to consider the multi-levelled political-economic structures of neoliberal capitalism in 
which these processes are embedded, and which constrain and enable the agency of 
small-scale fishers, industrial fishing company representatives and state management 
officials.  As Davis and Ruddle (2012) remind us:  
“marine harvesters must engage in exchange relationships. This means full-time fishing demands the 
production of commodities for exchange or sale, and it follows that the material quality of harvesters’ lives 
depends on the terms of economic exchange values. That is, harvesters are impoverished by political and 
economic circumstances they generally cannot control. Thus, the local, regional, national, and 
international political economy of commodity values, wealth distribution and accumulation, power, and 
class are … germane to understanding material poverty …” (Davis and Ruddle 2012: 249).  
While the material dimension of power is of central importance for analysing 
participation and political representation in fisheries governance, it is equally important 
to consider the more subtle and nebulous aspect of power, namely its symbolic 
dimension. The following section discusses the symbolic dimension of power, and its 
implications for analysing the politics of fisheries governance on the Cape Peninsula.  
2.6.2. The symbolic dimension of power 
Power manifests not only as a material phenomenon, but also as an immaterial - or 
symbolic - phenomenon. The material and symbolic dimensions of power exist in 
dialectical relation to each other: they are distinct but co-evolving modalities of power. 
In simple terms, all configurations of material power imply a corresponding symbolic 
dimension through which that configuration of material power is both legitimised and 
contested. While the necessity for analysing the material dimension of power in 
processes of participation and political representation in fisheries governance is self-
evident, this approach can lead the researcher to overlook how power operates in ways 
that are less empirically accessible. The symbolic dimension of power for this research 
brings attention to the ways that dominant ideological and discursive constructs shape 
interactions between those participating in fisheries governance processes, constraining 
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particular perspectives and courses of action, while legitimating others. As Schubert 
(2008) argues, “contemporary hierarchies and social inequality … are produced and 
maintained, less by physical force than by symbolic domination” (2008: 183). The work 
of Foucault emphasizes how power can operate unconsciously through both the mind 
and body of a subject - what Foucault calls ‘capillary power’. From this conceptual 
perspective, which shares a family resemblance to Lukes’ ‘Radical View’, power 
permeates both the body and mind of the individual through endless processes of ritual 
and symbolic affirmation of the dominant institutions in society. Particular modes of 
being in the world become etched onto the mind of the individual, shaping their thoughts 
and actions from within, so that that they instinctively and unconsciously ‘know their 
place’ in society - they ‘govern’ themselves (Foucault 1991). This line of thinking 
suggests that the boundaries of what we define as the political arena should be expanded 
to include dynamics such as ontology, epistemology, ideology, values, symbols and 
narratives. These subtle dynamics are all implicated in the symbolic dimension of power 
relations (see Gramsci 1971, Cohen 1976, Bourdieu 1989, Foucault 1991, Chomsky 
1996, Lukes 2005). In the context of fisheries, the symbolic power of particular 
ideological and discursive constructs is often strong enough to legitimate particular 
fisheries management structures and processes (see Jentoft 2007, Brockington et al. 
2008).   
One of the most insidious ways that symbolic power operates is through the modernist 
discourse of rationality. Rationality is presented as “the main means for making 
democracy work” (1998: 234). However, the axiomatic premise that “the more 
rationality the better” is flawed, because it to the neglects to confront the ways that 
rationality articulates with the exercise of power (Flyvbjerg 1998: 226). In his seminal 
work ‘Rationality and Power’ (1998), Flyvbjerg argues that the “normative emphasis on 
rationality leaves the modern project ignorant of how power works” (Flyvbjerg 1998: 
234). Following a venerable intellectual tradition that stretches from Thucydides to 
Machiavelli and Nietzsche, Flyvbjerg argues that in processes of planning and 
management, “reasoning quickly turns to rationalisation, and that dialogue becomes 
persuasive rhetoric under the pressures of reality” (1998: 5). In situations of political 
contestation between different actors, rationality yields to power: “actions are dictated by 
what works most effectively to defeat the adversary” (1998: 232).  
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According to Flyvbjerg, powerful actors are “more concerned with defining a specific 
reality” than they are “with understanding what reality is”, and for this reason, he argues 
that “power produces that knowledge and that rationality which is conducive to the 
reality it wants” and “suppresses that knowledge and rationality for which it has no use” 
(1998: 36 - emphasis added). In other words, notions of rationality often correspond 
more closely to the interests of powerful actors than to objective facts about reality - 
therefore rationality is not only a means to ‘make democracy work’, but it is also a 
central mode for exercising symbolic power. These observations must be taken into 
account when exploring the symbolic dimension of power in the context of fisheries 
governance in South Africa, where the modernist discourse of rationality has been 
harnessed to legitimise state-based scientific management and commercial exploitation 
of fisheries. However in the post-apartheid democratisation of fisheries governance, this 
modernist rationality has been contested by the emergence of alternative rationalities 
that seek to assert a different vision of fisheries governance based on principles of 
community-based management, fisher knowledge, and artisanal modes of production.  
The manifestation of power in South African fisheries governance processes through 
subtle symbolic forms (such as the discourse of rationality) reminds us that a lack of 
outward conflict, contestation or coercion does not necessarily equate to the absence of 
domination or strategic practices. It is precisely this subtle, intangible nature of symbolic 
forms of power that enable power to be exercised while maintaining the appearance of 
equitable and democratic political engagement. A critical argument made by Flyvbjerg is 
that “stable power relations are more typical of politics, administration and planning 
than antagonistic confrontations”, and that, therefore, “concentration on the most visible 
aspects of power … results in an incomplete and partial picture of power relations” 
(1998: 231).  This alludes to the view of power’s symbolic - and thus ‘invisible’ - 
dimension put forward by Foucault, who asserts that “power is tolerable only on 
condition that it masks a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability 
to hide its own mechanisms” (Foucault in Lukes 2005: 86). Schubert also argues that 
while the symbolic form of power “may in some ways be gentler than physical violence 
…it is no less real” (Schubert 2008: 184).    
The implication for this study power dynamics in the democratisation of fisheries 
governance in South Africa is that focusing solely on the obvious material manifestations 
47 | P a g e  
 
of power that are amenable to empirical research will miss important moments in the 
play of power. Drawing connections between his own analysis and that of Foucault, 
Lukes argues that “power shouldn’t be conceived narrowly as requiring intention … and 
positive actions: the power of the powerful consists in their being capable of, and 
responsible for, affecting the interests of others” (Lukes 2005: 68).  In this sense, conflict 
in fisheries isn’t necessary for the operation of power because the “most effective and 
insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising in the first place” (2005: 
27). Lukes argues that by restricting one’s study of power to conflict in formal processes 
of decision-making, one ignores the fact that what is being observed has - through the 
operation of power - been ‘allowed’ to surface in the observable political arena (2005: 
38). This has direct relevance for the study of power in democratic processes of fisheries 
governance in South Africa, which are framed and administered in terms of notions of 
inclusivity, partnership and collaboration. Viewing fisheries governance processes 
through this de-politicised lens, the observer may be encouraged to misinterpret a lack of 
outward conflict or coercion as an indication that relations of power and domination 
have been sublimated to the point where these relations no longer play a central role in 
determining the nature and outcome of these processes.  
As a basis to begin addressing this oversight in prominent fisheries governance theories, 
the following section presents Bourdieu’s conceptual and theoretical framework, which 
constitutes the basic theoretical lens for exploring how power dynamics manifest through 
participation, and political representation in fisheries governance on the Cape Peninsula. 
2.6.3. Theoretical lens: applying the framework of Pierre Bourdieu 
Bourdieu’s theorising provides a valuable means for exploring the multi-dimensional 
manifestation of power in the context of fisheries governance in South Africa, and can 
thus serve to address the oversights regarding power that pervade contemporary fisheries 
governance theory. The value of Bourdieu’s work lies in the fact that he places power at 
the centre of his theorisation of social relations, and more specifically, that he attempts to 
integrate both the material and the symbolic dimensions of power. For the purposes of 
this research, I will therefore be utilising Bourdieu’s theoretical framework, and his 
concepts of field, habitus, capitals, symbolic power, doxa, and symbolic violence. First, a 
brief description of ‘field’. The concept of field is broad, but therein lies its utility. 
Bourdieu describes it as a “research tool, the function of which is to enable the scientific 
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construction of social objects” (Bourdieu 2005: 31). Field could be described as the 
specific structural context within which social relations unfold. Each agent is constrained 
and enabled in different ways depending on the position they occupy in the field. Fields 
exist hierarchically within broader fields, and have sub-fields embedded within them - 
they are distinct but interconnected microcosms with their own logics (Bourdieu 1989). 
Bourdieu provides the following “simple definition” of the concept of field:  
“a field is a field of forces within which the agents occupy positions that statistically determine the 
positions they take with respect to the field, these position-takings being aimed at conserving or 
transforming the structure of relations of forces that is constitutive of the field. The field is comparable to a 
field of forces, but it is not reducible to a physical field - it is the site of actions and reactions performed by 
social agents endowed with permanent dispositions, partly acquired in their experience of these social 
fields. The agents react to these relations of force, to these structures … while being, therefore, constrained 
by the forces inscribed in these fields and being determined by these forces … they are able to act upon 
these fields” (Bourdieu 2005: 31). 
Bourdieu’s field refers primarily to a “social space”, but, to varying degrees includes 
geography and physical resources - a field is therefore material and symbolic, in the sense 
that it is constituted not only by social constructions but also by concrete places and 
things. In the case of this research, the field is fisheries governance on the Cape 
Peninsula. This field brings together the peninsula’s coastline and marine resources, and 
the various individual and institutional actors who are involved in some way in coastal 
and fisheries governance processes. The field includes laws, policies, discursive and 
ideological constructs and assumptions, and stratified access to resources that equip 
actors to contest the way that the coastal zone is managed.  
The significance of Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the field for this research is the 
principal position he gives to power. Indeed, the structure of a particular field is, 
according to Bourdieu, determined by the balance of forces - or the configuration of 
power relations - inhering in that field. This configuration reflects the relative positions 
of actors within this social space. In addition, a particular field is always embedded in 
what Bourdieu calls the ‘field of power’, which is the encompassing realm of human 
relations that surrounds all other fields.  The interactions between different actors within 
a field are structured by the relations of power between them, and their actions challenge 
and reinforce those relations of power that structures the field. For example, during a 
parliamentary hearing on fisheries governance, the nature of participation by a CEO or a 
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fisher is shaped by their relative positions in the field. These positions are themselves a 
reflection of the structure of the field, or of the relations of power that constitute it.  
Bourdieu brings further nuance to this theorisation with the concept of habitus. This 
concept refers to durable but malleable dispositions, or more specifically, to particular 
unconscious crystallisations of perception, value, and behaviour, or an internalised way 
of ‘seeing and being in the world’ that is consonant with an actor’s position in a 
particular field. In Bourdieu’s words, habitus is “a system of schemes of perception and 
appreciation of practices, cognitive and evaluative structures which are acquired through 
the lasting experience of a social position. Habitus is both a system of schemes of 
production of practices and a system of perception and appreciation of practices … a 
sense of one’s place” and a “sense of the place of others” (Bourdieu 1989:19). Habitus 
could be described as the unconscious internalisation of social structures, as Bourdieu 
and Wacquant (1992: 127) put it: habitus is “a socialised subjectivity” or the “social 
embodied”.  
In the case of fisheries governance on the Cape Peninsula it is possible to see the various 
actors such as small-scale fishers, marine scientists, conservationists, ground level 
officials, state managers, and company executives as having particular forms of habitus. 
Individuals within these groupings will generally share similar dispositions, perceptions, 
beliefs, and behaviour which orient their thoughts and actions within fisheries 
governance processes, though the precise configuration of each individual’s habitus is 
distinct. Because habitus functions at an unconscious level, the tension between different 
forms of habitus (or ways of seeing and being in the world) poses a fundamental 
challenge for contemporary approaches to fisheries governance in which divergent actors 
are expected to forge common understandings that lead to collaborative action.  
In Bourdieu’s theorising, the agents positioned within a particular field have recourse to 
particular capacities - or powers - that enable them to contest or reinforce the structure of 
that field, in order to access its specific material or symbolic resources (Bourdieu 1986, 
1989). Bourdieu uses the concept of ‘capital’ to enable the theorising of the social, 
cultural and economic capacities or powers of individual agents. The value of these 
capitals is specific to a particular field, and their accumulation and use by an individual 
agent produces parallel changes in the agents’ habitus, and in their position in the field. 
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In crude summary, the various forms of capitals include ‘economic capital’, in the sense 
of money or property. ‘Social capital’ refers to the social networks that an individual is 
able to draw from to negotiate their presence in the field. ‘Cultural capital’ is a set of 
knowledge and practices accumulated through the “total, early, imperceptible learning, 
performed within the family from the earliest days of life” (Bourdieu 1986: 47). Each 
agent is endowed with a specific composition of capitals from which they can draw as 
they contest the fields in which they operate. The notion of capital therefore allows us to 
see the nuances within groupings that are often aggregated and homogenized. In the 
context of this research, two specific forms of cultural capital are of primary significance: 
i) the first can be described as ‘institutional-specific’ cultural capital, which refers to 
knowledge and skills that are largely accumulated through formal education, including 
the capacities of reading, writing, and verbal communication; ii) the second form could 
be described as ‘fisheries-specific’ cultural capital, which refers to knowledge and skills 
associated with the harvesting of fisheries species, including fishing practices and local 
ecological dynamics.   
It should be noted here that Bourdieu uses the term ‘symbolic power’ to refer specifically 
to the structure and relative weight of an actor’s composition of capitals (Bourdieu 
1986a). However in this thesis, I use the term in a much broader sense to refer to the 
intangible dimension of power, as manifested through modes such as ideology and 
discourse, for example: the discourse of democracy has considerable symbolic power, 
and thus statements that are cloaked in this discourse are infused with greater political 
force. 
For Bourdieu (1977, 1989), language is a key mechanism through which the symbolic 
dimension of power manifests: language enables people to constitute and order the world 
through symbolic classification, and thus constitute and order people within it. Some 
categories and classifications serve to legitimise existing regimes of political-economic 
power through a process of symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1977, 1989, 2001). Bourdieu 
(2001) argues that the actors caught up in the process of symbolic violence “remain 
unconscious of submitting to or wielding to it”, and to this extent, the process of 
symbolic violence “is hidden” (2001: 246).  Schubert (2008) explains that symbolic 
violence manifests “when we misrecognise as natural, those systems of classification that 
are actually culturally arbitrary and historical” (Schubert 2008: 184). We could consider 
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the fetishization of apolitical orthodox conceptions of governance, participation and 
political representation as a form of symbolic violence because it attempts to present a 
picture of reality where real politik has given way to a form of politics without politics, 
thus concealing mechanisms of power while simultaneously reinforcing and perpetuating 
them.  Symbolic violence is thus “an effective and efficient form of domination in that 
members of the dominant classes need exert little energy to maintain their dominance” 
(Schubert 2008: 184). As a phenomenon operating at the non-material level, symbolic 
violence can be said to be everywhere and nowhere simultaneously: “the violence is 
symbolic, but the suffering and the reproduction of hierarchies that result are very real” 
(Schubert 2008: 193). In the context of this study of fisheries in South Africa, the notion 
of symbolic violence is crucial for exploring how the dominance of the state, capital and 
science is made, through language, to appear natural and inevitable.  
However, the structural inequalities of power and privilege that are legitimised and 
reproduced by symbolic violence do not go unchallenged. Bourdieu (1977) emphasizes 
that through practice, the structure of a field is open to contestation, and thus to change. 
At the heart of this contestation is the struggle to reinforce or challenge what Bourdieu 
calls doxa – the dominant framework of ideological and discursive constructs that 
maintains the configuration of power relations (or the structure) of that field (Bourdieu 
1977, Bourdieu and Eagleton 1992). Bourdieu describes doxa as “those things that 
people accept without knowing” (Bourdieu and Eagleton 1992: 111)Yet there is always 
the presence of heterodox ideas that challenge this dominant framework by seeking to 
define reality in ways that undermine the structure of the field. The tension between 
heterodox and orthodox ideas allows for dynamism in the structure of the field, which is 
neither fixed nor natural, but is constantly being contested, and has to be reinforced 
continuously to maintain existing relations of power between the agents within the field. 
As this research will demonstrate, the doxa of South African fisheries governance 
includes ideological and discursive constructs that are implicit within the field, for 
example, the discourse of the tragedy of the commons play an important but generally 
unrecognized role in reinforcing particular governance and management arrangements. 
At the same time heterodox ideas exist that are in opposition to this doxa. This 
countervailing knowledge presents a different interpretation of the reality of fisheries in 
South Africa, where the value of private property and profit is secondary to notions of 
community fishing rights and co-management arrangements administered with the direct 
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involvement of local fishers. In contemporary South Africa, the struggle to restore the 
historical rights of artisanal fishers has brought the tension between doxa and heterodoxy 
to the centre of the political stage.  
2.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a theoretical and critically-reflexive discussion of the key 
concepts that will be explored in the following ethnographic chapters. The concepts of 
governance, participation, political representation, and power were discussed in terms of 
two perspectives: an apolitical orthodox perspective, and a critical perspective. Drawing 
on the work of scholars writing from a critical perspective, it was asserted that the 
orthodox theorisation of politics underestimates the continued primacy of asymmetrical 
power relations in seemingly democratic processes. Furthermore, this chapter argued 
that the apolitical orthodoxy has penetrated the field of fisheries theory and policy-
making, with the result that many prominent approaches to fisheries governance have 
tended to overlook the ways that material and symbolic forms of power manifest in the 
utilisation and management of fisheries species. By combining the theoretical framework 
of Bourdieu with the contextual framing of critical geographers and political ecologists, 
this chapter has thus sought to make visible some of the dynamics of power that are 
concealed when viewing fisheries governance processes through the orthodox lens.  
It is this critical perspective that will inform this study of the tensions between power and 
democracy in fisheries governance processes on the Cape Peninsula. However, before we 
explore these tensions as they manifested in the empirical context of the Cape Peninsula, 
it is necessary to address how this study was conducted. To this end, the following 
chapter presents the research approach, methodology and methods that were employed 
during this study, and discusses some of the important methodological and ethical issues 
that emerged during the research process.      
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY  
3.1. Introduction: framing and conducting research on the Cape 
Peninsula 
Social research is shaped to a significant extent by the approach, methods and 
philosophy of the researcher. The purpose of this chapter is to therefore to present the 
general field of political ecology in which it is situated, the constructivist-structural 
ontology that informs this study, the ethnographic methodological approach, the 
methods used to gather field data, and the key ethical and reflexive considerations that 
emerged during the research process. 
3.2. Field of research: political ecology 
This study of power, participation and representation is set against the background of 
coastal and marine fisheries governance in South Africa, and can be broadly situated 
within the field of political ecology. Although the precise meaning of political ecology is 
contested, it is understood here as the study of “the discursive, material, social and 
cultural dimensions of the human-environment relation” (Escobar 1999: 2). Scholars 
steeped in the epistemology of natural science may argue that a study of political 
phenomena such as power, participation and representation has no relation to nature. 
These scholars may ask: “where is the ecology in political ecology?” (Walker 2005: 74). 
Yet, as David Harvey (1998) argues: “all ecological projects (and arguments) are 
simultaneously political-economic projects (and arguments) and vice versa …” (Harvey 
1998: 182). The fundamental observation that social relations with the natural 
environment are mediated by power and politics has been well established by pioneering 
studies in the field of political ecology, including work by Blaikie and Brookfield (1987), 
Bryant (1992), Blaikie (1995), and Dietz (1999). In line with this perspective, I adopt the 
position that ecological dynamics shape the limits and possibilities of participation and 
representation in fisheries governance; and, to the extent that these political processes 
determine patterns of resource use, management and conservation, ecological dynamics 
are themselves shaped by processes of participation and representation.   
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3.3. Ontological orientation: constructivist-structuralism 
Every researcher operates from a particular ontology, or view of the nature of reality.  
Following the work of Pierre Bourdieu, my ontological framework is ‘constructivist-
structuralism’. In other words, I am presuming that humans ‘construct their reality’ 
based on the interaction between their material environment and the forces of their 
specific socialisation, and that this construction takes place within the constraints of 
particular symbolic and material structures. Bourdieu (1989: 14) defines this ontological 
position thus:  
“by structuralism I mean that there exist, within the social world itself and not only within symbolic 
systems … objective structures independent of the consciousness and will of agents, which are capable of 
guiding and constraining their practices or their representations. By constructivism, I mean that there is a 
two-fold social genesis, on the one hand of the schemes of perception, thought and action … and on the 
other hand of social structures …”    
From this perspective, human experience is conceived as a mutually-constituting 
dialectic between subjective phenomena (perceptions and interpretations that are internal 
to the individual), and objective phenomena (part of a shared social world that is 
external to the individual), and this dialectic manifests through, and is shaped by 
material (political-economy, nature) and symbolic (value, discourse and ideology) 
structures and processes. In this way, the ontology of constructivist-structuralism charts a 
middle-path between strictly constructivist ontologies which negate the existence of an 
objectively structured external reality; and strictly positivist ontologies which ignore the 
extent to which our perceptions of reality are socially constructed. I am presuming that 
there is an objective reality ‘out there’, whose dynamics and patterns can be identified 
and analysed, while at the same time acknowledging that my perception, understanding 
and re-presentation of this objective reality is shaped fundamentally by a dialectic 
between this objective reality on the one hand, and my own subjective interpretations 
and constructions, which themselves are influenced by broader symbolic and material 
structures and processes.   
In the context of this study of participation and representation in South African fisheries 
governance, a constructivist-structural ontology implies that the words and actions of 
fishers, fisher representatives, management officials, scientists, conservationists and 
industry representatives emerge from the dialectic between social construction and 
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objective structure. The categories, values, beliefs, and perceptions that actors express 
emerged from specific processes of cultural construction, which are then mediated 
through the innovations and interpretations of the individual actors who express these 
categories, values, beliefs, and perceptions. At the same time, these actors operate within 
an objectively structured reality composed of coastal and marine ecosystems, capitalist 
relations of economic production, and a state-based legislative and fisheries management 
system. From a constructivist-structural perspective, these are the basic structures that 
determine, to a significant extent, the range of possible thought and action for the fishers, 
fisher representatives, management officials, scientists, conservationists and industry 
representatives in processes of participation and political representation. It is this 
dialectic between construction and structure that provides the ontological orientation for 
this PhD study.  
3.4. Rationale for a case study approach  
The decision to conduct research in three case sites on the Cape Peninsula was informed 
by the case study approach, which recognises the value of grounded, context-specific 
knowledge. There is considerable debate within the social sciences about the merit of this 
approach, with some scholars arguing that case studies are fundamentally context-
dependent, and therefore they do not provide a basis for generating and testing theories 
(Dogan and Pelassey 1990, Diamond 1996). However, this research adopts a different 
view of the case study approach, following the principle that “one good case may 
illuminate an entire world” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997: 127). Bent Flyvbjerg (2006) 
makes a strong argument for the value of case study research, and challenges the claim 
that case studies are too specific to generate insights beyond the case study itself. He 
argues that “the closeness of the case study to real-life situations and its multiple wealth 
of details” are important “for the development of a nuanced view of reality, including the 
view that human behaviour cannot be meaningfully understood” in terms of “rule 
governed acts” (Flyvbjerg 2006: 223). Case study research focuses on concrete practices 
more than on formal rules, and the researcher “is not satisfied by learning about only 
those parts of practices that are open to public scrutiny” (Flyvbjerg 2006: 240).   
Of direct relevance for this research on the Cape Peninsula is Flyvbjerg’s argument 
regarding the value of ‘atypical’ and ‘extreme’ case studies for providing insight into 
social phenomena. Flyvbjerg asserts that the “typical or average case is often not the 
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richest in information”, and that “extreme cases often reveal more information because 
they activate more actors and more basic mechanisms in the situation studied” 
(Flyvbjerg 2006: 229). Extreme (or ‘deviant’) cases are “unusual” in some way, and their 
dynamics “can be especially problematic” in terms of a particular social issue (Flyvbjerg 
2006: 230).  Consequently, extreme cases are potentially valuable because they make 
visible some of the wider dynamics that underpin the phenomena being analysed, as 
Flyvbjerg states: “it is often more important to clarify the deeper causes behind a given 
problem and its consequences than to describe the symptoms of the problem and how 
frequently they occur” (Flyvbjerg 2006: 229). Furthermore, the starkness with which 
social phenomena manifest in extreme cases makes them “well-suited for getting a point 
across in an especially dramatic way …” (Flyvbjerg 2006: 229).  
Briefly put, the case sites on the Cape Peninsula could be classified as atypical in relation 
to the majority of coastal communities in South Africa, in the sense that most coastal 
communities in South Africa were located in rural areas, with small, broadly 
homogenous populations, and relatively few actors competing to harvest local marine 
and coastal species; while the communities on the Cape Peninsula were situated in a 
highly urbanised area, with a large, heterogeneous population, and multiple groupings 
competing to harvest local marine and coastal species. These crucial distinctions meant 
that the politics of fisheries governance in the case sites on the Cape Peninsula were 
especially complicated and contentious, and for this reason could be referred to as 
‘extreme’ cases. However, this research contends that while the case sites on the Cape 
Peninsula (and Ocean View in particular) may be extreme in relation to other coastal 
communities in South Africa, it is precisely this attribute which makes the case sites 
valuable for research: they provide a stark illustration of some of the ways that power 
dynamics manifest in processes of small-scale fisheries governance in South Africa. 
3.5. Activist research 
A critical element of this research was my role as an ‘activist researcher’. The meaning of 
this term is highly contested, and is used to refer to a wide range of activities, from 
developing research goals and objectives in consultation with research participants, to 
playing a direct political role in the field of study. In the case of this PhD study, I use the 
term ‘activist researcher’ to refer simply to a researcher who uses their skills and 
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resources to provide direct practical assistance to research participants through the 
research process, according to the needs expressed by the participants themselves.  
There has been heated debate among social anthropologists regarding the merits of this 
approach to ethnographic research: some have critiqued activist research by arguing that 
it undermines the objectivity of the ethnographic process (D’Andrade 1995), while others 
argue that, in situations of social injustice, ethnographers have an ethical obligation to be 
politically active in the field of study (Scheper-Hughes 1995). While more extreme forms 
of activist research (in which the researcher seeks to intervene according to a political 
agenda) are undoubtedly problematic, there are certain contexts where the provision of 
practical support to research participants can be helpful, both to the research participants 
and to the researcher. Given the conditions of economic and political-economic 
marginalisation in which much of this research was conducted, I believe there was an 
imperative to make some kind of practical contribution to research participants during 
the fieldwork process, while maintaining a critical perspective regarding the impact this 
approach might have on the rigour of this research.  
To this end, I used my knowledge and skills during this research to assist several fishers 
and fisher representatives in their endeavours to exercise their democratic rights through 
various channels of participation. In Ocean View, I sought to assist one of the local fisher 
representatives (referred to as OV Veteran Fisher 5) by editing some of his formal written 
submissions to DAFF, providing research assistance, and informing him of current 
governance-related developments (principally the SSF policy process). I played the same 
activist researcher role (though to a much lesser degree) in the supplementary case sites 
of Hangberg and Imizamo Yethu. My efforts centred on one particular process in April 
2012, in which members of both communities sought to obtain a meeting with a member 
of parliament. I also accompanied this grouping on the day of their meeting with this 
official (see Chapter Six).   
While the benefits that research participants in the case sites may have obtained from my 
efforts as an activist researcher were miniscule at best, these efforts yielded considerable 
benefits for this study, and proved highly effective as a means to conduct participant-
observation. As an activist researcher, I had privileged access to uncensored data 
regarding power, representation and participation at the community level. To some 
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extent, I was also able engage with research participants as a colleague and therefore an 
insider, rather than as an outsider who was merely extracting information.  
3.6. Methodology: ethnography  
To explore how people construct their reality within particular symbolic and material 
structures, I employed the qualitative methodology of ethnography. Social 
anthropologist David Graeber (2004) describes this methodology as follows: “when one 
carries out an ethnography, one observes what people do, and then tries to tease out the 
hidden symbolic, moral, or pragmatic logics that underlie their actions; one tries to get at 
the way people’s habits and actions makes sense in ways that they are not themselves 
completely aware of” (Graeber 2004: 11). In straightforward terms, ethnography is a 
social research methodology that involves spending a prolonged period of time 
physically immersing oneself in a field site, making an intimate and detailed study of 
people’s speech and actions to try and reveal what is usually taken for granted by the 
research participants. This research was defined by the ethnographic methodology, 
which was employed to conduct study of what could be called the micro-political 
dimension of power, political representation and participation in South African fisheries 
governance – in other words, this study focused heavily on the agency and practices of 
individual actors (for which ethnography is particularly well-suited). 
The understanding and practice of ethnography has changed significantly since this 
methodology first emerged at the start of the 20th Century. The early pioneering 
ethnographers such as Malinowski, Hadden and Rivers were informed by what 
philosopher Henry Lefebvre (1995) calls the “cocksure conviction” of modernist logic 
(1995: 2). According to this logic, ethnography was seen as a positivist scientific 
endeavour, in which the ethnographer produced empirical findings regarding the 
essential nature of a particular social group, whose structures and functions could be 
identified and understood with the same detachment and certainty that scientists had 
achieved in relation to the natural laws of physics and biology (Stocking 1992).   
However, the dominance of positivist ethnography began to be challenged in the 1970s 
during the rise of post-modern philosophy and social theory, which catalysed a move 
towards an interpretive research paradigm (Geertz 1973, Clifford and Marcus 1986, 
Marcus and Fischer 1986, Stocking 1992). From this perspective, interpretive scholars 
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concluded that “ethnographic truths are … inherently partial” (Clifford 1986: 7). In this 
view, every stage of the ethnographic enterprise is shaped by the subjectivities of the 
ethnographer and the research participant, and the relationship between them in terms of 
culture, race, gender and class (Marcus and Fischer 1986). Crucially, the interpretive 
approach recognised that ethnography is not a purely apolitical scholarly exercise, but a 
political act shaped by the relations of power between ethnographer and research 
participant, and the broader structures of power in which a particular ethnographic 
process is embedded.  
Despite these insights, interpretive ethnography has been critiqued by positivist-inclined 
scholars who argue that interpretation is too subjective a basis to make scientific claims, 
and that it therefore poses fundamental challenges to traditional social science notions of 
verification and generalizability (Jacobson 1991). Political economists Jonathan Nitzan 
and Shimshon Bichler (2009) observe that post-modern scholars disparage social 
research aimed at discovering a semblance of objective truth, and “deny the possibility of 
a universal logic – which pretty much eliminates the possibility of debate. And they are 
hostile to scientific thinking …” (2009: 26).  
With this broad critique in mind, I sought to temper both the uncertainty of post-modern 
interpretive ethnography, and the certainty of positivist ethnography based on the logic of 
modernism: I recognise my ethnographic research reflects an amalgamation of objective 
reality and interpretation filtered through my own subjectivity, and the structures of 
power in which this ethnography was embedded.  
3.6.1. Ethnography at the ground level and high level  
Ethnographic field research was carried out at two socio-spatial levels: the ground level 
and the high level. The ground level is defined broadly here as the social space of 
everyday practices and lived experiences, while the high level is defined as the more 
formalised social space of public interaction in participation meetings, consultations, 
hearings, workshops and other events relating to particular governance processes.  
At the ground level, ethnography was conducted from January 2011 until December 
2012 amongst local residents in three case sites on the Cape Peninsula: Ocean View (the 
primary case site), Hangberg and Imizamo Yethu (the supplementary case sites) (see 
Chapter Four). A relatively traditional style of ethnography was conducted in the 
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primary case, with research being focused on specific, geographically defined community 
over a pro-longed period of time. These ground level case sites served as basis for 
studying the practices and effects of power, participation and representation among 
small-scale fishers and other members of disenfranchised coastal communities in South 
Africa.  
At the same time, a less traditional, multi-sited form of ethnographic fieldwork was 
conducted at the high level. From September 20l0 until August 2013, I attended twenty 
one fisheries policy and management-related meetings, workshops and public 
consultations, that were initiated and facilitated by state agencies, and non-state 
organisations. The ethnographic study of these high level events, which were held at a 
number of locations throughout the Cape Town area, provided the empirical basis for 
exploring power, participation and representation in the formalised, public interaction 
between relatively disempowered actors (small-scale fishers and fisher representatives) on 
the one hand; and relatively empowered actors (government officials, fishing industry 
representatives, fisheries scientists and conservationists) on the other hand.  
By conducting ethnographic fieldwork at the ground level provided access to the 
everyday lived experience of fishers and non-fishers in the three case sites, over a 
prolonged time period. It is at this level where the practical effects of abstract high level 
fisheries policy and management processes manifested and became ‘real’. The ground 
level gave me access to the relatively uncensored articulation of beliefs, perceptions and 
facts by fishers and non-fishers, revealing a side of power in participation and 
representation that is usually concealed by official narratives (see Goffman 1963).  
In contrast to the ground level, ethnographic fieldwork conducted at the high level made 
visible what could be termed the ‘official’ dimension of participation and representation. 
Fisheries policy and management-related participatory events were highly-stylised 
encounters, in which fishers, fisher representatives, government officials, fisheries 
scientists, industry representatives and conservationists expressed their official or public 
views and positions. The relative rarity with which these high level events occurred, and 
the restrictive time limits set for each event compelled people to speak and act 
strategically, so as to maximise the political opportunities that these events presented – 
their message had to be carefully calculated.  Therefore, their speech and action in these 
social spaces can be seen as distilled symbolic expressions of their underlying beliefs, 
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interests and positions. These concentrated articulations reveal in stark clarity the 
essential antagonisms that define the field of fisheries governance in South Africa. 
3.6.2. Sampling 
Research at the ground level was centred on fisher representatives and fulltime fishers 
who were active in the local small-scale fisheries, and who resided in one of the three 
case sites. It is these fishers and representatives who were the core focus of this PhD 
research: their perspectives and interests constituted the point of departure for 
conducting fieldwork in Ocean View and Hout Bay. The vast majority of the primary 
sample group were male crew members, skippers and vessel owners above the age of 
thirty five, who worked fulltime in the local small-scale fisheries. However, this sample 
group did include a number of women fishers participating in this research both vessel 
owners and crewmembers. My sample also included fishers who worked in large-scale 
fisheries (such as the hake and tuna long-line, offshore WCRL and pelagic sectors), as 
well as ‘new entrants’, defined here as individuals who have participated in fishing-
related activities for less than ten years (whether by personally harvesting fisheries 
species, or by receiving a fishing quota or permit). Sampling for this study also entailed 
throwing the net wide open to non-fisher residents who had knowledge or experience of 
local community dynamics and fisheries governance-related processes, and who was 
willing to participate in this research23. Similarly, my sampling strategy at high level 
participatory events was to include in my research all the actors who were present, while 
focusing particular attention on observing key individuals who represented small-scale 
fishing communities, industrial fishing companies, state departments, political parties, 
and conservation and research organisations. Specific attention was focused on small-
scale fishers, community representatives and senior DAFF officials during formal 
participatory events. 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 It is crucial to recognize Agrawal’s (1999) insights regarding the concept of community: this research 
assumes that ‘communities’ are dynamic, heterogeneous and fractured, rather than static, homogenous 
and harmonious.  
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3.7. Methods 
A range of qualitative methods were utilised to explore power, participation and 
representation in South African fisheries governance. These qualitative methods were the 
primary means for collecting data from the field. Quantitative surveys were used as a 
supplementary means of data collection in the primary case site. This section begins with 
a brief description of the sampling strategy employed for this PhD study, followed by a 
presentation and discussion of the research methods used to collect field data.     
3.7.1. Participant-observation  
The defining method of ethnographic research is participant-observation. Participant-
observation is defined here in simple terms as a method whereby the researcher 
“participates in social activities with the subjects of study over an extended period of 
time” (Whyte, 1979: 56). In this PhD study, I attempt to chart a middle path the 
positivist (see Malinowski 1922) and interpretivist approaches (see Clifford and Marcus 
1986, Marcus and Fischer 1986) to participant-observation by accepting the value of 
experiential knowledge gained through the physical immersion in, and close study of a 
particular social field, while at the same time recognising the central role of context and 
interpretation in the application of the participant-observation method.   
The strength of participant-observation as a research method was affirmed during this 
PhD study.  In particular, this method allowed me to compare what people say they do, 
and what they actually do in practice (see Becker and Geer 1957).  Participant-
observation also enabled a blurring of boundaries between me (as researcher) and 
research participants. In the primary case site in particular, the extended time spent in 
the field allowed a degree of trust and rapport to develop with many of the research 
participants, opening a space for my identity as a researcher to fade (to some extent) into 
the background. This method facilitated an atmosphere of engagement in which research 
participants felt more willing to speak and act in a relatively uninhibited manner. In 
addition, the application of participant-observation during this study also enabled me to 
obtain a direct and visceral sense of research participants’ lived experience. While 
recognising that this ‘direct’ and ‘visceral’ sense is infused with interpretation, I argue 
that participant-observation allowed me to view glimpses of the social field of study from 
the ‘emic’ perspective, at least to the extent that this might be possible.  
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3.7.1. a) Participant-observation at the ground level: case sites on the Cape Peninsula  
In the context of this study, participant-observation was conducted at the two levels 
described above. At the ground level, this method was employed in the traditional 
manner: namely through direct participation in, and observation of daily life in a single 
place, over a prolonged period of time. Ground level participant-observation was 
conducted among fisher and non-fisher residents in three coastal communities on the 
Cape Peninsula: Ocean View, Hangberg and Imizamo Yethu. Essentially, this method 
was employed through organic engagement, by which I mean informal and spontaneous 
interaction that was not planned, directed, or motivated by a specific research agenda24. 
Typical participant-observation activities at the ground level included: 
 sitting with people in their homes or yards, conversing about local community 
dynamics, fisheries-related issues, politics, economics, and life in general 
 spontaneously meeting, and speaking with people on the street, or along the 
coastline 
 participating in and observing the informal activities of local fisher 
representatives   
 observing private meetings held in the case sites 
 observing daily community life 
 observing fishing practices along the coastline 
During participant-observation, I documented the discursive constructs that fishers and 
non-fishers in the case sites articulated with regard to power, participation and political 
representation in fisheries governance. These discursive constructs included: claims, 
discourses, narratives, metaphors and images. When it was appropriate, I also recorded 
observations of their tone of voice, facial expressions, and body language as they 
articulated these constructs. The recording of these interpersonal observations were 
complemented by general observations of community relations, socio-economic 
conditions and fishing-related practices in the community and along the local shoreline. 
Specific attention was paid to collecting verbal and observational data relating to the 
strategies and tactics of fisher and non-fishers as they contested issues of access, 
representation and participation in processes of small-scale fisheries governance, most 
                                                 
24 It should be indicated that throughout this research, I was residing at my home in Kalk Bay, which was 
located roughly seven kilometres from Ocean View, and roughly fifteen kilometres from Hout Bay.  
64 | P a g e  
 
significantly the processes relating to interim relief and the SSF policy, the establishment 
of co-operatives, and the redistribution of commercial fishing rights. 
The primary case site was Ocean View, where I conducted participant-observation from 
February 2011 until October 2013 (with intensive participant-observation being 
conducted from September 2011 until January 2013). I engaged in participant-
observation among a number of residents active in a range of mostly small-scale fishing 
sectors, and who had varying levels of fisheries experience; as well as with residents who 
had no direct relation to fishing, or who had only become involved in fishing-related 
activities relatively recently. Attention was also focused on residents who were acting as 
representatives of small-scale fishers in Ocean View.   
Most of my time was spent with one particular social network of residents composed of 
both fishers and non-fishers, all of whom had multi-generational ties to the local area. 
This social network was constellated around one particular research participant who was 
both a veteran fisher and a veteran fisher representative (and who will be referred to as 
‘OV Veteran Fisher 5’). OV Veteran Fisher 5 was my principal local expert for this 
research, and facilitated my entry into his extensive social network, and into the broader 
community of Ocean View. I spent countless hours with OV Veteran Fisher 5, and we 
developed a close relationship: depending on the context in which we were engaging, my 
identity as a researcher was often eclipsed by my identity as a fellow member of his 
informal social network. 
Based on my own critical assessment, OV Veteran Fisher 5 could be described as an 
exemplary local expert. During the time I spent engaging as a participant-observer with 
him, I obtained access and insights into community and fisheries-related dynamics that 
would otherwise have taken me years to obtain, if at all. OV Veteran Fisher 5 had 
extensive knowledge and experience of a wide range of fishing practices, local ecological 
dynamics, and fisheries management and policy processes. Furthermore, his deeply-
embedded position in the local community meant that he had an intimate and 
comprehensive understanding of the social dynamics among fisher and non-fisher 
residents in Ocean View. Crucially, OV Veteran Fisher 5 knew, and was known by most 
of the fulltime fishers I encountered in Ocean View, particularly by veteran fishers in 
Ocean View (who could be described as the custodians of the local fishing culture). His 
65 | P a g e  
 
relationship with these fishers was crucial for gaining access and insight during this 
research.  
It was while spending time as a participant-observer with OV Veteran Fisher 5 that I met 
my research associate in Ocean View (who will be referred to here as ‘Research 
Associate’).  The Research Associate was in his early thirties, and could be described as 
an observant individual with strong analytical skills and a laudable work ethic. He had 
personal knowledge of the local fisheries through his experiences as a WCRL and 
abalone diver, and as a casual employee at a local WCRL factory. As a lifelong Ocean 
View resident, he had a deep and comprehensive knowledge of community dynamics, 
and was able to provide me with rich emic insight into local history, and cultural beliefs 
and practices. I spent a considerable amount of time interacting with the Research 
Associate as a participant-observer and colleague, and we developed a close relationship 
over this period, in which my identity as a researcher faded into the background.   
The participant-observation method was also employed to a lesser degree in the 
supplementary case sites of Hangberg and Imizamo Yethu, two coastal communities 
situated in Hout Bay on the Cape Peninsula. I conducted participant-observation in 
Hangberg from April 2012 until the end of May 2012, engaging primarily with a local 
resident, fisher and representative (‘HGB Fisher 1’). This research participant introduced 
me to several of his fisher colleagues, many of whom were active in the local linefish, 
WCRL and abalone fisheries. He also introduced me to two of his fisher colleagues who 
were fellow members of a forum consisting of community representatives and 
government officials, which was established to address housing issues in Hangberg. I 
spent several afternoons with HGB Fisher 1 at Hout Bay harbour, and in the homes of 
Hangberg fishers, conversing informally about local community dynamics, fishing 
practices, and the political-economy of the fishing industry. I also spent several days with 
a local resident, fisher, and political activist (HGB Fisher 3). During our informal 
interactions, HGB Fisher 3 accompanied me on guided explorations of Hangberg and 
Hout Bay harbour, introducing me to local fishers and non-fishers.  
During this period, I also conducted participant-observation in Imizamo Yethu with a 
core group of fishers and fisher representatives, most of whom had lived in Imizamo 
Yethu for more than ten years, and who had personal experience of fishing. Participant-
observation with these research participants included sitting in their homes, sharing food 
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and drinks, talking about local community and fisheries-related dynamics, 
accompanying them as they conducted various organisational and administrative 
activities, and using my car to provide transport for various errands. These research 
participants played a crucial role in assisting me to understand local community and 
fisheries governance-related dynamics. I also interacted to a lesser extent with two 
representatives and several members of a local organisation representing women in the 
Imizamo Yethu fishing community. Most of these research participants did not 
personally harvest fisheries species (though some had been allocated interim relief 
permits). However, they played a crucial role in supporting the fishing activities of their 
male spouses, as well as in the representation of their spouses, and Imizamo Yethu 
fishers more broadly. My informal interactions with these research participants provided 
a degree of insight into their lived experience as female members of the local fishing 
community.   
3.7.1. b) Participant-observation at the high level: participatory events 
Participant-observation at the ground level was complemented by the use of participant 
observation at the high level. As described earlier, the high level refers to fisheries 
governance-related participatory events that were initiated and facilitated by various state 
and non-state agencies, and held in various locations around Cape Town such as the 
chambers of parliament, community halls, churches, hotels, offices, and private 
conference venues. Unlike the participant-observation that was conducted at the ground 
level case sites, the deployment of this method at the high level was multi-sited rather 
than being based in a single place; and was conducted during brief moments (usually two 
to three hours) every few weeks or months, rather than for sustained periods of time, as 
was the case at the ground level. I was present at these high level events both as a 
participating ‘stakeholder’ (specifically, a fisheries scholar), as well as an observing 
researcher. From this dual position, I was able to study in intimate detail the words and 
actions of fishers, fisher representatives, government officials, conservationists, fisheries 
scientists, industry representatives, politicians, and union leaders, as they engaged with 
each other in formal processes of participation.  
The principal focus of participant-observation at the high level was on observing in fine 
detail how these instances of formal engagement unfolded, and the political practices 
used by the various actors to promote or contest particular interests, agendas and 
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ideologies. I documented the discursive practices of the various actors as they engaged in 
these formal participatory spaces. At the same time, I recorded my observations of the 
tone of voice, facial expressions, and body language of these various actors during their 
participatory performances. Particular attention was paid to the performative and 
discursive tactics used by facilitators to control the participatory space, as well as the 
tactical manoeuvres that participants used to assert their views and agendas at these high 
level events.  
3.7.1. c) Tools and techniques for recording participant-observation data  
The data gathered through participant-observation were primarily recorded using a pen 
and notepad. Field notes from each day of participant-observation were typed up as 
Microsoft Word documents when I arrived home from the field. I also used a camera 
and voice recorder as supplementary tools to collect participant-observation data.  
While I would generally have my pen and notepad in hand during participant-
observation at the ground level, these tools created a sense of information being 
extracted, and of separation between the researcher and the research participant.   For 
this reason, I would often put this equipment aside so that I was able to fully engage as a 
participant-observer with people in the case sites.  Yet, even in these instances, my 
research antenna was rarely de-activated, and I remained alert to valuable statements 
and observations that might emerge when I did not have my pen and notepad. Notes 
from these interactions would be written down later in the day while I was still in the 
field, or typed out that night once I had returned home.  At the ground level, I found that 
the camera and voice recorder were even more intrusive than the pen and notepad, and 
tended to undermine my attempts (as a participant-observer) to blur the boundary 
between me and the research participants.  For this reason, I employed the camera and 
voice recorder judiciously, sacrificing audio-visual accuracy for the sake of creating a 
more informal and organic context for interaction. Though a degree of empirical 
accuracy was lost, I was able to engage with people in a relatively non-contrived manner, 
and to pay closer attention to the important subtleties of facial expression, body language 
and tone of voice, much of which is lost with the use of cameras and voice recorders.  
To collect participant-observation data at the high level, the same research tools were 
used, but with slightly different techniques. The pen and notepad were my primary tools, 
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but unlike at the ground level, I used these tools throughout the participant-observation 
process, taking finely-detailed and comprehensive notes of what I saw and heard.  The 
relatively impersonal context of high level participatory events generally enabled me to 
sit in the background and take notes unobtrusively throughout the event, negating to 
some extent the issues of separation between researcher and research participants, while 
allowing me to document proceedings in high resolution. These notes were typed up 
later that afternoon or evening upon returning home. In addition, I was also able to use a 
camera and voice recorder more freely at high level participatory events than during 
participant-observation at the ground level.         
3.7.2 Interviews  
The interview method was the secondary means of data collection for this ethnographic 
research. In the positivist approach to interviewing, verbal communication provides the 
interviewer with unmediated access to the mental contents of the interviewee, allowing 
the interviewer to “find out what is in and on someone else’s mind” (Scheurich 1997: 
61). Yet, as Scheurich asserts, language does not “mirror reality” in a pure and 
unmediated way; instead, he argues the interviewer must reconstruct the words of the 
interviewee through the “interpretive moments” that define the interview process (1997: 
73). The outcome of an interview is also fundamentally determined by the social, 
political, and economic context in which it is conducted (Fabian 2001). I recognise that 
the interviews conducted during this PhD study were shaped by context and 
interpretation; while at the same time recognising that the interview method does make 
it possible to learn something of what is ‘inside’ the interviewee’s mind.  
3.7.2. a) Interview styles: unstructured and structured  
During this PhD study, interviews and conversations were predominantly conducted at 
the ground level among fisher and non-fisher residents in the three case sites. The style of 
interviews was determined by the specific context, and ranged from informal, 
unstructured ‘conversations’, to formal, structured exchanges. Unstructured interviews 
lasted from between a few minutes to several hours, and were usually conducted in one 
of two basic ways. The first was a highly informal conversation, initiated and conducted 
organically, with the topics of discussion being primarily determined by the interviewee. 
As a consequence of the spontaneous manner in which these conversations were 
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initiated, these highly unstructured conversations would sometimes be conducted 
without a pen and notepad.  Notes from these conversations would be written down 
immediately afterwards. The second form of unstructured interview was more formal 
and planned, with the conversation being directed according to a few broad research 
questions. These informal exchanges were, however, not aimless:  it may be correct to 
argue that such interviews are at “one level … simply conversations … but at the same 
time they are also highly skilled performances” (Terre Blanche and Durrheim 1999: 
128). I attempted to guide these conversations along particular channels, while also 
allowing the space for the interviewee to influence the line of discussion, and to 
articulate issues in their own idiom. This proved an effective tactic for uncovering what 
the participants in this research considered to be of greatest importance, and the way 
they perceived and re-presented these critical issues. These interviews were always 
recorded usually with pen and notepad.  
In addition to these informal, unstructured interviews, I also conducted a series of 
formal, structured interviews with fishers, fisher representatives, new entrants, non-
fishers in the three case sites. These structured interviews were formally arranged with 
the interviewee, and directed according to a set of pre-determined questions. Within this 
rigid framework, space was left for the interviewee and me to improvise, and address 
subjects that arose during our interaction. Structured interviews lasted anything from 
thirty minutes to three hours, and were primarily recorded by taking comprehensive and 
detailed notes (often supplemented with a camera and voice recorder). In this formal 
style of interview, the degree of control that I exercised over the discussion enabled me to 
obtain information specific to my research objectives, information that may have taken 
far longer to elicit in the context of an unstructured interview. My use of structured 
interviews thus allowed me to maximise the research benefits of my relatively brief time 
with the interviewee. 
3.7.2. b) Summary of interviews conducted in the field 
At high level participatory events, conversations were conducted with fishers, fisher 
representatives, fisheries scientists, industry representatives, NGO representatives, and 
DAFF officials (before, during and after these events) in a highly spontaneous and 
unstructured manner. These informal conversations usually lasted a few minutes, and 
were often conducted without the use of my pen and notepad (notes would be written 
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down immediately after the conversation had ended). However, as mentioned above, the 
focus of research at the high level was on observation, and therefore the conversations 
conducted at these participatory events were limited, and are not presented in this thesis. 
In contrast, the interview method was employed extensively at the ground level (see 
table below). I focused on fishers, fisher representatives, new entrants and non-fishers 
who resided in the case sites, with the overwhelmingly majority of conversations and 
interviews being conducted in the primary case site of Ocean View. A total of 58 
structured and semi-structured interviews were conducted in the three case sites, of 
which 24 could loosely be categorised as ‘life histories’ (to the extent that the interviewee 
gave a broad narration of their life in a coastal community on the Cape Peninsula). I also 
conducted 66 unstructured interviews and conversations, which were characterised by 
varying degrees of formality, including nine unstructured interviews at the Hout Bay 
harbour with people related in various ways to the fishing industry, including a 
prominent WCRL marketer, and a DAFF compliance officer. I also conducted 10 
informal group discussions at the homes of local fishers. These discussions could be 
described as unstructured focus groups where I discussed fisheries governance-related 
issues with between three and nine fulltime fishers, with the line of discussion being 
improvised by research participants and me. The average duration was between two to 
three hours, during which time I took extensive and detailed notes, as well as audio 
recordings. 
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Table 1: Interviews, conversations, and group discussions conducted in the case sites. 
3.7.3. Quantitative surveys  
The qualitative methods of participant-observation and interviewing were supplemented 
by conducting 82 quantitative surveys in the primary case site of Ocean View. These 
surveys were conducted  from June 2012 until October 2012 as part of my contribution 
to the ‘Human Dimensions of Marine Protected Areas’ research project being carried out 
by the Environmental Evaluation Unit (EEU), a research unit that is based at the 
University of Cape Town25. The surveys conducted in Ocean View had two essential 
objectives: to gather baseline information on small-scale fishing communities, and to 
uncover critical dynamics related to marine protected areas in these communities. These 
surveys were based on a template that was used by other project team members in a 
number of other coastal communities around South Africa. The template was tailored by 
each researcher according to the specific communities and areas in which they were 
working.   
The Research Associate and I began our survey process in June 2012. Our first step was 
to develop a list (with the assistance of OV Veteran Fisher 5) of residents who were 
participating in the local fisheries. The initial list had a strong focus on experienced 
                                                 
25 This three year research project was funded by the ‘Green Trust’, a partnership between Nedbank and 
the Worldwide Fund for Nature-South Africa (WWF). The Environmental Evaluation Unit’s project 
mandate was to conduct field and desktop research to explore the social dynamics of marine protected 
areas (MPAs), with the aim of informing policy and management.  
 Structured   
and Semi 
Interviews 
Unstructured 
Interviews and 
Conversations  
Unstructured 
Group 
Discussions 
Ocean View 38 41 4 
Imizamo 
Yethu 
12 11 4 
Hangberg 8 5 2 
Other (in Hout 
Bay) 
 9  
Total 58 66 10 
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fulltime fishers who were active in small-scale fisheries (most of whom happened to be 
above the age of forty).  We also included other residents such as fishers who had been 
personally involved in harvesting fisheries species in the last decade, fisher 
representatives, marketers, and non-fisher residents who held fishing quotas and permits. 
This list was expanded as the survey process progressed. Surveys were arranged in 
person, or over the phone, as well initiated through spontaneous interaction. The 
Research Associate and I usually conducted the surveys at the respondent’s home, but 
we also conducted many surveys on street corners, or in my car. Information was 
primarily recorded by taking detailed notes, and to a lesser extent through the use of a 
camera and voice recorder. 
3.7.4. Discourse analysis  
Discourse analysis was selected as a key method to explore the symbolic dimension of 
power in processes of participation and political representation on the Cape Peninsula.  
Academic use of the word ‘discourse’ generally refers to broad patterns of speech, or 
systems of statements (Terre Blanche and Durrheim 1999). These systems of speech 
construct truths about the world, which in turn make some subjectivities and actions 
more possible than others.  By framing reality and legitimating action, discourses play a 
fundamental role in the symbolic exercise of power (Bourdieu & Eagleton 1972, 
Foucault 1991). While there is no fixed set of instructions for conducting discourse 
analysis, there are common tactics that provide some direction. One begins by attending 
to the context in which a written or verbal text was produced, and to the broader 
political-economic and ideological context that ‘sets the setting’ of textual production. 
Attention is also focused on the relationship between the imagined audience and the 
author, and the ways in which this relationship is affirmed or challenged through the use 
of particular discursive formations. Another important tactic for a study of discourse is 
the identification and analysis of binary oppositions, and recurring phrases, images and 
metaphors. Discourse analysis is not limited to what is represented in a text, but also 
involves paying close attention to that which is omitted from a text. By identifying the 
boundaries of acceptable discursive territory delineated by a particular discourse, one is 
able to make inferences about the author’s basic values and presuppositions regarding 
the issue under discussion.  
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During this PhD study, discourse analysis was based on texts from primary, secondary 
and grey literature. In addition to a critical analysis of written texts, the discursive 
constructs uttered by actors participating in coastal and fisheries governance processes 
were also analysed. The analytical focus was on discursive themes that legitimate or 
challenge dominant management arrangements and processes: for example, the 
discourses of ‘community’, ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’, ‘the tragedy of the commons’, 
‘sustainability’, and ‘economic growth’.  I paid particular attention to the metaphors and 
narratives that were repeatedly articulated during this study, which provided insight into 
the beliefs and perceptions of research participants, and the relations of power between 
them. Significant focus was also placed on the use of discursive tactics used to police or 
contest the boundaries of permissible discussion during high level participatory events 
(see Chapter Six).   
3.7.5. A brief word on translation 
Staying on the subject of language, it is important to indicate how I approached the 
matter of translation. In terms of my own language proficiencies, English is my first 
language, and Afrikaans my second language. Although my ability to express myself in 
Afrikaans is somewhat limited, my ability to understand it is excellent. In Ocean View 
and Hangberg, most research participants spoke Afrikaans as a first language, and 
English as a second language26.  Though it was their second language, these research 
participants were sufficiently proficient in English to understand my questions and 
statements, and many were able articulate their responses in English with a degree of 
clarity. In practice, we would generally converse in a mixture of English and Afrikaans, 
with me speaking English and the research participants speaking Afrikaans. This enabled 
us to communicate clearly with each other, thus obviating to a significant extent the 
language differences between us. I argue that my proficiency in Afrikaans, my familiarity 
with local idioms of expression, and the consistent support of local experts enabled me to 
understand, and accurately translate the statements of Afrikaans-speaking research 
participants without significantly altering their intended meaning.  
The question of translation was slightly more difficult in Imizamo Yethu, where most 
residents spoke Xhosa and Zulu as their first languages, while Afrikaans and English 
                                                 
26 Statistics South Africa. 2011. National Census. 
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were the most common second languages27. As was the case in Ocean View and 
Hangberg, most research participants in Imizamo Yethu were sufficiently proficient in 
English to allow us to communicate with relative clarity.  However, it was also the case 
that some research participants felt more comfortable speaking in their first language 
(Xhosa or Zulu). In these instances, my key local experts were on hand to provide 
translation. They had substantial knowledge of Xhosa, Zulu, English and Afrikaans, and 
were thus able to facilitate meaningful communication between me and the research 
participants who were not amenable to conversing in English. With the support of these 
local experts, most interviews and conversations were conducted with me 
communicating in English, and the research participants communicating in Zulu and 
Xhosa, English, and Afrikaans, or using a combination of these languages. 
While I claim to have been able to communicate across language barriers, I also 
acknowledge that the act of translation always involves the loss of meaning. This is 
exacerbated when a language is translated by a researcher who does not have a solid 
grasp of that language. However, aside from the limited translations from Xhosa and 
Zulu to English (for which I received assistance from first language speakers), I contend 
that I was able to translate the statements of research participants without losing the 
essential meanings they intended to convey.  
3.8. Reflections 
At this stage in the discussion, it is necessary to reflect on some of the complexities and 
challenges that were encountered in the field, and later during the analysis, interpretation 
and re-presentation of field data. The following reflections will attend to three aspects of 
this process: my personal equation, and the ethics of this study.  
3.8.1. Personal equation 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the ethnographer studies and translates a particular 
social reality by interpreting it through their own subjective filter. Ethnographic writing 
therefore requires the researcher to provide an indication of their ‘personal equation’ 
(Watkins 2000). To this end, the following section briefly elucidates my personal 
equation, with a focus on my position as a lifelong resident of the Cape Peninsula, and 
on my political beliefs and positions.    
                                                 
27 Statistics South Africa. 2011. National Census. 
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The first aspect of my personal equation that should be acknowledged is that I was born 
and raised on the southern part of the Cape Peninsula where this research was conducted 
(which is colloquially referred to as ‘The Deep South’). During this time, I developed a 
close understanding of the local socio-cultural, political and economic milieu, and am 
deeply rooted in this socio-ecological setting. This raises questions about the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of conducting ethnography ‘at home’. From a traditional 
social anthropological perspective, this is considered to be a contravention of basic 
research protocol. While there is some merit to this perspective, it has been increasingly 
contested because it overlooks the extent to which ‘difference’ is constructed and 
embellished by the ethnographer, as some scholars have argued: “anthropology cements 
the exaggeration of the ‘other’ culture … What goes on to the anthropological map is 
exaggerated difference” (Hastrup in Frankental 1998: 33). In the case of this research, I 
made sure to maintain a critical awareness of my biases and assumptions as an insider in 
the Deep South, and was guided by the data encountered during fieldwork.  
Another factor in my personal equation that deserves reflection is my political views 
regarding fisheries governance in South Africa. Though social researchers may strive 
towards the ideals of balance and objectivity, they always occupy specific positions in the 
field they are studying, and these positions inevitably shape their collection and re-
presentation of data. In the case of this PhD study, my activities as a researcher were 
informed by the conviction that local small-scale fishing activities are potentially more 
equitable and sustainable than industrial approaches to fishing, and therefore that small-
scale fishing should be given greater priority in national policy-making. This research 
was also guided by the conviction that small-scale fishing communities in South Africa 
have a supra-legislative right to access the marine commons – in other words, that small-
scale fishers have a right to access that supersedes statutory legislation. As a consequence 
of these views, I made the decision to position this research according to the cultural, 
political and economic interests of small-scale fishers (as they expressed them to me, and 
to each other). In this sense, this PhD study is positioned in solidarity with small-scale 
fishing communities in South Africa, and more, and more specifically, with those on the 
Cape Peninsula fishers whose livelihood is dependent on personally harvesting fisheries 
species.  
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3.8.2. Ethics 
In the process of conducting social research, the researcher constantly encounters ethical 
dilemmas which require cautious and delicate consideration. The researcher is guided in 
this regard by the primary ethical imperative to avoid or minimise the potential risks to 
research participants. However, ethical difficulties inevitably emerge during any social 
research process. To preserve the ethical integrity of this research, I adhered to basic 
ethical protocols when interacting with research participants by: identifying myself, 
providing a synopsis of the research I was conducting, explaining what I intended to do 
with the information being collected, and guaranteeing confidentiality and anonymity28. 
To ensure that I did not exploit the trust of research participants, I endeavoured to 
portray them as accurately, fairly and safely as possible. 
A key ethical quandary emerged from my focus on issues of power and politics, which 
required me to speak with research participants about contentious dynamics within the 
context of a small community where many people knew each other, and in which news 
travelled quickly. This created a potential risk that this research might incriminate or 
jeopardise particular research participants. While the ethically contentious material 
presented in this thesis comes overwhelmingly from those research participants who 
stated explicitly that I should use their names, and that I should not censor the 
information they provided, I have used pseudonyms for all research participants, and 
have removed or alter any information that could be traced to specific individuals or 
organisations. However, I acknowledge that it may be “a virtually unachievable goal” to 
guarantee complete anonymity when conducting ethnographic research in small 
communities (Hoonaard 2003: 141). Yet it could be argued that this ethical risk is 
defensible because the dynamics of power in political representation and participation 
uncovered during this research had implications not only for small-scale fishers’ 
livelihoods, but also for their ability to exercise their democratic right as citizens to 
meaningful participation in governance processes, and for their right to live a dignified 
life as envisaged in South Africa’s post-apartheid Constitution.  
 
 
                                                 
28 See the ethical guidelines of the Association of Social Anthropology of the UK and Commonwealth, 
which served as the point of departure for this research.  
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3.9. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented research process undertaken for this study of power and 
democracy in fisheries governance on the Cape Peninsula. The chapter began by 
situating this study within the field of political ecology. This was followed by a 
presentation of the constructivist-structural ontology which guided this research. Briefly, 
the constructivist-structural ontology views social phenomena in terms of the dialectic 
between subjective construction and objective structure. The chapter then moved to a 
discussion of the qualitative ethnographic methodology which was employed on the 
Cape Peninsula, and the primary methods of participant-observation, interviewing, and 
discourse analysis (as well as the supplementary use of quantitative surveys). After that, 
the discussion turned back to reflect on the research process. This included a 
consideration of my research methodology and personal equation. The chapter 
concluded with a presentation of the ethical risks that were encountered during this 
research, and the measures that were taken to address or mitigate these risks.  
In the next chapter, the discussion turns to the empirical case sites on the Cape 
Peninsula, where the ethnographic methodology was utilised to study the dynamics of 
public participation, political representation and power in small-scale fisheries 
governance.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE CASE SITES: THREE COASTAL COMMUNITIES ON 
THE CAPE PENINSULA  
4.1. Introduction: empirical research context  
In this chapter, the case sites on the Cape Peninsula are introduced. The discussion 
begins by locating these case sites within the broader context of coastal and marine 
resource use and governance in South Africa. This is followed by a description of the 
three coastal communities on the Cape Peninsula that constituted the primary and 
supplementary case sites for this study of power and democracy in fisheries governance. 
The case sites will be presented in terms of their socio-economic and cultural 
characteristics; the fishing-related activities that are conducted by local residents; and the 
crucial fisheries governance processes that are unfolding in these case sites.   
 
Figure 1: Map of South Africa showing location of Cape Town. 
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4.2. Overview of marine and coastal resource use and governance in 
South Africa 
The coastal and marine ecosystems that are found along South Africa’s 3000km 
coastline are exceedingly rich and diverse. Flowing upwards along the west of South 
Africa is the cool Benguela current, which is high in nutrients, and supports a wide range 
of commercially-valuable fisheries species which occur in great abundance. Running 
southwards along the east coast is the warm Agulhas current, which is relatively poor in 
nutrients, and which supports more diverse, but less productive marine and coastal 
ecosystems than those found in the Benguela region (Branch and Clark 2006).  
4.2.1. The pre-colonial, colonial and apartheid eras 
The harvesting of coastal and marine resources has been practiced throughout South 
Africa for thousands of years. On the semi-arid west coast, Khoi-San hunter gatherers 
were harvesting coastal resources at least 70 000 years ago (Volman 1978), and along the 
tropical coastline of northern KwaZulu-Natal, fishing practices among indigenous 
coastal communities dates back roughly 100 000 years (Harris et al. 2003). Indigenous 
populations harvested these resources for subsistence, economic, medicinal and spiritual 
purposes, using a wide range of locally-specific methods, including stone and wooden 
fish traps (Sunde and Raemaekers 2010).  
From the 1600s onwards, successive European colonial regimes assumed control of land 
and natural resources, dispossessing indigenous coastal communities in the Cape region 
of their right to access the marine commons, and gradually integrating them into the 
colonial economy as low-skilled labour (Mitchell 2002, Van Sittert 1993). Around the 
rich temperate waters off the Cape coast, fishing began to take on a commercial 
dimension during the colonial period, and by the 1800s, there was a small industry using 
non-mechanised wooden vessels and low technology fishing gear to harvest a range of 
locally-occurring species (Lees 1969). A slightly different scenario unfolded along the 
east and northeast coastlines (what is now the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal), where 
the small-scale fishing activities of indigenous coastal communities were shore-based, 
and largely governed by African customary law, with relatively minimal interference by 
colonial authorities, and few commercial fishing activities when compared with the Cape 
region (Sunde et al. 2011). This was primarily because few commercially-valuable 
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fisheries species occurred in the sub-tropical waters along the Eastern Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal coastlines, and because these coastal communities lived in extremely 
isolated rural locations, far from the reach of colonial authorities (Sunde et al. 2011).  
South Africa’s commercial fisheries underwent a second wave of modernisation during 
the Second World War, when rapid advances in fishing technologies, and a rise in 
international demand for the country’s fisheries products led to the development of 
highly-mechanised, capital-intensive industrial fishing and post-harvest processing (Lees 
1969, Van Sittert 1993). Local indigenous coastal communities participated in these 
emerging industrial fisheries as an exploited low-skill labour force (Van Sittert 1994), or 
continued to engage in small-scale fishing activities, with their customary access to the 
marine commons being either restricted or ignored by state authorities (Van Sittert 1993, 
Sowman et al. 2014).  
In 1948, the system of apartheid was formally established, further reinforcing the 
imbalances in South Africa between the white-owned commercial fishing industry on the 
one hand, and small-scale fishing communities classified as ‘coloured’, ‘black’ and 
‘Indian’ on the other29. From the 1940s until the 1980s, the apartheid regime instituted 
racist policies and regulations that prioritised the development of a white-owned 
commercial industry, and state-driven scientific fisheries management, while legally 
disenfranchising indigenous coloured and black coastal communities of their rights to 
access the marine commons (Van Sittert 2006, Sunde and Raemaekers 2010). 
Nevertheless, these coastal communities continued to engage in small-scale fishing 
activities throughout the apartheid period (Hauck and Sowman 2003, Van Sittert 2003, 
Raemaekers 2009, Sunde et al. 2011). Small-scale fishing activities played an important 
role in their culture and livelihoods, but they were conducted in a kind of legal limbo 
because small-scale fishing was “either ignored … or addressed by law enforcement 
efforts that resulted in fines or imprisonment” (Hauck 2008: 638). During apartheid, the 
involvement of coloured and black people in the commercial fisheries remained limited 
                                                 
29 The apartheid system divided all South African citizens into four racial categories: ‘white’, ‘coloured’, 
‘black’, and ‘Indian’. However, it should be explicitly recognised that these categories are social constructs. 
Yet these racial categories continue to find expression in popular discourse, and in South Africa’s policy 
and legislative frameworks. Perhaps the most contentious racial category is that of ‘coloured’, which was 
used by the apartheid state to refer to Afrikaans-speaking people of mixed ancestry, who resided mainly in 
the Western and Northern Cape provinces. The genetic and cultural lineage of people who were identified 
as ‘coloured’ was generally traced to the encounter between the indigenous Khoi-San population and 
European settlers, Indonesian and African slaves during the colonial period (Adhikari 2005).  
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to employment as crewmembers and factory workers, while they were excluded from 
ownership and control of the commercial fishing industry, as well as from participation 
in fisheries management processes (Van Sittert 2002).  
4.2.2. Fisheries governance in post-apartheid South Africa  
When apartheid was formally abolished in 1994, there were expectations among 
marginalised coastal communities that they would finally obtain equitable access to the 
marine commons, in accordance with the principles of the newly established democratic 
dispensation (Isaacs 2006, Van Sittert 2006, Isaacs et al. 2007, Sowman et al. 2014).  
Environmental policy and law-making in post-apartheid South Africa was reformed in 
accordance with the national Constitution (1996), which guaranteed equitable access to 
the natural commons for all citizens as a human right30. In 1998, the Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) gazetted the National Environmental 
Management Act (NEMA), which requires that “the State must respect, protect, 
promote and fulfil the social, economic and environmental rights of everyone, and strive 
to meet the basic needs of previously disadvantaged communities”31.  
In the same year, the first wave of post-apartheid fisheries reform was ushered in with 
the gazetting of the Marine Living Resources Act (MLRA) (1998)32. The MLRA became 
the overarching legislation governing fisheries in post-apartheid South Africa, and placed 
fisheries management under the authority of the Marine and Coastal Management 
(MCM) branch within the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT), 
with ultimate responsibility being vested in Minister of DEAT. Underpinning the MLRA 
were three basic objectives: racial and economic equity, ecological sustainability, and 
economic profitability in harvesting of coastal and marine species (Branch and Clark 
2006). Furthermore, the MLRA stated the importance of “broad and accountable 
participation in the decision-making processes”; and “the need to restructure the fishing 
industry to address historical imbalances and to achieve equity within all branches of the 
fishing industry” (DEAT 1998: 15). However the Act only provided legal recognition to 
three forms of fishing: ‘subsistence’, ‘commercial’, and ‘recreational’, effectively 
excluding the majority of small-scale fishers who harvested fisheries species both for 
                                                 
30 Republic of South Africa. 1996. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. Chapter 2, 
Section 25(1). 
31 DEAT. 1996. National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1996.  
32 DEAT. 1998. Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998. 
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home consumption and for sale (Isaacs and Nielson 2001, Nielson and Hara 2006, Van 
Sittert 2007, Sowman et al. 2014).  
Under the auspices of the MLRA, DEAT implemented the medium term (2001) and 
long term (2005) commercial fishing rights allocation processes, which sought to allocate 
rights according to the goal of racially transforming South Africa’s fisheries33,34. The 
number of commercial fishing rights that were allocated increased dramatically: from 
400 in 1994, to 4000 in 2002 (Van Sittert 2006). However, the allocation of commercial 
fishing rights favoured the existing white-owned fishing industry, and local elites in 
coastal communities, while the majority of active fishers in these communities did not 
secure fishing rights through these allocation processes, despite their economic and 
cultural reliance on the harvesting of fisheries resources (Hersoug and Isaacs 2001, Van 
Sittert 2002, Sowman 2006, Sowman et al. 2014). The inequitable allocation of 
commercial fishing rights has created conflict in many coastal communities, and many 
fishers who had been excluded turned to illegal fishing activities to sustain their 
livelihoods (Hauck and Kroese 2006, Sowman et al. 2014).  
At the same time, the implementation of the MLRA has been characterised by a marked 
expansion in the state’s regulation of the marine and coastal environment, further 
constraining the access of small-scale fishers to the marine commons (Hauck and Kroese 
2006, Hauck 2008, Schultz 2010). While apartheid-era fisheries management generally 
overlooked or criminalised the fishing activities of small-scale fishing communities, the 
post-apartheid reform of fisheries governance extended the scale and scope of fishing 
regulations and marine protected areas (MPAs) in ways that further criminalised the 
harvesting practices of small-scale fishers (Hauck 2008, Sowman et al. 2014). 
From the late 1990s onwards, the commercial fishing sectors also underwent a formal 
process of racial transformation through the state-driven ‘Black Economic 
Empowerment’ (BEE) programme, which sought to increase the percentage of ‘black’ 
ownership and control in the fishing industry, and in the national economy more broadly 
(Nielson and Hara 2006, Ponte and Van Sittert 2007)35. However, industrial fishing 
                                                 
33 DEAT. 2001. Medium term rights allocation. Pretoria: DEAT 2001.  
34 DEAT. 2005. General policy on the allocation and management of long term commercial fishing rights. 
Pretoria: DEAT 2005. 
35 The BEE programme has been implemented across the South African economy (Ponte and Van Sittert 
2007). According to the BEE prescriptions, the term ‘black’ includes those classified as ‘coloured’, ‘black’ 
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companies lobbied against radical reform and redistribution, arguing that these 
transformations threatened their economic stability, and therefore placed at risk their 
ability to provide employment (Nielson and Hara 2006, Van Sittert 2006).  During the 
mid-1990s to early 2000s, a number of collective enterprises were established to facilitate 
the integration of black and coloured fishers into the fishing industry as owners and 
managers, rather than as employees - many of these enterprises were constituted with the 
ostensible goal of operating in a democratic and equitable manner (Hersoug and Isaacs 
2001, Isaacs et al. 2007, Ponte and Van Sittert 2007). These companies were structured as 
commercial companies, and were largely based in the Western Cape. They had hundreds 
(and in some cases, thousands) of black and coloured member-shareholders, whose 
‘previously disadvantaged’ status served as the basis for these enterprises to apply for 
commercial fishing rights (Hersoug and Isaacs 2001).  
Yet the profit-driven legal structure of these enterprises, combined with authoritarian and 
corrupt practices by individuals at management and board level, lack of organisational 
capacity among fishers, and negligible support from the government meant that fishers 
were unable to exercise substantive control, or to benefit equitably from the profits of 
these companies of which they were the ostensible owners (Hersoug and Isaacs 2001, 
Isaacs et al. 2007, Ponte and Van Sittert 2007). Perhaps the most infamous example was 
the South African Commercial Fishermen’s Corporation (SACFC), and its holding 
company South African Commercial Fishermen’s Holding (SACFH), which saw nearly 
3000 fisher-owners being excluded from benefitting equitably from the fishing rights that 
had been allocated to the SACFH36.  
While the percentage of coloured and black people who owned shares, or who occupied 
managerial positions in established industrial fishing companies increased, the BEE 
process did not benefit the majority of fish factory workers and small-scale fishers, but 
instead benefitted individuals who were already in positions of political and economic 
advantage, many of whom were associated with the ruling political party (Hersoug and 
Isaacs 2001, Ponte and Van Sittert 2007). The first wave of post-apartheid fisheries 
reform thus reinforced the exclusion of impoverished coastal communities, who were the 
                                                                                                                                                        
and ‘Indian’ South African citizens (see DTI. 2005. Code 000: Framework for the Measurement of Broad 
Based Black Economic Empowerment’. Pretoria: 2005). 
36 Inspector’s Report on the South African Commercial Fishermen’s Corporation (SACFC), and the South 
African Commercial Fishermen’s Holding (SACFH). 2006.  
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intended beneficiaries of South Africa’s new democracy (Van Sittert 2006, Sowman et al. 
2014).  
The continued political and economic marginalisation of small-scale fishing 
communities led to their growing frustration with the post-apartheid state’s governance 
of fisheries, which was widely perceived by small-scale fishers to lack legitimacy (Isaacs 
2006, Hauck 2009, Schultz 2010).  In the early 2000s, a grass roots movement began to 
develop amongst small-scale fishing communities (located mostly in the Western Cape), 
with the objective of asserting their rights to equitable access to the marine commons 
(Sunde 2003). With the support of the Masifundise Development Trust (MDT and a 
number of grass roots fisher organisations, small-scale fishers and local fisher 
representatives in more than two dozen coastal communities began organising 
themselves politically, and they started to articulate a collective vision of equitable and 
democratic fisheries governance in South Africa (Sunde 2003)37. In 2004, several small-
scale fishers in the Western Cape, in partnership with MDT and the Legal Resources 
Centre (LRC) (a non-profit legal organisation), filed a class action suit in the Equality 
Court against the Minister of DEAT, arguing that small-scale fishers had a constitutional 
right to access the marine commons, but that this right was not recognised by the 
existing system of fisheries governance (Sowman et al. 2014)38. The Equality Court ruled 
in favour of the applicants in May 2007, and ordered the Minister of DEAT to initiate 
the development of a policy for previously excluded small-scale fishing communities, 
and to ensure that these communities were given ‘interim relief’ until the policy was in 
place (Sowman et al. 2014).  
Later that year, small-scale fishers from around the country gathered at a national 
summit, prompting DEAT to form a National Task Team and Technical Task Team 
composed of community representatives, fisheries researchers, government officials, 
NGO representatives, and representatives of industrial fishing companies, whose 
mandate was to formulate a policy for small-scale fishing (Sowman et al. 2014). As 
required by the Equality Court ruling in 2007, MCM instituted a system of interim relief 
in coastal communities in the Western and Northern Cape Provinces. Interim relief took 
                                                 
37 The Masifundise Development Trust (MDT) is a non-governmental organisation whose work focuses on 
the empowerment of small-scale fishers, and coastal communities more broadly.   
38 See Kenneth George and Others versus the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 
2007 (EC1/2005). The Equality Court is a division of the High Court, and adjudicates over cases relating 
to social inequality (such as gender, race and class). 
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the form of exemption permits that were allocated annually to between 1000 and 1500 
individuals on the basis of their verification as ‘bona fide’ small-scale fishers (defined by 
the Equality Court order as those individuals whose livelihoods depended entirely on the 
small-scale harvesting of fisheries species, and who had been excluded from previous 
fishing rights allocation processes) (Sowman et al. 2014)39. However, MCM lacked the 
capacity to manage the interim relief system effectively: monitoring and regulatory 
enforcement was weak, and the annual process of verifying bona fide fishers was plagued 
with difficulties, with many non-fishers being allocated permits at the expense of 
recognised bona fide fishers (Isaacs 2011, Sowman et al. 2014)40.  While the interim relief 
process made a valuable contribution to the livelihoods of many coastal residents by 
providing them with a degree of formal access, it also reinvigorated community tensions 
surrounding the allocation of fishing rights (Sowman et al. 2014).  
From 2007 onwards, the SSF policy formulation process continued to unfold in parallel 
to the interim relief process, with many participatory engagements occurring between 
representatives of small-scale fishing communities, NGOs, industrial fishing companies 
and the recreational fishing sector. There was considerable contestation regarding policy 
proposals for the allocation of small-scale fishing rights, specifically regarding: the share 
of the TAC that small-scale fishers would be allocated, whether these rights would be 
allocated to individuals or communities, and which species would be included. In 
addition, there was also intense contestation regarding the most suitable institutional 
structures for managing small-scale fishing activities. Concern was expressed by 
government officials, fisheries scientists, and representatives of the recreational and 
industrial fishing sectors regarding the re-distribution of fishing rights to small-scale 
fishing communities, stating that this would jeopardise the profitability and sustainability 
of South Africa’s marine and coastal resources (Sowman et al. 2014). 
It is crucial at this point to pause and consider two political factors that played an 
important role in shaping this process of fisheries reform. The first factor relates to the 
                                                 
39 It should be noted that the term ‘bona fide’ is used advisedly throughout this thesis. The concept of ‘bona 
fide’ fisher is partly associated with intangible phenomena such as ‘historical fishing experience’, and is 
thus difficult to define in a precise and categorical manner. Although the formal criteria were established in 
the interim relief process to identify ‘bona fide’ fishers, the act of drawing a clear boundary between who is 
or is not ‘bona fide’ can often involve a strong element of subjective judgement.   
40 The industrial WCRL sector filed a case against the Minister of DEAT to oppose the interim relief 
fishery, with which it was competing for the WCRL allocations - see West Coast Rock Lobster 
Association and Others versus the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2010 
(532/09) ZASCA 114. 
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ANC government’s re-structuring of state departments in 2010, in which DEAT was 
divided into two new ministries: the Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) and 
the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF). The mandate of DEA is 
primarily focused on environmental conservation, and its responsibilities include MPA 
management and policy-making41. DAFF became the new national authority governing 
fisheries, whose responsibilities include allocating fishing rights and export permits, 
regulating large and small-scale fishing activities, conducting scientific research, and 
formulating fisheries policy. In contrast to the former fisheries authority under DEAT, 
DAFF’s mandate has a strong emphasis on economic development and poverty 
alleviation, which allows greater latitude for the department to pursue the economic and 
racial transformation of South Africa’s fisheries.  
It could be argued that this institutional re-structuring was closely linked to party politics, 
and the agenda of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) to use fisheries reform 
(and the SSF policy in particular) as part of the party’s campaign to gain voter support in 
the Western Cape. In crude summary, the ANC controls eight of the nine provinces in 
the country, with the only exception being the Western Cape, which has been governed 
by the Democratic Alliance (DA) since 2009. As the second most economically-
important province in South Africa, and the only province controlled by an opposition 
party, the Western Cape is of considerable strategic significance, and the ANC is 
engaged in an intensive political campaign to win this province42,43,44,45. During the 2009 
provincial elections, President Jacob Zuma told attendees at a rally in Cape Town that: 
“We must use this election to send a clear message to those in this province who 
disregard the wishes of the people that no longer can they stand in the way of 
transformation. We must mobilise for a resounding ANC victory in the Western 
Cape”46. Media reporting also observed the extensive efforts that “the party is putting 
                                                 
41 At the time of this research there was uncertainty regarding which department had principal jurisdiction 
over MPAs because DAFF was mandated to declare new MPAs under the MLRA, and to regulate fishing 
practices within MPAs. 
42 Marrs D. 2014. ‘Relief for traditional fishermen still far off’.  Business Day. 4 March. 
43 ‘South Africa Updates’. 2014. Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA). 
44 ‘Address by the ANC Treasurer General, Dr Mathews Phosa, to the ANC Provincial General Council  
in the Western Cape’. 2012. ANC Western Cape Provincial Branch. 9 June. 
45 ‘Zuma joins drive to regain Western Cape’.  2014. South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). 17 
February. 
46 ‘Address by ANC President Jacob Zuma to ANC Western Cape rally’.  2009. ANC Western Cape 
Provincial Branch. 4 May.  
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into campaigning in the Western Cape in the hope of regaining some of the ground it has 
lost to the Democratic Alliance in recent years”47. 
Central to this campaign has been the targeting of what is known in local political 
discourse as ‘the coloured vote’48. Demographically, coloured people constitute a 
significant percentage of the Western Cape population, and obtaining their support is a 
pre-requisite for winning provincial elections in this province. Given that many coloured 
people in the Western Cape reside in coastal communities and participate in small-scale 
fishing activities, the ANC has identified small-scale fishing as an important element in 
its campaign to win back the Western Cape. The national broadcaster reported: “The 
ANC is … targeting the fishing community … to increase its popularity amongst the 
Western Cape's key constituencies”49. This strategy was evidenced by the series of visits 
by senior ANC politicians and government officials to coastal communities in the 
Western Cape: President Zuma visited a number of fishing communities along the Cape 
coast in 2009 and 2012, while the DAFF Minister Tina Joemat-Peterson met with local 
fishing communities on the Cape Peninsula in 201350. In the context of the ANC’s 
political campaign to win the Western Cape, there is a strong argument to be made that 
the SSF policy and the broader reform of fisheries governance (through the amendment 
of the MLRA, and the new round of commercial fishing rights) were being viewed by the 
ANC as an opportunity for obtaining the votes of mostly coloured small-scale fishers in 
the province51.  
In 2011, with DAFF as the new fisheries authority, and the ANC seeking to use fisheries 
reform as means to gain votes in the Western Cape, a draft of the SSF policy was 
debated at the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), 
where representatives from the fishing industry, labour unions, small-scale fishing 
communities and government agencies engaged in a series of meetings to reach 
consensus on the policy52. After the NEDLAC process, the revised policy draft was 
                                                 
47 Marrs. 2014. ‘Relief for traditional fishermen still far off’.  Business Day. 4 March. 
48 EISA. 2014. ‘South Africa Updates’.  
49 ‘Zuma joins drive to regain Western Cape’.  2014. South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). 17 
February. 
50 Mokomele P. 2014. ‘Minister embarks on listening campaign in fishing communities ahead of appeals’. 
South Africa Government Online. 20 February. 
51 See ‘Terrible twins: Tina and Iqbal all at sea’. 2012. Noseweek 156. 1 October. 
52 Prospective laws and policies that have national economic implications are required to be negotiated at 
NEDLAC, a formal structure for “social dialogue” between representatives from the private sector, labour 
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subjected to another six months of intensive political reviews and public participation 
processes (Sowman et al. 2014).The SSF policy was finally gazetted in June 2012 under 
the authority of DAFF53. This represented a significant moment in the governance of 
South Africa’s fisheries, and promised to bring about a more equitable form of fisheries 
governance that more closely resembled the vision set out by the national constitution 
(Sowman et al. 2014).. Not only did the policy give legal recognition to the rights of 
small-scale fishing communities, but it also proposed a “paradigm shift”  in the state’s 
approach to the governance of small-scale fisheries (DAFF 2012: 17).  
The nature of the policy’s ambition is articulated in the first line of its introduction: “This 
policy aims to provide redress and recognition to the rights of small-scale fisher 
communities in South Africa … to fulfil the constitutional promise of substantive 
equality” (DAFF 2012: 1). To realise the desired ‘paradigm shift’, the policy proposes a 
range of new measures centred on a community-based approach to small-scale fisheries 
governance, including the allocation of collective, multi-species fishing rights to legal 
entities in those communities recognised by the Minister as ‘small-scale fishing 
communities’. These legal entities are to be controlled by residents within these 
communities, whose will have the authority to decide how to distribute and utilise these 
fishing rights amongst themselves.  The policy also proposes that small-scale fishers 
should have active representation and participation in fisheries policy processes, and in 
the management of their own fishing activities.  
In the policy, ‘small-scale fishers’ are defined as “persons that fish to meet basic 
livelihood needs or are directly involved in harvesting/processing or marketing of fish, 
traditionally operate on/near the fishing grounds, predominantly employ traditional low 
technology or passive fishing gear, usually undertake single day fishing trips and are 
engaged in the sale or barter or involved in commercial activity (sic)” (DAFF 2012: 6). 
To identify ‘bona fide’ small-scale fishers who were eligible for inclusion in the 
community-based legal entities, the policy designated a set of criteria for determining 
eligibility, which included those who “harvest marine living resources directly”, or 
“those involved on a daily basis in operations such as processing or marketing …”, and 
those with “historical involvement” in small-scale fisheries-related activities (at least ten 
                                                                                                                                                        
unions, and the government (www.nedlac.org.za). The SSF policy was unique in that small-scale fishers 
were added as a fourth stakeholder group, under the title of ‘community’.   
53 DAFF. 2012.  Policy for the small-scale fisheries sector in South Africa. Pretoria: Government Gazette 
2012. 
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years of experience) (DAFF 2012: 38). The policy states that individuals who meet these 
bona fide small-scale fisher criteria should be identified through a community-based 
verification process - according to the policy, it is “the responsibility of the small-scale 
fishing community to identify the small-scale fishers within that community …” (DAFF 
2012: 40). People identified as bona fide fishers are required to establish what the policy 
describes as a ‘community-based legal entity’ - a formal, commercial structure to which 
small-scale fishing rights are to be allocated (DAFF 2012).  
While bona fide small-scale fishers are the primary focus of the SSF policy, there is also a 
broader developmental aim of using small-scale fisheries as a basis for poverty alleviation 
and economic development in coastal communities (DAFF 2012: 4). This includes 
government support for the development of landing sites, transport and post-harvest 
facilities. Another fundamental element in the policy’s paradigm shift is “the principle of 
preferential access to small-scale fishing communities who have traditionally depended 
on marine living resources for their livelihood”, which legally mandated the 
prioritisation of the rights of small-scale fishing communities to access fisheries species 
for the first time in South Africa’s  history (DAFF 2012: 10). The policy also recognises 
the customary rights and practices of small-scale fishing communities (DAFF 2012: 
14)54. This is especially important for communities along in the Eastern Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal, where small-scale fishing is conducted under the authority of tribal 
leadership, and according to traditional, locally-specific rules (Sunde et al. 2011). 
At the time of this research, a plan to implement the SSF policy was formulated by a 
legal consulting firm on behalf of DAFF. The implementation plan was opened for 
public comment in August 2013, and a number of public consultation meetings were 
held in coastal communities throughout the country. However, as late as August 2014, 
the policy had not yet been implemented, and the interim relief system remained in 
place, with many small-scale fishers continuing to rely on interim relief permits to 
sustain themselves and their families. Nevertheless, the impact of the policy was already 
evident in coastal communities on the Cape Peninsula, where the policy process had 
converged with a number of other fisheries governance processes.  
                                                 
54 Customary rights are recognised in Section 211 (3) of the South African Constitution, and have been 
affirmed by legal precedent in a number of cases, including Alexkor Ltd. versus The Richtersveld 
Community 2004(5) SA 460 (CC). 
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To begin with, the policy’s inclusion of co-operatives as one possible form of 
community-based legal entity, was converging with the Department of Trade and 
Industry’s (DTI) Co-operative Incentive Scheme (CIS) and Fishing Cluster Project 
(FCP). This convergence has fuelled the formation of dozens of small-scale fishing co-
operatives throughout the Northern and Western Cape Provinces (including on the Cape 
Peninsula)55. Through the FCP, the CIS offered up to ZAR350 000 for residents in 
coastal communities to form small-scale fishing co-operatives, creating a significant 
incentive in the context of widespread poverty and unemployment. The expected 
allocation of small-scale fishing rights to community-based legal entities under the SSF 
policy has created further incentive for the formation of fishing co-operatives. However, 
at the time of this research, the legal standing of these co-operatives in relation to fishing 
rights allocations was unclear as the SSF policy had not yet been implemented.   
The SSF policy, and the rapid development of co-operatives were also converging with 
the expiration of medium and long term commercial fishing rights, including those for 
economically-valuable species (such as WCRL and abalone) which are targeted by both 
the large and small-scale fishing sectors (Sowman et al. 2014). The expiration of 
commercial fishing rights has created the political and administrative opportunity for 
DAFF to re-distribute a percentage of commercial fishing rights from the large to the 
small-scale fishing sector. After a series of public participation processes, a general policy 
for the allocation of commercial fishing rights was gazetted in July 2013, making 
provision for the re-distribution of fishing rights in accordance with the SSF policy56. 
There is widespread expectation in coastal communities that DAFF will do so, and this 
has prompted many residents of these communities to establish co-operatives in 
anticipation of the new commercial fishing rights allocation process57. In order to 
accommodate small-scale fishing communities in the new round of commercial fishing 
rights allocations, a parallel process to amend the MLRA was initiated, which saw 
public hearings being held at parliament buildings in Cape Town in October 2013. The 
political stage was thus set for a rapid shift in the governance of small-scale fisheries in 
South Africa.    
                                                 
55 See DTI. 2013. ‘2012-13 Incentive Performance Report’. The Industrial Development Incentive 
Administration Division. 
56 DAFF. 2013. General policy on the allocation and management of fishing rights. Pretoria: DAFF. 
57‘DTI supports small-scale fisheries’. 2013. South African Government News Agency. 24 March.  
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Having provided a broad overview of the fisheries governance context in South Africa, 
the discussion hones in on the Cape Peninsula, and introduces the three case sites that 
constituted the empirical focus of this research. 
4.3. Empirical case sites on the Cape Peninsula  
The Cape Peninsula is defined by its narrow jagged form, bound on both sides by the 
ocean. Dramatic mountains form the spine of the peninsula, and tower above the sandy 
and rocky shoreline, creating the vistas that characterise Cape Town’s natural beauty. 
The Cape Peninsula is located within the boundaries of the Table Mountain National 
Park (TMNP), a protected area that is interwoven with an urban environment, and 
which seeks to protect and showcase this distinctive coastal ecosystem. The Peninsula 
also forms part of the Cape Floristic Region, a floral ‘biosphere’ that has been designated 
by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site of global significance58. The flora (known as 
fynbos) is exceptionally diverse - there are 8200 documented plant species, 85% of which 
are unique to the Cape region, many of these species can only be found along the Cape 
Peninsula. (Fowkes and Younge 2002: 1). The coastal waters of the peninsula are also 
rich with biodiversity, and form part of the TMNP’s MPA. Located near the confluence 
between the Agulhas and Benguela Current systems, these waters provide an abundant 
environment for hundreds of different marine and coastal species (Branch and Clark 
2006). 
In the midst of this natural splendour is the City of Cape Town, a densely populated 
urban environment The city centre is located on the northern boundaries of the TMNP, 
but the municipality itself is spread along the length of the Peninsula, and into the heart 
of this national park. There are significant anthropogenic pressures associated with this 
metropolitan area of over 3 million people. Dozens of residential and industrial areas 
produce large amounts of pollution that has a direct impact on the natural environment 
(Clark 2002). The Cape Peninsula is also the site of intense pressure from the harvesting 
of marine and coastal resources for recreational, small-scale and commercial purposes 
(Clark 2001). Small-scale and industrial fisheries are highly active in this area. The 
former is mainly constituted by a small fleet of skiboats and bakkies that target marine 
                                                 
58 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation  (UNESCO) 
(http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/) 
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species such as snoek, yellowtail, WCRL, abalone and hottentot59. The industrial 
fisheries - defined here as capital and technology-intensive fishing activities conducted on 
a large commercial scale - consist predominantly of pelagic trawlers, hake trawl and 
longliners, tuna pole and WCRL trap vessels. Although the industrial and small-scale 
fisheries generally target different species, there is a significant degree of overlap with 
regard to the harvesting of WCRL, which is targeted by both small-scale and industrial 
vessels. Despite the regulatory distinction between ‘nearshore’ (small-scale) and 
‘offshore’ (industrial) WCRL sectors, they often operate at sea in close proximity to each 
other, and are direct competition with regard to the allocation of WCRL quotas60.  
Anthropogenic pressures on the Cape Peninsula’s coastal environment are currently 
managed by a palimpsest of interweaving institutional jurisdiction and responsibilities. 
Fisheries-related activities are governed by DAFF, which has an enforcement presence 
in and around the main harbours and landing sites. DEA is responsible for setting 
policies for MPA governance and management, which has a direct bearing on coastal 
and marine resource access and use within the TMNP MPA.  At the same time, 
SANParks is responsible for day-to-day management of terrestrial and marine activities 
within the TMNP and its adjacent MPA. The City of Cape Town Municipality (CCTM) 
is responsible for activities such as land use, water and waste management. The legal and 
policy framework governing the Peninsula’s coastline is as complex as the range of 
resource users and management agencies. To begin with, all activities that have 
environmental impacts are subject to the National Environmental Management Act of 
1998 (NEMA). Governance of the TMNP is also guided by the NEM: Protected Areas 
Act (2003), as well as the NEM: Biodiversity Act (2004). Fishing activities are governed 
by the MLRA, as well as the recently gazetted SSF policy (2012). The ICMA (2008), 
which aims for the holistic management of the coastal space, also contains provisions 
                                                 
59 ‘Skiboats’ were introduced in South Africa in the 1970s, and have become widely used in the linefishery 
because they can be easily towed, and can launch in a range of conditions. They are made of fibreglass, are 
between 10 and 15metres in length, and are propelled by two powerful outboard engines. ‘Bakkies’ are 
traditional wooden and fibre-glass vessels, averaging five to seven metres in length. Most are now 
propelled by small outboard motors, but in some places on the west coast, bakkies are still propelled using 
traditional rowing oars. Bakkies have gradually been replaced by the larger and more powerful skiboat. 
60 The WCRL fishery is divided into two sectors: ‘nearshore’ and ‘offshore’ (see DEAT’s 2001 medium 
term and 2005 long term commercial fishing rights allocation policies). Around the Cape Peninsula, the 
nearshore WCRL sector could be described as a small-scale fishery which operates within one nautical 
mile from shore using small (<10m) motorised vessels, and which is characterised by the use of hoop-nets 
which are lowered and raised by hand. The ‘offshore’ WCRL sector operates on a much larger scale, using 
industrial (>10m) vessels that range from 500 metres to 5 nautical miles from shore, utilising steel traps 
that are lowered and raised with powerful onboard machinery.     
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relevant to the management of the TMNP. To complicate matters, the draft Coastal 
Protection Zone by-law places restrictions on activities in the coastal zone between the 
high water mark and the coastal edge line within the jurisdiction of the CCTM. 
As one moves south along the Cape Peninsula, the environment changes from urban to 
peri-urban.  There are a number of small towns and villages nestled in coves between the 
mountains and the sea. It is along the southwestern portion of the Peninsula that field 
research was conducted. The following section introduces the three case sites, namely 
the coastal communities of Ocean View (primary case site), and Hangberg and Imizamo 
Yethu in Hout Bay (supplementary case sites), with a particular focus on the primary 
case site of Ocean View. 
 
Figure 2: Map of Cape Peninsula indicating location of case sites. 
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4.3.1. Ocean View: the primary case site 
Ocean View was the primary case site. This relatively isolated peri-urban coastal town 
has a population of roughly 41 000 people, and is located on the southwestern portion of 
the Cape Peninsula, where it borders the TMNP, with spectacular views of the Atlantic 
Ocean, Noordhoek beach, and the surrounding mountains. Ocean View was established 
in 1968 under the apartheid-era Group Areas Act (1950), which mandated the forced 
relocation of coloured communities from surrounding areas like Noordhoek, Fish Hoek, 
Simonstown, Red Hill, Kommetjie and Witsands61. 
 
Figure 3: Map of southern Cape Peninsula, indicating location of primary case site of Ocean View, and 
key areas mentioned in relation to the primary case site. 
 
                                                 
61 The Group Areas Act (1950) was the principal legal mechanism for implementing racially-segregated 
spatial development during apartheid. More specifically, the Group Areas Act mandated the forced 
removal of ‘non-white’ people away from residential areas designated for ‘white’ people, and into 
residential areas specially designated for ‘non-white’ people. Between 1960 and 1983, more than 3 million 
people were forcibly relocated. 
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4.3.1. a) Socio-economic conditions 
Socio-economic conditions are typical of coloured and black coastal townships along 
South Africa’s coastline, with poverty and marginalisation characterising the lives of a 
significant percentage of the local population62. These conditions have their foundation 
in the structural inequalities of the past, and have been reinforced through the structural 
inequalities of the present. The alignment between class and race that was initiated by 
colonialism, and refined by apartheid, has largely been reproduced by the free market 
economic policy orientation of the post-apartheid state (Bond 2004). As was argued in 
Chapter Two, the post-apartheid state has sought to act as a developmental state within 
the strictures of a macro-economic policy approach that is averse to the kind of radical 
state intervention in the economy (such as the re-distribution of wealth) that is required 
to address the structural inequality of colonialism and apartheid (Bond 2005). With few 
exceptions, most coloured and black people living in coastal communities - such as 
Ocean View - who were poor before 1994 are still poor (DEAT 2000, Sowman 2006, 
Isaacs 2007)63. 
The level of formal education among Ocean View residents is relatively low. Though 
there are two primary schools and one high school in Ocean View, national census 
figures from 2011 indicate that only 15 % of residents surveyed above the age of 18 have 
completed high school64.  Again, in keeping with the trend in coloured and black coastal 
townships, there are few economic opportunities in Ocean View, and unemployment 
levels are high. The national census found that only 31% of residents were employed. 
Many of these residents are employed in surrounding areas, working in skilled sectors 
(such as office administration, electrical, plumbing, carpentry, and brick-laying), and 
‘unskilled’ sectors (such as domestic work, garden maintenance, and manual labour) 
(Battersby 2011: 7). Income levels in Ocean View are generally low - according to the 
2011 national census, 31% of households in Ocean View had an annual income of 
between ZAR38 200 and ZAR76 400 per year. The census also indicated that 35% of 
                                                 
62 ‘Poverty’ is loosely defined here as ‘living on less than USD1.25 per day’, following the United Nations 
Development Programme’s classification (UNDP 2013). In the South African context (with current 
exchange rates of roughly ZAR10 to USD1), this equates to less than ZAR10 per day, or less than 
ZAR3650 per year. The UNDP definition is included here to provide comparative perspective. However, 
it should be noted that this measurement is misleading when applied to the South African context, because 
many people live in conditions of considerable material deprivation and insecurity, even though they 
survive on more than ZAR10 per day. 
63 See DEAT. 2000. Subsistence Fisheries Task Group, Final Report 2. 
64 Statistics South Africa. 2011. National Census. The Census surveyed 13569 Ocean View residents. 
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individual respondents in Ocean View had no income, while 32% only earned between 
ZAR801 and ZAR6400per month.    
As is the case in many other coastal communities in South Africa, the high levels of 
unemployment and economic insecurity among Ocean View residents contribute 
towards a widespread dependence on social grants from the government, These social 
grants are designated for pensioners, disabled people, and children, and are often the 
only source of income for entire households. Although they provide critical relief to 
disadvantaged Ocean View residents, the contribution of social grants is limited by their 
relatively small monetary value (ZAR300 per month for a child grant, and ZAR1200 per 
month for pensioners). A significant percentage of Ocean View residents are registered as 
grant recipients, and the number of people who benefit is much higher if we consider the 
number of household and family members who depend on each grant (Battersby 2011).  
Most Ocean View residents live in free-standing and semi-detached brick homes, and in 
multi-storey apartment blocks. These formal dwellings are connected to the municipal 
water and electricity grid, and are provided with waste removal services, though it was 
often observed during this research that these services were erratic; in particular, there 
were many occasions when the supply of water to resident’s homes was shut off for 
many hours at a time. The demand for housing in Ocean View exceeds supply, and 
residents are often forced to live in overcrowded conditions, with many residents living 
in small wooden structures erected in backyards. This research identified several distinct 
but interwoven neighbourhoods in Ocean View. The original part of Ocean View is 
located to the west, and consists of small free-standing brick and mortar houses. By local 
standards, the majority of residents who live in this part of Ocean View could be 
described as low to middle-income. However, most of the other neighbourhoods in 
Ocean View could be described as low income, and were characterised by small free-
standing dwellings, densely-arranged apartment blocks, and informal structures (usually 
constructed from wood). These neighbourhoods included Lapland, Mountain View, and 
‘Ghost Town’ (located next to the local cemetery).  At the foot of the mountains behind 
Ocean View is a small informal settlement composed of roughly 30 wooden shack-
dwellings.  This informal settlement does not receive electricity and other basic service 
provision from the municipality, and exists in legal limbo because it encroaches on the 
boundaries of the TMNP.  
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In this context of poverty, it is common for people in Ocean View to suffer from ill 
health (Isaacs 2013). There are high levels of Tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and 
cardiovascular disease. It was evident from this research that the economic insecurities of 
life in Ocean View also contributed to high levels of anxiety and depression. With few 
resources to address this psychological pressure, many residents opt to self-medicate 
using psychoactive substances. The excessive use of alcohol and methamphetamine 
(known locally as ‘tik’) is widespread in Ocean View (see Kapp 2008). The growing use 
of tik in particular, has had a devastating impact on the community. Besides the health 
risks involved, tik can produce extremely unpredictable and anti-social behaviour in 
users - an effect that is captured by the colloquial term ‘tik monster’.  
The cumulative effect of these economic and social conditions is a sense among many 
local residents that ‘life was better in apartheid’ (OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 
21/01/11; OV Veteran Fisher 13, 14, 15, pers comm 13/07/12; OV Fisher 6, pers comm 
24/10/12; OV Veteran Fisher 1, pers comm 02/011/12). Even if we account for the way 
that nostalgia can omit negative aspects of the past, this controversial claim that 
economic and social conditions has deteriorated during the post-apartheid period 
appears to reflect a general perception among Ocean View’s coloured residents that they 
have been overlooked in the post-apartheid dispensation (see Battersby 2011).  
Having said this, it is critical to emphasise that life in Ocean View is not entirely defined 
by economic insecurity and social tribulation. Without wishing to idealise the situation 
(because Ocean View experienced the same tensions and uneven power relations that 
prevail in all community settings), this research encountered a clear sense of 
‘conviviality’ and ‘community’ among most local residents. It is this sense of 
‘conviviality’ and ‘community’ which enables people in Ocean View (as well as in 
Imizamo Yethu and Hangberg) to negotiate through life together on a day-to-day basis 
(see Ross 2010). In the context of broader structural inequalities, this sense of 
conviviality and community - which was also observed in the supplementary case sites - 
is crucial, not only as a means to facilitate daily social interaction, but also a means to 
ensure material survival. Many residents would likely have nothing to eat and nowhere 
to live if not for the material support of social networks among family, neighbours and 
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friends65. It is thus evident from this research that the hardships that many Ocean View 
residents face are, to some extent, made bearable by the empathy and solidarity that is 
displayed as a matter of daily practice.  
4.3.1. b) History and socio-cultural dynamics    
Though Ocean View was only established in 1968, the area’s history goes back more 
than a century. During this period, the southern peninsula was predominantly farm land 
and wilderness. Before Ocean View was established, there were small rural communities 
in Kommetjie, Witsands, and Slangkop (what is now Ocean View). These communities 
lived from the land and sea - growing vegetables, husbanding animals, and harvesting 
marine and coastal resources. They were multi-racial, with white people living (and 
sometimes intermarrying) with the mainly coloured residents. During the 1960s, these 
small rural communities were broken up, and their coloured residents relocated to Ocean 
View under the Group Areas Act (1950).  
Many people in Ocean View still remember what life was like before the township was 
formally established. Two fishers and lifelong residents spoke of how they lived in 
Slangkop without electricity. They recounted their childhood observations of fishers 
using homemade animal fat lamps to light the way on their pre-dawn walks to Witsands 
(OV Fisher 3 and OV Fisher 4, pers comm 23/10/12). One of these fishers explained 
that his father used to go into the mountain to collect medicinal plants for the family to 
consume as a preventative healthcare measure (OV Fisher 3, pers comm 23/10/12).    
The most senior female fisher in Ocean View (OV Veteran Fisher 4) was in her early 
eighties during this research, and was the matriarch of a local family of fishers. She was 
born at Buffelsbaai (located in what is now the Cape of Good Hope National Park), and 
later moved to Witsands, and finally settled in Ocean View when it was established in 
the late 1960s. Her late husband was a fulltime fisher, and her mother used to work in 
the ‘trek’ fishery in Simonstown, where she also ‘flekked’ fish (mostly snoek and 
yellowtail)66. OV Veteran Fisher 4 explained that before the 1980s, she worked on shore, 
                                                 
65 It should be noted that this form of ‘social capital’ is unevenly distributed, and is not equally available to 
all. Rather, it is the relations of power in the community which determine who has access to which 
resources, and the nature of that access (see Du Toit 2005). 
66 ‘Trek’ is an Afrikaans term that literally means ‘pull’. It used to refer to local beach seine fishing 
activities where a net is dropped around a shoal of fish using a row boat, and then the net is pulled ashore 
by a crew standing on the beach. ‘Flekking’ is a local Afrikaans term for the act of de-scaling and gutting 
fish by hand using a knife. 
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flekking fish, and supporting her husband’s fishing activities. When her husband passed 
away in 1982, she was forced to become the breadwinner in the household. This 
compelled her to go to sea - despite the physical risk of injury and drowning, and the 
social risk of breaking gender-based taboos. She went to sea on a regular basis from 1982 
until 2007 as a professional small-scale fisher, primarily catching WCRL and linefish 
(OV Veteran Fisher 4, pers comm 26/06/12).  
OV Veteran Fisher 4 described the transformation of the area from a rural idyll to a 
bustling peri-urban township, and spoke fondly of “the old days” growing up at 
Witsands (located less than a kilometre south of Ocean View), where a community of 
about twelve coloured and white families lived (OV Veteran Fisher 4, pers comm 
26/06/12). This settlement was established before the 1900s, and existed until the mid-
1960s. She recounted that the Witsands community lived in wooden and aluminium 
shacks. There was only one formal brick structure, and this was demolished when the 
community was re-located, leaving no trace of the people who lived here (OV Veteran 
Fisher 4, pers comm 26/06/12).  
As this veteran fisher explained, the Witsands community lived from the land and sea. 
There were vegetable gardens radiating out from the community homes, providing food 
for the community. Residents would take their surplus produce to markets in 
surrounding areas such as Fish Hoek, Noordhoek and Simonstown. According to her, 
they had about 40 chickens, as well as several ducks, geese, goats, donkeys, sheep, cows, 
and a bull. She explained that when food supplies were low, her father would walk up 
into the mountains behind the community to hunt for ‘dassie’ (a small furry mammal), 
‘klipspringers’ (a small antelope), or even tortoise. The community members would also 
collect shellfish (such as limpets, white mussels, abalone, WCRL) along the coastline by 
hand. Subsistence fishing from the shore with nets and rods was a common practice 
among male community members, as was the use of traditional rowboats to fish in 
nearshore waters.  According to this veteran fisher, the Witsands community did not 
overfish, even though there were virtually no fishing restrictions (OV Veteran Fisher 4, 
pers comm 26/06/12). The knowledge and experience of maritime and fishing-related 
practices among local people such as those residing in the Witsands community can be 
seen as a form of cultural legacy which has been passed down among social and kin 
networks through the generations. This cultural legacy includes detailed empirical 
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knowledge about local ecological dynamics, based on generations of rigorous and 
sustained observation. For example, veteran fishers in Ocean View have considerable 
insight into the interactions between meteorology and fish behaviour, observing that 
linefish such as hottentot will change their feeding behaviour (by ceasing to bite the 
fishers’ lines) in early anticipation of storms that are usually heralded by easterly winds. 
This observation is captured in their colloquial phrase: “the fish has the east wind on its 
mind” (OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 03/05/12).    
Although local fisheries-related practices and social relations have changed over time, 
many veteran fishers continue to identify with this cultural legacy (OV Veteran Fisher 5, 
pers comm 03/10/11; OV Veteran Fisher 3, 4, pers comm 26/06/12).   
4.3.1. c) Fishing: people and practices 
The practices and economics of fishing among Ocean View residents are complex. There 
is significant diversity and dynamism regarding the economic conditions of those who 
participate in fisheries-related activities, the extent of their personal involvement in the 
actual harvesting of fisheries species, and the degree to which their livelihood and 
income is dependent upon fishing. This research indicates that there are roughly between 
1000 and 1500 Ocean View residents participating in fisheries-related activities, and of 
these residents, about 700 are personally involved in the harvesting of marine and coastal 
resources. The vast majority of fishing activities are small-scale. Veteran fishers 
estimated that perhaps only 200 Ocean View residents were ‘bona fide’ fishers whose 
livelihoods were solely dependent on personally harvesting fisheries species fishing, and 
who were embedded in the local fishing culture (OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 
21/01/11; OV Veteran Fisher 3, pers comm 26/06/12; OV Fisher 6, pers comm 
24/10/12; OV Veteran Fisher 1, pers comm 02/11/12).  There was consensus among 
these research participants that bona fide fishers in Ocean View were increasingly being 
outnumbered by new entrants (OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 21/01/11; OV Veteran 
Fisher 3, pers comm 26/06/12; OV Fisher 6, pers comm 24/10/12; OV Veteran Fisher 
1, pers comm 02/11/12). 
Fishing used to have a relatively low social status among most Ocean View residents, 
some of whom he argued perceived fishing to be “a dirty job” (OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers 
comm 03/05/12). However, veteran fishers in Ocean View argued that the social status 
101 | P a g e  
 
of fishing has risen over the last 15 years, as fisheries reform created new economic 
opportunities, and attracted many newcomers who previously perceived fishing to be a 
lowly endeavour, but who increasingly perceived it as a source of income (OV Veteran 
Fisher 5, pers comm 21/01/11; OV Veteran Fisher 3, pers comm 26/06/12; OV Fisher 
6, pers comm 24/10/12; OV Veteran Fisher 1, pers comm 02/11/12). This reflects the 
broader commercialisation, commodification and individualisation of small-scale fishing 
practices, both locally and internationally, that have resulted from the introduction of 
individual fishing rights under market-based macro-economic policy frameworks (see 
Mansfield 2004, St Martin 2007). However, despite the perception that fishing represents 
a potentially valuable source of income, it was evident from this research that many local 
fishers were struggling to meet their basic material needs. While a small minority of 
residents involved in the local fisheries own double-storey homes, motor vehicles, and 
fishing vessels, and by Ocean View’s standards could be described as middle-income; this 
research indicated that a significant number of local fishers lived in conditions of 
material deprivation and insecurity. According to the surveys conducted among local 
fishers during this research: 
 27% of respondents lived in informal shack dwellings; 
 more than half of all respondents (55%) were compelled by economic pressure to 
harvest marine and coastal resources to survive, regardless of whether they were 
in possession of a fishing quota or permit;  
 30% of respondents stated that they skipped meals one or more times per week; 
 39% of respondents lived in households which depended to some extent on social 
grants; 
 only 25% of the respondents had completed high school. 
For many fisher residents, this economic insecurity is significant, and is a primary factor 
influencing their livelihood decision-making processes. To grasp the extent of the 
economic security experienced by so many fishers in in Ocean View, it is worth 
considering a few brief examples. One relatively young but experienced fisher observed 
that his income from fishing was limited and erratic, forcing him to either fish illegally, 
or to go out in search of food or work in the local area: “as you can see, you get me 
walking … because I’m looking for something” (OV Fisher 1, pers comm 03/07/12). He 
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described his intermittent routine of hitchhiking to Kalk Bay harbour to obtain fish 
bones, which he took home to mix with potato and onion to make fish cakes and other 
dishes: “fish bones … that’s good food” (OV Fisher 1, pers comm 03/07/12).  
One of the most esteemed veteran fishers in Ocean View lived in a small informal 
dwelling constructed from corrugated metal, wood and plastic. He shared his home with 
eight other people, including his three adult children, his step-sister, and their four young 
children. They relied primarily on this veteran fisher’s government pension of R1200 per 
month, and it was a daily struggle for him and his family to secure basic material 
necessities. When asked if there were ever days when there was no food in his house, he 
replied: “there are many such days, do you see? Like today for instance” (OV Veteran 
Fisher 13, pers comm 13/07/12).  
In spite of these stark socio-economic conditions, the fact that many Ocean View 
residents were already living in a context of poverty and unemployment meant that 
fishing was a relatively attractive option, if only as a supplementary source of food and 
income. The economic positions of research participants in Ocean View were 
determined to a significant extent by the fishing sectors in which they participated (see 
discussion of fishing activities below). Those who worked in industrial sectors generally 
earned more than those who worked in small-scale fisheries. And within the small-scale 
fisheries, boat owners usually earned more than their crew members.  
The allocation of fishing permits and quotas played an important role in determining the 
socio-economic conditions of residents who participated in fisheries-related activities. At 
the time of this research, Ocean View residents had been allocated roughly 300 interim 
relief permits (OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 03/05/12) and six line fish permits 
(Isaacs 2013). Ten of the survey respondents (12%) had nearshore WCRL quotas. With a 
permit or quota, residents were able to legally harvest specific fisheries species, and could 
earn an income from the sale of their catches. Nearshore WCRL quotas were prized 
because of the economic value of WCRL, and the relative ease of harvesting this species: 
a nearshore quota allocation (averaging roughly 600kg) could be harvested in a few days, 
and could earn the quota holder between ZAR80 000 per annum, and ZAR100 000 per 
annum for their catches. Commercial linefish permits were also prized, though these 
were generally less lucrative than WCRL quotas. Ocean View residents who had been 
allocated interim relief permits were able to catch both WCRL and linefish. However the 
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amount of WCRL allocated per season (an average of 120kg) was relatively small, so the 
total income from this permit was only about ZAR17 000 per annum (OV Veteran 
Fisher 3, pers comm 25/01/11; OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 15/02/11).  
Those who had not received a fishing quota or permit were forced to catch other people’s 
allocations, or to fish illegally as a means to access food and money. Many of these 
fishers opted to use recreational permits to access specific fisheries species. These permits 
were available to any South African citizen at a cost of between roughly ZAR200 per 
permit. 35% of survey respondents had one or more recreational permits (mainly for 
WCRL, and various intertidal shellfish and linefish species). It was a common practice 
for local fishers to use recreational permits to harvest marine species to be sold illegally 
to meet their basic subsistence needs (OV Fisher 1, pers comm 03/07/12).  
Ocean View residents engage in a wide variety of overlapping fishing sectors that 
targeted many different species using a variety of gear and vessels. Some of these 
residents participate in industrial fishing activities such as WCRL trapping, pelagic 
trawling, tuna pole fishing, and hake trawl and long-lining (where they work mostly as 
crew members). These residents often participate in small-scale fishing activities on a 
part-time basis when not working in the industrial sector.  The vast majority of Ocean 
View fishers were engaged in small-scale fishing activities that include fishing for snoek, 
yellowtail and hottentot with hand-held lines, and crayfishing with hoop nets (working 
as crew, skippers and boat owners). Local fishers estimated that in Ocean View, only 
eleven small-scale fishing vessels went to sea throughout the year, with most of these 
vessels registered to operate within the interim relief system, while about twenty other 
small-scale vessels were registered to operate within the nearshore WCRL fishery, and 
only went to sea during the WCRL season, after which they remained in on dry ground 
until the following season (OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 03/05/12; OV Veteran 
Fisher 3, pers comm 14/07/12). Most small-scale boat-based fishing activities conducted 
by Ocean View residents were centred around the Witsands and Kommetjie area, where 
two slipways served as the primary landing sites. The slipway at Witsands is located next 
to a post-harvest facility which was the centre of the local commercial WCRL fishery 
from the 1960s. In 1994, the factory was sold and re-structured, and many of the 
employees were retrenched (OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 03/10/11; OV Veteran 
Fisher 12, pers comm 24/06/12; OV Veteran Fisher 15, pers comm 13/07/12).  
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Many fishers in Ocean View also engaged in the illegal harvesting of fisheries species 
(TMNP Ranger, pers comm 15/11/12; Former DAFF Compliance Officer 09/04/12; 
Private Fisheries Monitor 15/11/12; OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 03/05/12). 
According to most local fishers, illegal fishing played a significant role in the local 
fisheries economy, and was practiced both by fishers who had been allocated permits or 
quotas, and by those who had not (OV Focus Group, pers comm 09/02/12; OV Veteran 
Fisher 5, pers comm 03/04/12). Some research participants harvested marine resources 
illegally for subsistence purposes, with small amounts of WCRL, linefish, and inter-tidal 
molluscs being sold or consumed at home (OV Veteran Fisher 13, pers comm 13/07/12; 
OV Fisher 1, pers comm 03/07/12). However, the majority of illegal fishing practices 
were conducted on a more professional basis, usually by younger fishers from Ocean 
View, many of whom resided in Ocean View’s small informal settlement. This form of 
illegal fishing activities was generally well-organised, and mainly targeted WCRL 
(though abalone was increasingly being targeted), which were harvested in large 
amounts, and then laundered through criminal networks (TMNP Ranger, pers comm 
15/11/12; Former DAFF Compliance Officer 09/04/12; Private Fisheries Monitor 
15/11/12; OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 03/05/12). 
In addition to boat-based fishing activities, many Ocean View residents also engaged in 
shore-based harvesting of coastal fisheries species. These harvesting activities tended to 
utilise low-technology methods, and included shellfish harvesting in the rocky intertidal 
zone using, the use of rods and ‘trek’ nets from beaches to catch a wide range of fish 
species, as well as the use of homemade bamboo rod and line to harvest WCRL. Shore-
based resource harvesting made an important contribution to the local food economy. 
This happened in a number of important ways. For example, personal access to the 
marine and coastal environment served as a ‘safety-net’ for poorer Ocean View residents 
when they have no money to purchase food. One local fisher in his thirties observed that 
when he had no money or food for his family, he would collect white mussels, primarily 
because these were locally accessible, and because white mussels were included in his 
interim relief permit (OV Fisher 5, pers comm 23/10/12).  
It was often observed that fishers would distribute some of their linefish catch (mainly 
snoek, and hottentot) through their social networks for free, or to the local community at 
affordable prices. One of Ocean View’s most experienced and respected fishers stated 
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that this practice “makes it cheaper for the community … for the poor in our community 
… to buy straight from us, than via the fish merchants, you know?” (OV Veteran Fisher 
2, pers comm 02/11/12)67. Yet, many fishers argued that the increasing regulation of 
fishing, the commodification of fishing, and increasing economic hardship have changed 
the value and meaning of fish. The majority of research participants in Ocean View 
observed that the flow of cheap fish into the local food economy has been reduced, with 
fishers opting to sell all of their catch to professional buyers, rather than selling it 
cheaply, or giving some of it away in the community.  
The relationship of Ocean View residents to the local coastal environment is not only 
about livelihoods, but also about recreation and enjoyment. For example, in the early 
1990s, there was a popular pastime among Ocean View residents of frequenting the 
‘Soetwater’ area during the summer. Dozens of people would camp on the beach, 
spending their days swimming, drinking, eating and generally having a pleasurable time. 
During this period there were very fewer regulations, and people were effectively free to 
harvest small amounts of abalone and WCRL along the intertidal rock shelves. This 
fresh catch would be cooked on the fire, or even eaten raw (TMNP Ranger, pers comm 
15/11/12, OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 03/05/12).  
However, local residents pointed to the gradual erosion of the cultural practice of shore-
based harvesting, which they attribute to a number of factors, principally the rapid 
expansion of fishing regulations. Older fishers in Ocean View observe that there were 
very few formal regulations until the 1960s, when fishers were suddenly prohibited from 
going to sea between 4pm and 8am. These new regulations also included limitations on 
the daily amount that fishers were permitted to harvest. In addition, it was during this 
period that fisheries inspectors began to monitor landing sites Local fishers explained 
that during the 1980s, quotas were introduced, which further excluded local fishers from 
access.  They argued that since the implementation of the MLRA, and the establishment 
of the TMNP MPA (which included the Cape of Good Hope Restricted Zone to the 
south of Witsands), the regulatory regime governing their access to marine resources 
have increased, and become more onerous (OV Veteran Fisher 4, pers comm 26/06/12; 
OV Veteran Fisher 13, pers comm 13/07/12; OV Veteran Fisher 1, pers comm 
                                                 
67 The ‘fish merchants’ referred to here are known by the colloquial Afrikaans term ‘langaanas’. Langaanas 
purchase fish directly from local fishers at the landing site. They use their vehicles to transport this fish 
around the Cape Town region, most in the poorer coloured communities on the Cape Flats, selling most of 
it along the road side (Isaacs 2013).    
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02/11/12). The perception and experience of a regulatory explosion that was 
increasingly constraining the fishing practices of local residents was regularly articulated 
by veteran fishers in Ocean View. According to one veteran fisher in his late sixties: 
“… we lived much better during apartheid because I could go and catch anything that is in the sea … but 
now I must have a piece of paper to go an collect something from the sea … and it’s not only me who 
suffers as a result, but my whole family suffers … the other day during apartheid … when the sea was 
rough, I could walk to the beach and collect some limpets ….  or mussels … I went to the beach the other 
day … to harvest some mussels … when I turned around there were two inspectors standing behind me -  
‘do you have a permit?’ I said ‘no’. Then I said to them ‘I’ve only removed six mussels’. So they told me 
‘you can take those, but just go’. Now what can I do with only six mussels? So I just threw them away, 
and haven’t been back since” (OV Veteran Fisher 13, pers comm 13/07/12). 
4.3.2. Hangberg  
The discussion now moves from the primary case site of Ocean View, to the 
supplementary case site of Hangberg in Hout Bay, a major fishing centre located roughly 
ten kilometres to the north of Ocean View along the Peninsula’s coastline.  The township 
of Hangberg has a population of roughly 15 000 people68. It clings to the slopes of the 
Sentinel Peak in the southwestern corner of Hout Bay, overlooking the harbour. Like 
Ocean View, Hangberg is surrounded by the TMNP. The village now known as 
Hangberg was originally established in 1956 under the Group Areas Act (1950), when 
the apartheid authorities created a new residential area to house the coloured population 
of Hout Bay, many of whom were working for the fishing companies at the harbour 
(Witte 2010, Fieuw 2011). The socio-cultural context is broadly similar to that found in 
Ocean View: most of the residents are coloured, and speak Afrikaans as a first language, 
and English as a second language69.  
4.3.2. a) Socio-economic conditions  
At the time of this research, the levels of poverty and unemployment in Hangberg were 
broadly similar, if not higher than they were in Ocean View. The nostalgia for apartheid 
articulated by some research participants in Ocean View was also encountered among 
some research participants in Hangberg (see below). According to the 2011 national 
census, formal education levels are relatively low - although there is a primary and a high 
                                                 
68 Statistics South Africa. 2011. National Census. 
69 Statistics South Africa. 2011. National Census. 
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school located in Hangberg, only 12.5% of census respondents had completed high 
school. Only 29% of Hangberg residents had some form of employment, and roughly 
37% of residents had no source of income70. Consequently, there is a considerable 
reliance upon government grants in Hangberg (Hauck 2009). Housing is in even shorter 
supply than in Ocean View. In Hangberg, approximately 22% of residents live in 
informal housing (mostly wooden shack-dwellings)71. From 1994 onwards, a small 
informal settlement has also developed along Hangberg’s perimeter at the base of the 
Sentinel Mountain (Fieuw 2011). Severe housing shortages in Hangberg, compounded 
by unresolved questions of land ownership, eventually led to violent clashes between 
residents and police in 2010. Police and military forces were called in, and several 
residents were seriously injured (Fieuw 2011).   
The high levels of poverty and unemployment in Hangberg can be partly attributed to 
the decline of the fishing industry in Hout Bay in the 1990s. From the 1950s until the 
1980s, industrial fishing and processing activities were the foundation of the local 
economy, and a significant proportion of the Hangberg population worked on industrial 
fishing vessels, and in the fish factories which operated from the harbour. However, from 
1990s, these companies began to restructure their operations in response to the post-
apartheid transformation of fisheries, the pressures of declining resources, and the formal 
re-integration of South Africa’s industrial fisheries into the global economy (see Crosoer 
et al. 2006). This restructuring process led to widespread retrenchments of Hangberg 
residents (Hauck 2009). At the time of this research, the number of commercial fishing 
vessels on the harbour had declined, and some factories stood empty. In 2010, there were 
only 127 Hangberg residents employed (many on a seasonal basis) at the eight fish 
processing and storage facilities, and three fish shops operating on Hout Bay harbour 
(Witte 2010). At the same time, a gentrification process has steadily unfolded at the 
harbour, where the economic focus has shifted from fishing to tourism (reflecting the 
experience of other fishing harbours in South Africa).  
 
 
                                                 
70 Statistics South Africa. 2011. National Census. 
71 Statistics South Africa. 2011. National Census. 
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4.3.2. b) History and socio-cultural dynamics 
As is the case in Ocean View, many Hangberg residents have a long history of harvesting 
fisheries species along the local coastline, one which pre-dated the formal establishment 
of Hangberg itself. At the time of this research there was an emerging discourse among 
some Hangberg residents which positioned them as direct living descendants of the 
Khoi-San people - the original inhabitants and fishers of the Cape Peninsula (HGB 
Fisher 4, 9, pers comm 12/04/12). Fishing practices are thus deeply rooted into the 
history and culture of the Hangberg community (see Hauck 2009, Sowman et al. 2011). 
Some of the community elders explained that during apartheid, they lived in informal 
structures amongst the milkwoods behind Hout Bay beach, and recalled these days with 
fondness (HGB Veteran Fisher 1, 2, 3, 4, pers comm 09/04/12).  Describing life during 
this period, one of these elders explained that her family had experienced “the hard times 
of apartheid”, yet she maintained that, in many ways, life had become more difficult 
since that time. According to this research participant, the inherent injustices of 
apartheid were mitigated to some degree by the fact that “there was work for everyone”, 
and people came from relatively distant places including Ocean View and Grassy Park to 
work on the harbour (HGB Veteran Fisher 2, pers comm 09/04/12). 
Several Hangberg residents observed that local people used to enjoy a relative degree of 
freedom with regard to the small-scale harvesting of local fisheries species (HGB Fisher 
3, pers comm 09/04/12; HGB Fisher 7, 8, pers comm 12/04/12). They explained that, 
until the 1990s, small-scale fishing activities provided a basic safety-net for local people, 
who had the option of walking to the beach and participating in trek-net fishing 
activities, or harvesting fish and shellfish along the rocky shoreline (HGB Fisher 3, pers 
comm 09/04/12; HGB Fisher 7, 8, pers comm 12/04/12). Despite the presence of 
exclusionary marine protected areas from the 1930s onwards (see below), these small-
scale fishing activities provided a dependable source of food and income, not only for 
fishers, but also for others in the broader Hout Bay community (Hauck 2009).  
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4.3.2. c) Fishing: people and practices  
Hangberg residents engage in the same broad continuum of interrelated fishing activities 
as people in Ocean View. The continuum ranges from subsistence foraging for shellfish 
to crewing on industrial vessels. There are roughly 400 residents who personally harvest 
fisheries resources (though the exact figures were unavailable) (Witte 2010). Though 
many Hangberg residents are employed in more than one sector, most concentrate on 
small-scale fishing activities, principally the harvesting of WCRL using hoop nets, 
catching snoek, yellowtail and hottentot with handlines, and diving for WCRL and 
abalone. Witte (2010) documented 45 people in Hangberg catching traditional linefish, 
12 people catching WCRL, and 85 catching a variety of species under interim relief 
permits. Small-scale fishing activities play a central role in the livelihoods of Hangberg 
residents. 
Many of Hangberg’s small-scale fishers share the same basic conditions of economic 
insecurity as Hangberg’s non-fisher residents (Hauck 2009). These conditions contribute 
to increased levels of participation among local fishers in Hangberg’s booming informal 
WCRL and abalone fisheries which operates largely outside of legal regulation (Hauck 
2009, Witte 2010, Greef 2013). A significant number of residents have direct or indirect 
ties to these fisheries, which are crucial to the Hangberg economy (Hauck 2009, Greef 
2013). Local fishers point to the decline of the fishing industry at the harbour as a reason 
for increased prevalence of illegal fishing practices in Hangberg, as one fisher observed:  
“what’s going to happen, if you close all the factories? My mother isn’t working, my father isn’t working, 
I’m at home. No income is coming in. What am I going to do? You see I’m going to go to the rocks. I’m 
going to go make a living for myself and my family. And when I start doing that, they [the fisheries 
authority] classify me as a poacher … as a criminal” (HGB Fisher 2, pers comm 12/04/12). 
Regulatory defiance has also been fuelled by the exclusion of many local fishers in 
Hangberg from the medium term (2001) and long term (2005) fishing rights allocation 
processes, as one Hangberg fisher representative explained:  “after they gave the quotas 
to the doctors and teachers and all that, so the real fisher was standing outside in the 
cold. So what he did is, the next day … he take the row boat around the corner to get a 
few rand to feed his family. And then the police come and say he’s a poacher?! He didn’t 
even know what is a poacher!” (HGB Fisher 1, pers comm 12/04/12). The practice of 
fishing outside of the law in Hangberg is also fuelled by the exclusionary spatial 
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management of the waters adjacent to Hangberg - an area where residents and their 
ancestors have fished for over a century, but which has been subjected to successive 
waves of enclosure that have excluded local people from access to the marine commons 
(Hauck 2009, Sowman et al. 2011, Greef 2013). The Table Bay WCRL Sanctuary has 
prohibited the harvesting of WCRL since 1934 (Sowman et al. 2010). And in 2004, the 
TMNP MPA was established, with the Karbonkelberg Restricted Zone (KBRZ) adding 
another layer of exclusion by prohibiting all fishing activities along Hangberg’s coastline.  
4.3.3. Imizamo Yethu 
The second case site in Hout Bay is Imizamo Yethu, situated across the valley to the 
northeast of Hangberg. The township sprawls up the steep mountainside, tucked almost 
out of site from the surrounding affluent white neighbourhoods. It is markedly different 
to both Ocean View and Hangberg because the majority of the population of roughly 50 
000 people are black. Imizamo Yethu was formally established in 1991 to house the 
black residents of five small informal settlements located around Hout Bay, many of 
whom had a history of working on farms in the area, or in the local fishing industry 
(Sowman and Gawith 1994, Oelofse and Dodson 1997).  From the end of apartheid 
onwards, Imizamo Yethu’s population grew rapidly as black economic migrants moved 
to the township from other provinces in South Africa, and from the rest of the African 
continent, many of whom were seeking employment in the local fishing industry (see 
below).  
4.3.3. a) Socio-economic conditions 
Imizamo Yethu has higher levels of poverty and unemployment than the coloured 
townships of Ocean View and Hangberg. National census figures indicate that 39% of 
working age residents had some form of employment72. Most of these residents worked 
in low-skill jobs in the white neighbourhoods and retail centres, and earn minimal 
wages73. In 2010 there were 73 Imizamo Yethu residents working in the fish shops and 
processing facilities at the harbour. According to the same census figures, most 
individuals (41%) earned a monthly income of between ZAR1 and ZAR6400, while 39% 
of individuals had no income74. As was the case in Ocean View and Hangberg, Imizamo 
                                                 
72 Statistics South Africa. 2011. National Census. 
73 Development Action Group. 2003  
74 Statistics South Africa. 2011. National Census. 
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Yethu residents depend to a significant degree upon government grants as a means to 
survive.  
There are two schools located in the township, but only 20% of residents over the age of 
18 had completed high school75.  The competition for scarce resources is exacerbated by 
the increased level of economic migration to Imizamo Yethu of people in search of 
employment in Hout Bay. A 2003 survey conducted by a local NGO found that 95% of 
respondents were born in South Africa, with the other 5% of respondents  had moved to 
Imizamo Yethu from other African countries such as Angola, Mozambique and 
Namibia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo76. However, only 17% of respondents 
who were originally from South Africa were born in the Western Cape, with most of 
these respondents (79%) having been born in the Eastern Cape. This survey also 
indicates that 55% of those who had migrated to Imizamo Yethu had done for the 
purpose of seeking employment, particularly in the local fishing industry77. 
Imizamo Yethu has a combination of formal and informal housing. The majority of 
residents (62%) lived in informal dwellings, while roughly 20% of residents lived in brick 
and mortar structures78, of which roughly 70 were RDP houses, while nearly 500 houses 
have been built with funding support from an Irish philanthropist79.  Many people suffer 
from ill health, with high levels of TB and HIV/AIDS (Shortt and Hammett 2013). 
Levels of substance abuse are also high, and continue to increase because of the 
marginalisation and economic insecurity faced by many Imizamo Yethu residents (Kapp 
2008). Affirming the views expressed by several research participants in Ocean View and 
Hangberg, some Imizamo Yethu residents articulated a sense that life had, in some 
ways, become more difficult since the end of apartheid. One research participant 
explained that “when the white government was in power”, there was less 
unemployment, and it was very rare to see people in Hout Bay rummaging through 
rubbish bins for food, or being permanently homeless, but he argued that this kind of 
                                                 
75 Statistics South Africa. 2011. National Census. 
76 Development Action Group. 2003. 
77 Development Action Group. 2003. It must be noted that the facts on the ground are highly dynamic, 
and these DAG figures may have changed since they were documented in 2003. However, the general 
pattern of in-migration indicated here is broadly congruent with the observations conducted during this 
research.  
78 Statistics South Africa. 2011. National Census. 
79 Niall Mellon Township Trust. 2007. ‘Summary Report 2007’. 
112 | P a g e  
 
extreme poverty has become more common in the post-apartheid period (IY Fisher 5, 
pers comm 10/04/12). 
4.3.3. b) History and socio-cultural dynamics  
As a black township in Hout Bay (which is largely populated by white and coloured 
people), Imizamo Yethu is socially isolated. There is a popular narrative among white 
residents which positions black people as ‘outsiders’ who have only come to the Hout 
Bay after 1994 (Dixon et al. 1997, Saff 2001). However, this narrative is contradicted by 
the historical record: while it is true that the number of black people living in Imizamo 
Yethu increased considerably since 1994 as a result of economic migration, there has 
been a black population living and working in Hout Bay since at least to the 1940s (Lees 
1969). While Imizamo Yethu was only established in the early 1990s, many of its 
original residents had already been living in Hout Bay for several decades before moving 
there, mostly working in the local industrial fisheries, and on local farms (Sowman and 
Gawith 1994, Oelofse and Dodson 1997). However, during this PhD research, several 
Imizamo Yethu residents argued that the historical presence of black people in Hout Bay 
had been negated by the broader Hout Bay community (IY Veteran Fisher 1, 2, pers 
comm 06/04/12; IY Fisher 5, pers comm 10/04/12).  
4.3.3. c) Fisheries: people and practices 
A relatively small minority of Imizamo Yethu residents (roughly 250, though the precise 
number is unknown) participate in local fisheries-related activities at the time of this 
research (see Witte 2010).  Most of the fishers encountered during this research shared 
the same basic conditions of economic insecurity as those experienced by other Imizamo 
Yethu residents: these fishers lived in informal structures and small RDP houses, 
struggled to meet their basic material needs, and had low relatively levels of formal 
education. The racialised notion of ‘black people as outsiders’ in Hout Bay (as perceived 
by many coloured and white residents) had also filtered down into the local field of 
fishing. Several coloured research participants in Hangberg expressed the view that black 
people do not have an affinity for the ocean in the same way that coloured people do 
(HGB Fisher 2, 8, 9, pers comm 12/04/12; HGB Fisher 3, pers comm 09/08/12).  
In support of this claim, these research participants pointed to the fact that black fishers 
in the Western Cape have predominantly been involved in industrial fishing sectors, 
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rather than in small-scale sectors (Witte 2010). In their home provinces of the Eastern 
Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, small-scale fishing activities are mostly restricted to 
subsistence harvesting of shellfish and other species from the shore (Sowman et al. 2014). 
However, in the Western Cape small-scale fishing tends to be practiced in terms of boat-
based activities that have a stronger commercial component. There was thus a tension 
because Imizamo Yethu fishers do not fit the dominant conception of bona fide small-
scale fishers as conceived in the context of the Western Cape (Witte 2010; HGB Fisher 
2, 8, 9, pers comm 12/04/12). This research suggests that the perception among many 
Hangberg fishers that Imizamo Yethu residents are not bona fide fishers is also sustained 
by a legacy of racial prejudice stemming from apartheid and colonial history - a legacy 
that appears to have been re-invigorated by increasing levels of economic insecurity and 
competition for material opportunities and resources. 
However, despite many coloured fishers’ perceptions regarding the ‘non-bona fide’ status 
of Imizamo Yethu residents, the fact is that a number of residents have a history of 
personally harvesting fisheries resources. For a small percentage of people in Imizamo 
Yethu, fishing is an important part of their lives, and though their experience is largely 
based in the industrial sectors, they could be classed as bona fide fishers according to the 
interim relief and SSF Policy criteria.  In 2010, there were approximately 23 Imizamo 
Yethu residents working in the small-scale fishing sector (Witte 2010). Most fishers in 
Imizamo Yethu encountered during this research were older than 35, with some retired 
veterans who were in their sixties and older. A number of these fishers began their 
fishing careers catching ‘chokka’ (squid) in the Port Elizabeth area, moving to Cape 
Town during the 1980s when the chokka became scarce and working conditions began 
to deteriorate (IY Fisher 5, pers comm, 10/04/12; IY Fisher 4, 6, pers comm 11/04/12; 
IY Veteran Fisher 1, 2, 5, pers comm 11/04/12). They generally work, or used to work 
as crew in the large-scale commercial sector which operated from Hout Bay harbour. As 
was observed in Ocean View and Hangberg, there has also been a shift in the meaning 
and class status of fishing in Imizamo Yethu, with an increasing number of people 
becoming involved in small-scale fishing, mostly through the interim relief process (IY 
Veteran Fisher 2, pers comm 06/04/12).  
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4.3.4. Fisheries governance context in Ocean View, Imizamo Yethu and 
Hangberg 
Perhaps the most prominent and contentious fisheries governance issue in the case sites 
on the Cape Peninsula at the time of this research was the allocation of fishing rights. 
Indeed, for fishers it appeared that all of their concerns about fisheries governance in 
South Africa were crystallized in the issue of fishing rights allocations - as one local 
fisher explained: “at the end of the day, first of all, you have to deal with rights!” (OV 
Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 21/01/11).  There was consensus among the majority of 
small-scale fishers encountered during this research (including those with commercial 
quotas and permits) that fishing rights at a national level have not been granted in an 
equitable manner. They pointed to the fact that the total allowable catch (TAC) 
distribution for commercially valuable species is dominated by industrial companies, 
while the larger group of small-scale fishers were left with a disproportionately small 
percentage of the total allocation. Based on this research, it could be argued that small-
scale fishers on the Cape Peninsula perceived the inequitable distribution of fishing rights 
as symbolic of the balance of power in South African fisheries governance. The 
allocation of fishing rights at the community was also viewed as unjust. This perception 
of injustice has been fuelled by successive post-apartheid fishing rights allocation 
processes - while fishing rights have been allocated to a number of legitimate fishers in 
the case sites, they have also been allocated to several non-fisher residents, effectively 
excluding many bona fide fishers on the Cape Peninsula. The question of who has, or 
has not received rights is a critical point of friction among in Ocean View, Hangberg and 
Imizamo Yethu.  
The tensions catalysed by the competition for post-apartheid fishing rights have been 
given new impetus by the interim relief exemption system, which has created 
competition and conflict amongst residents in the case sites who wish to access the 
marine commons. Much of this tension has centred on the interim relief permit 
allocation process, and in particular, the process of verifying permit applicants, which 
has opened a space for strategic manoeuvring, as people compete for a limited number of 
permits by making claims to being ‘bona fide’. Some local fisher representatives appear 
to be exploiting the interim relief verification process by facilitating access to permits on 
the condition that they are granted authority to market the permit holder’s catch (for a 
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percentage of the sale price). This has created an incentive to indiscriminately endorse 
the verification of as many permit holders as possible. In addition, DAFF has been 
unable to manage the verification process effectively, creating conditions conducive for 
exploiting the verification process. As a consequence, the inequitable pattern of the 
medium and long term fishing rights allocation processes has been repeated: while 
interim relief permits have been granted to bona fide fishers in the case sites, many bona 
fide fishers have not received these permits, while dozens of permits have been granted 
to residents in the case sites who have little or no involvement in fisheries-related 
activities prior to the implementation of the interim relief system - several permits were 
even allocated to individuals who were deceased but whose names had been included on 
application lists (OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 08/12/11). By relying on the category 
of ‘bona fide fisher’ as a unit of governance, the interim relief verification process has 
reinvigorated contestation in the case sites regarding the question: who is a ‘genuine 
fisher’, and therefore deserving of inclusion?  
During this research, it became clear that the SSF policy has exacerbated the existing 
tensions regarding the allocation of fishing rights and interim relief exemption permits. 
The collective nature of the right-holding arrangement proposed in the policy was the 
focus of concern among many fishers encountered in the case sites. These fishers 
expressed concern regarding who would be included and excluded from the community-
based legal entity, particularly because the policy linked fishing rights to the category of 
bona fide fishers. The SSF policy has also fuelled this anxiety and conflict because it 
does not specify which species will be included within the small-scale fishing right, or the 
quanta that would be allocated. There was also a lack of clarity among most research 
participants regarding whether rights will be allocated to more than one community-
based legal entity in each ‘small-scale fishing community’, and whether these structures 
can be economically viable. Nevertheless, many residents in the case sites have been 
manoeuvring to position themselves favourably in anticipation of the allocation of 
community-based small-scale fishing rights. 
The fundamental uncertainties regarding the entry of non-fishers, and the form of rights 
allocations contributed to the reluctance of many fishers on the Cape Peninsula (and in  
Ocean View in particular) to support a community-based model whose implementation 
was imminent. For these fishers, the community-based form of right-holding was 
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juxtaposed against the individual form of right-holding.  Because of the entry of high 
numbers of non-fishers into the local small-scale fisheries through previous commercial 
fishing rights and interim relief permit allocation processes, and the conflict that this had 
generated within the case sites,  many local fishers expressed a preference for individual 
allocations, arguing that this would enable them to have more control of their own 
fishing activities. Scepticism of a collective model of fishing rights among senior fishers 
in the case sites could also be traced back to their negative experience as members of 
community trusts, and collective fishing enterprises such as the SACFC/SACFH during 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, where commercial fishing rights were allocated to the 
enterprise and not to the individual fisher-members (see Hersoug and Isaacs 2001)80.  
The negative view of collective forms of fishing rights that was expressed by these local 
fishers was also informed by the rapid establishment of between 20 and 30 small-scale 
fishing co-operatives in case sites (though the exact number is unknown). These co-
operatives are being established through the DTI Co-operative Incentive Scheme (CIS), 
in anticipation of the implementation of the SSF policy (and the attendant allocation of 
community-based rights), as well as the new round of rights allocation in the commercial 
sectors. In November 2012, six vessels were delivered to six co-operatives in Imizamo 
Yethu as part of the DTI’s CIS, and in March 2013, the DTI delivered six vessels to six 
co-operatives in Ocean View.  The Imizamo Yethu co-operative members caught their 
own interim relief and nearshore WCRL allocations, as well as the allocations of non-
members who mostly resided in Imizamo Yethu (IY Fisher 5, pers comm 06/03/13).  
4.4. Conclusion  
This chapter sketched the general context of fisheries resource use and governance in 
South Africa, and introduced the primary case site of Ocean View, and the 
supplementary case sites of Hangberg and Imizamo Yethu on the Cape Peninsula (which 
constitute the community level focus for this exploration of the politics of small-scale 
fisheries governance in South Africa). This chapter indicated that there are high levels of 
poverty and unemployment among residents in these coastal communities, with many 
residents asserting that economic insecurity had worsened since 1994. Consequently, 
fisher and non-fisher residents in the three case sites are increasingly competing to access 
the local marine commons, which presented a potential source of food and income. The 
                                                 
80 Many veteran fishers in the case sites are still in possession of their SACFC/SACFH share certificates. 
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competition to access the marine commons is intertwined with a number of small-scale 
fisheries governance processes, including the interim relief permit system, the SSF 
policy, and the formation of co-operatives. These processes have created possibilities for 
residents in the case sites to obtain greater access to, and benefits from the marine 
commons, while at the same time exacerbating existing tensions within these 
communities.  
The following chapter explores how power and strategic practices manifest through the 
political representation of small-scale fishers on the Cape Peninsula. In particular, it 
presents a study of the primary case site of Ocean View, and the micro-politics of 
‘community-based’ political representation.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
A STUDY OF THE POWER DYNAMICS AND MICRO-
POLITICS OF COMMUNITY-BASED REPRESENTATION IN 
SMALL-SCALE FISHERIES GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF 
OCEAN VIEW 
5.1. Introduction: political representation as a potential instrument 
of, and barrier to democratic fisheries governance 
In the field of fisheries governance in South Africa, political representation is harnessed, 
to varying effect, by a range of actors who seek to influence fisheries governance 
processes, including small-scale fishers, commercial fishing companies, fisheries 
scientists, conservation organisations, and state agencies. Their political representatives 
have the dual task of promoting their specific interests, while also contributing more 
broadly towards equitable and sustainable fisheries management. As described in 
Chapter One, the opening of political space for small-scale fishers in the governance of 
South Africa’s fisheries has placed political representation at centre stage. Political 
representation stands as the primary mechanism to facilitate the access of small-scale 
fishers to participatory processes, and the benefits associated with South Africa’s marine 
resources.  
Yet, as this chapter will demonstrate, the political representation of small-scale fishers in 
some coastal communities on the Cape Peninsula has been fraught with difficulties. It 
was evident during this research that there was competition within these communities to 
represent local small-scale fishers because of the political and economic opportunities 
associated with this role, and consequently, claims to represent small-scale fishers were 
the subject of considerable contestation. In this context, it appeared that community-
based representation served both as a democratic mechanism to work towards equity and 
sustainability, and as a means to pursue hidden agendas. To explore these dynamics 
further, this chapter will focus on small-scale fisher representation in the coastal 
community of Ocean View. In particular, this chapter will present the micro-political 
strategies and tactics employed by a one particular grouping to occupy the position of 
legitimate fisher representatives, and the ways in they used this position to gain and 
exercise power, and to capture economic benefits in the local field of small-scale 
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fisheries. This chapter seeks to demonstrate that while some small-scale fishers in Ocean 
View were empowered through community-based political representation, others were 
disempowered. 
5.2. Overview of political representation of small -scale fishers in 
South Africa 
The political representation of small-scale fishers in South Africa is highly diverse and 
dynamic, and it is therefore difficult to present a definitive typology of the kinds of 
representatives, constituencies, and representational activity that were observed during 
this research. In broad terms, small-scale fisher constituencies are usually delineated 
according geographically defined communities, and differed significantly with regard to 
their fishing practices, cultural identity, and levels of social and organisational cohesion. 
Regional representation of small-scale fishers is uneven, with fishers in the Western Cape 
Province being more politically organised than fishers in the Kwazulu-Natal and Eastern 
Cape Provinces (McDaid 2014). 
The people and groupings representing small-scale fishers in South Africa are equally 
diverse. This research identified three basic categories: i) ‘community-based 
representatives’ who represent a single community or area in which they resided, and in 
which they were, to some extent socially embedded  ii) ‘roving community-based 
representatives’ who represent several communities or areas simultaneously iii) high 
level representatives (such as NGO staff) who represent small-scale fishers at the regional 
and national level, what Mansbridge (2003) terms ‘surrogate’ representation, or 
“representation by a representative with whom one has no electoral relationship” 
(Mansbridge 2003: 522) . In the South African context, the most prominent NGO 
representing small-scale fishers at the regional and national level is the Masifundise 
Development Trust (MDT), whose surrogate representation has been central to securing 
legislative recognition for small-scale fishing communities (Sowman et al. 2014, McDaid 
2014). While ‘roving’ and ‘high level’ representatives have played a crucial role in the 
representation of small-scale fishing communities, this chapter will focus specifically on 
the category of ‘community-based representatives’. 
Within the complex and dynamic political field of fisheries governance in South Africa, 
the representatives who are generally positioned closest to small-scale fishers on the 
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ground level are the community-based representatives. The role of community 
representatives is to assert the views of their constituency in fisheries management and 
governance processes (most critically interim relief, and the SSF policy), communicating 
information regarding these and other processes back to their constituency; and 
promoting their constituency’s interests by securing access to fishing rights, capital, and 
equitable marketing arrangements. Many community representatives also provide 
administrative and marketing support to their constituency. Although these 
representatives are highly diverse, they share the following basic characteristics: 
 they represent specific coastal communities, or groupings within those 
communities;  
 they reside permanently in the communities they represent; 
 they were, or claim to be similar to, or analogous with those whom they 
represent. 
5.3. Community-based political representation on the Cape Peninsula  
Having given a brief overview of small-scale fisher representation in South Africa, the 
discussion moves to the empirical case of community-based political representation on 
the Cape Peninsula. Political representation in this urban stretch of coastline could be 
described as particularly complex and challenging when compared with rural coastal 
areas in South Africa, where fishing communities are relatively smaller and more clearly 
defined.  There are many individuals and groupings claiming to represent small-scale 
fishers in various coastal communities on the Cape Peninsula. The representational 
relationship between these community-based representatives and their fisher 
constituencies in the case sites varies considerably, with some representatives appearing 
to operate according to clearly defined institutional rules and procedures, while others 
appear to operate within a loose institutional framework, without clearly defined rules 
and procedures regarding election, authority and control. In some cases, the legitimacy 
of community-based representatives and organisations is intensely contested. This has 
created a number of difficulties for fishers and government officials alike. As a senior 
DAFF official explained during a multi-stakeholder workshop, the management of 
small-scale fisheries would be much easier “if we could have a single representative 
association or organisation … we should do away with all of these organisations” 
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(DAFF Director 6, pers comm 04/11/11). This perception was expressed by a 
representative of the Imizamo Yethu fishing community: “the leaders, they say they’re 
working for the community, they’re not fishermen. They sit with the government, and 
tell them what they should provide to us. We have our own mouths, we can tell the 
government what is should provide. They get big quotas, and the fishermen … they sit 
with fuck-all …” (IY Fisher 2, pers comm 09/04/12). 
In the primary case site of Ocean View, there are a number of community-based 
groupings claiming to represent residents who were involved in some way in fishing-
related activities, as one local veteran fisher put it: “there’s too many!” At the time of this 
research, there were at least six community-based representative groupings in Ocean 
View (see Isaacs 2013), of which three were particularly prominent in the local fishing 
community. These will be referred to here as the Forum for Ocean View Fishers 
(FOVF), the Democratic Fishers Organisation (DFO), and the Association of Ocean 
View Fishers (AOVF)81. Their primary role is ostensibly to represent the views and 
interests of small-scale fishers in governance and management processes, though some 
also conduct other important tasks on behalf of their membership, such as marketing, 
facilitating rights applications, and providing general administrative support.  
These groupings are largely driven by a few individuals, who have a loosely identifiable 
constituency within Ocean View’s small-scale fishing community. The relation between 
these representatives, and those they claimed to represent varies considerably, in terms of 
the formality of the relationship, autonomy and responsiveness exercised by each 
representative, the representative’s knowledge of their constituency, the representative’s 
personal fishing experience, the alignment or conflict between their interests, and the 
relations of power between them.  Given the relatively small number of fishers in Ocean 
View, it is perhaps unsurprising that there is competition between these organisations. 
This competition has been increasingly driven by the economic opportunities associated 
with interim relief and the SSF policy. Representation in Ocean View is also shaped by 
the influence of party politics: ANC members were observed to be active as 
representatives in Ocean View’s small-scale fisheries arena. It is widely perceived by 
local fishers that these representatives were using their party connections to position 
                                                 
81   The name of organisations and individuals in the case sites have been changed for the purpose of 
ensuring anonymity. 
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themselves as legitimate representatives of local fishers, and to promote wider party 
political agendas.  
In Hangberg, the most prominent and formally organised grouping is the Community 
Network (Hangberg) (CN-HGB), a recently formed local branch a national body of 
community-based representative organisations, referred to here as the Community 
Network (CN). The Hangberg branch of CN constellates around two community-based 
representatives who are lifelong Hangberg residents with direct family links to the local 
fishing culture, but who do not personally harvest marine resources on a fulltime basis. 
There are also a number of less organised groupings in Hangberg, who have recently 
begun to speak on behalf of local small-scale fishers. These included the Hangberg 
Fisherwomen’s Association (HFA), a relatively small (perhaps 20 members), loosely 
structured grouping of local women which appears to be driven by a lifelong resident 
who does not personally harvest marine resources. There is also an informal grouping of 
Hangberg residents which constellates around a local resident and fisher representative 
who has played a role in various community organisations, and who personally harvests 
fisheries resources. There is also a party political dimension to political representation in 
Hangberg, with some prominent ANC members leading several community-driven 
economic development initiatives at the harbour on behalf of the local small-scale fishing 
community. 
In Imizamo Yethu there are two main community-based groupings claiming to represent 
small-scale fishers. The first was the local branch of the United Fisher Association 
(UFA), a network of black fishers residing in Cape Town’s various townships such as 
Gugulethu, Langa and Khayelitsha. The UFA has been operating in Imizamo Yethu for 
over 15 years, and is well established. Its membership includes experienced fishing 
veterans in Imizamo Yethu, most of whom who are over forty years of age, and work (or 
had worked) in the industrial fishing sectors. Three of these veteran fishers have 
previously occupied leadership positions in the association. At the time of this research, 
the most active UFA representative in Imizamo Yethu was a young resident in his early 
thirties, who occasionally participated in small-scale fishing activities. The second 
organisation representing the fishing community in Imizamo Yethu is the relatively less 
established Atlantic Fisherwomen’s Forum (AFF).  Membership of the AFF is mostly 
composed of the wives and widows of local fishers, and constellates around three 
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women who lead the grouping. The members of the AFF generally do not personally 
harvest marine resources, though some have interim relief permits. Both UFA and AFF 
members alleged that there are community leaders in Imizamo Yethu (and Hout Bay 
more broadly) who have claim to represent local fishers and their families without 
sufficient experience of fishing or the lives of the local fishing community. They alleged 
that these individuals are involved in party politics, and have financial interests in the 
fishing industry: “in Hout Bay, the fishing industry is run politically” (IY Fisher 5, pers 
comm 09/04/12).   
5.3.1. Key dynamics of political representation in the case sites  
A dominant theme among fishers encountered on the Cape Peninsula was the view that 
a community-based representative’s legitimacy was directly proportional to their 
knowledge, experience, and skills in fishing, and the extent to which the representative 
was similar (or analogous) to, or different from the fishers they represented. The majority 
of the fulltime fishers articulated this view by arguing that fishers should be represented by 
fishers. From Bourdieu’s perspective, the degree to which community-based 
representatives are analogous to their fisher constituency could be described in terms of 
the extent to which they share a ‘habitus’ (internalised schema of perception, value and 
behaviour), and capitals (set of knowledge, skills and resources which correspond to a 
specific field position). One fisher from Imizamo Yethu expressed frustration regarding 
those community representatives who do not personally harvest marine resources, and 
who “only know how to read and write … we need only fishermen to represent us!” (IY 
Fisher 9, pers comm 11/04/12). A veteran fisher and representative from Ocean View 
also argued strongly that: “If you don’t use a handline to feed yourself, you can’t 
represent me … You must live in my shoes … You need to feel what I feel … A fisher 
can only be truly represented by another fisher because they have the same interests as 
you” (OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 23/09/12).  
Most of the community-based representatives I encountered in the case sites were not 
fishers themselves, in the sense that they did not participate personally in the harvesting 
of fisheries species as livelihood. Instead their involvement was restricted to shore-based 
activities relating to representation, administration and marketing. Though most of these 
non-fisher representatives had long-term ties to the fishing communities whom they 
represented, it was often the case that they had only entered the local fisheries relatively 
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recently, and had limited personal experience, knowledge and skills with regard to local 
fishing-related practices and social dynamics. These ‘non-fisher’ representatives could be 
said to have relatively low levels of cultural capital in the fisheries field, when compared 
with fulltime fishers on the Cape Peninsula who harvest marine species for their 
livelihood, and who have a vast body of internalised knowledge and skills relating to 
local fishing practices and ecological dynamics, which was developed through extensive 
direct personal experience, and through inculcation by family and immediate social 
networks.  
However, when compared with their fisher constituency, these non-fishing 
representatives generally possessed more cultural capital in the institutional or 
bureaucratic field. It was observed during this research on the Cape Peninsula that non-
fisher representatives generally had higher levels of formal education, stronger reading, 
writing, and verbal articulation skills,  and a better grasp of the English language (as the 
lingua franca of democratic participation), than the fishers they represented, and were 
thus more equipped to navigate the world of officialdom. Many of the small-scale fishers 
encountered during this research referred to these non-fisher community-based 
representatives using the ironic terms ‘literate’ or ‘clever people’. Yet this research 
suggested that it was possession of this ‘institutional’ form of cultural capital that 
appeared to be a primary reason why community-based representatives were selected by 
a fisher constituency - it was a set of knowledge and skills which they did not themselves 
possess, but whose value they recognised.   
The relative lack of cultural capital in its institutional form among many small-scale 
fishers in the case sites was regularly evidenced, for example, during structured 
interviews, and was particularly evident among the senior generation of fishers. After 
one interview conducted in Ocean View with a veteran fisher, my research associate 
described what he perceived to be the lack of self-assurance evidenced by many local 
fishers during the formal interview process: “I just picked up something from him now, 
where, they feel sort of … like they’re not qualified … it’s like they feel inferior” 
(Research Associate, pers comm 26/06/12). These fishers were in a potentially 
vulnerable position because of their lack of formal education, and the attendant lack of 
confidence regarding the world of pen and paper. Throughout this research, it was 
evident that many of the fishers in the case sites (particularly the older fishers) found 
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written documents intimidating, and were reluctant to attempt to decipher their contents 
on their own - as a Hangberg fisher observed a DAFF road show in July 2012: “people 
think ‘no, this is too high for me’” (HGB Fisher 9, pers comm 19/0/7/12). Yet, in a 
context of structural poverty, local fishers are “sitting with the hope”, as the Research 
Associate put it, that their interaction with an external party who is ‘literate’ and ‘clever’ 
might bring some kind of material opportunity (Research Associate, pers comm 
26/06/12). Cultural capital in the institutional field thus provides community-based 
representatives with considerable strategic advantage in relation to their fisher 
constituencies, effectively placing representatives in a position of power. According to 
one veteran small-scale fisher in Ocean View, this relative advantage in institutional-
specific cultural capital meant that, in practice: “anyone can claim to speak for fishers” 
OV Veteran Fisher 3, pers comm 21/01/11).  
In addition to the asymmetries in cultural capital between small-scale fishers and their 
representatives, this research also identified asymmetries in terms of economic capital. 
For instance, a common view expressed by fishers in Ocean View was that certain 
community-based representatives have greater access to economic capital than their 
constituency. According to these fishers, this economic capital is constituted by their 
own financial resources, as well as being sourced from marketing agents outside of the 
community who working for large fishing companies (OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 
20/02/12;  OV Veteran Fisher 13, pers comm 13/07/12; OV Fisher 6, pers comm 
24/10/12)82. In the context of structural poverty in the case sites, access to economic 
capital places these community-based representatives in a position of advantage, 
empowering them to exert greater influence and control over their constituency, most 
particularly through the provision of monetary loans (see below).  Economic capital also 
enables them to discharge their representative duties more effectively because they have 
access to telephones, faxes, the internet, and transport. In contrast, I encountered several 
community-based representatives on the Cape Peninsula whose access to economic 
capital was as limited as the fishers they represented, and whose activities as a 
representative were severely undermined by their own financial insecurity and lack of 
material resources.  
                                                 
82 It should be emphasised here the term ‘wealth’ is relative to the socio-economic context in the case sites, 
which is characterised by high levels of poverty (see Chapter Four).  
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To explore how power dynamics and strategic practices operate in fisher representation 
on the Cape Peninsula, the following section presents a study of the micro-politics of 
community-based fisher representation in the primary case site of Ocean View.  
5.4. The micro-politics of community-based fisher representation in 
Ocean View 
This discussion will focus on the leadership of two community-based representative 
groupings in Ocean View: the Democratic Fishers Organisation (DFO), and the 
Association of Ocean View Fishers (AOVF), whose respective activities can be said to 
symbolise two opposing styles of political representation - the one style being 
democratic, and the other undemocratic83. The DFO, and its principal leader are 
presented first, and are described in detail so as to provide a comparative juxtaposition of 
their style of representation with that of the AOVF leadership. In particular, the 
discussion will focus on the strategic practices of the AOVF leadership, whose activities 
illustrate how community-based political representation can serve as a mechanism for 
empowered actors to gain and exercise power, while undermining the democratic rights 
and practices of local small-scale fishers.  
5.4.1 The Democratic Fishers Organisation  
The most established grouping representing fishers in Ocean View was the Democratic 
Fishers Organisation (DFO). However, this organisation was largely rendered inactive in 
2010, when it is alleged to have been captured by a local elite grouping who deposed its 
elected leadership (see case study below). The DFO was founded on the basis of an 
earlier structure called the Witsands Fishers Organisation (WFO), which was formally 
established in August 1993, prior to the end of apartheid. The WFO was founded by a 
small group of local bona fide fishers, in partnership with a highly prominent ‘roving 
representative’84. One of the first actions taken by the members of WFO was to write a 
letter to the office of President Nelson Mandela, calling for political action to address the 
marginalisation of local small-scale fishing communities. They also delivered this letter 
to Alan Boesak, a prominent ANC leader who “gave … his assurance that 
                                                 
83 The names of these organisations have been changed for the purpose of anonymity. 
84 This information was drawn from an affidavit submitted by one the founding members for the Equality 
Court case, as well as from conversations with four of the founding members. It should be noted that two 
of these members were applicants in this historic court case.  
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transformation of the fishing industry would enjoy priority as soon as the ANC takes 
government …”85 Two years later, these fishers established Democratic Fisher 
Organisation of South Africa (DFO-SA)86. At this point, WFO began to operate under 
the name DFO banner.  
According to the local founding members, the DFO started out as a non-racial 
organisational and representational nexus for local fishers from Ocean View and the 
surrounding neighbourhoods on the South Peninsula, including Simonstown, Fish 
Hoek, Kommetjie, and small, predominantly black townships of Masiphumelele and 
Red Hill (OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 15/02/11; OV Veteran Fisher 16, 17, pers 
comm 09/02/12; OV Veteran Fisher 3, pers comm 26/06/12). The DFO membership 
included a cross section of fulltime fishers who made their living by harvesting marine 
resources as crew, skippers and boat owners in the traditional linefish, nearshore WCRL 
and treknet fisheries, as well working as divers in the abalone sectors. Members of DFO 
also included fishers who worked in large-scale sectors such as tuna and hake longlining, 
pelagic trawling, and offshore WCRL fishing. Some of DFO members had formal 
fishing rights, but the majority of members (who were mostly coloured and black) did 
not. The principal aim of DFO was thus to secure equitable access to marine resources 
for local fishers, in line with South Africa’s post-apartheid transition to democracy (OV 
Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 15/02/11; OV Veteran Fisher 16, 17, pers comm 
09/02/12; OV Veteran Fisher 3, pers comm 26/06/12). According to two of the 
founding members, DFO was perhaps the only organisation for coloured and black 
fishers on the southern peninsula during the 1990s (OV Veteran Fisher 3, 5, pers comm 
21/01/11). From the official record, and statements from various research participants, 
it was evident that the leadership of DFO had, for almost twenty years played an active 
role in the representation of local fishers, including participating in the formulation of the 
Marine Living Resources Act (from 1996 to 1997), the proceedings of Equality Court 
case (from 2004 to 2007).  
                                                 
85 Equality Court Affidavit (2005).  
86 By the late 1990s, DFO-SA had become one of the most prominent and influential representative 
groupings in the field of small-scale fishing in South Africa. Though it was largely based in the Western 
Cape region, DFO-SA went on to establish twenty four local branches in coastal communities stretching 
from Doring Bay in the Northern Cape Province, to Port Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape Province (Equality 
Court Affidavit 2005). 
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From the accounts of research participants who were present at the time, OV Veteran 
Fisher 5 played an important role in the founding of WFO in the early 1990s, and in its 
subsequent transformation into DFO in 1995. Since that time until late 2010, OV 
Veteran Fisher 5 had been the driving force behind the DFO, serving as executive 
chairperson from the organisation’s inception. Although he plays the role of political 
representative, OV Veteran Fisher 5 is also a fulltime fisher who has been going to sea 
since the late 1970s. His personal experience of fishing spans a wide range of sectors, 
from traditional and commercial linefishing, to the nearshore and offshore WCRL trap 
fisheries. OV Veteran Fisher 5 worked at the Witsands factory from the early 1980s until 
1994, catching WCRL on the factory’s vessels. He also has experience diving WCRL 
and abalone on a recreational and commercial basis. During the period of this research, 
OV Veteran Fisher 5 had an interim relief permit, and was catching WCRL and linefish 
(usually hottentot and snoek) for his livelihood87. He usually skippers one of his close 
colleague’s small motorised vessels. During some of these fishing trips, OV Veteran 
Fisher 5 also catches linefish and WCRL on behalf other interim relief permit holders, as 
well as landing the commercial allocations of nearshore WCRL quota holders. Based on 
the views expressed by research participants in Ocean View, it is clear that OV Veteran 
Fisher 5’s credentials as an experienced fulltime fisher are well recognised (OV Veteran 
Fisher 16, 17, pers comm 09/02/12; OV Veteran Fisher 15, pers comm 13/07/12). This 
was evident in the demand for his skills among boat owners operating in the local small-
scale fisheries - I often observed OV Veteran Fisher 5 being requested by various boat 
owners to work as a skipper on their vessels. 
In addition to his extensive cultural capital in the fisheries field, OV Veteran Fisher 5 
also has extensive cultural capital in the institutional field, as is evident in his high level 
of reading, writing and verbal communication skills, and his command of the English 
language. OV Veteran Fisher 5 also has considerable experience, knowledge and skills as 
a political activist and community leader. He was actively involved in the anti-apartheid 
struggle, and was a member of the local United Democratic Front (UDF) branch88. And 
from 1993, he helped to found the WFO, (and subsequently the DFO), becoming deeply 
                                                 
87 At the time of writing this thesis in 2014, he had recently been denied an interim relief permit. 
88 The UDF was a political organisation which played a prominent role in the anti-apartheid struggle, 
effectively operating as an extension the ANC (which was banned at the time) (Bridgland 1997). Its grass 
roots political activities were focused on protest and civil disobedience campaigns against the apartheid 
state, with the aim of establishing a non-racial democracy in South Africa.   
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involved in the struggle to secure equitable access to marine resources for local fishers. 
As a representative of small-scale fishers, OV Veteran Fisher 5 has been actively involved 
in a wide range of formal participatory structures and processes relating to fisheries 
governance. These included his involvement in: 
 the Western Cape Fishing Forum, whose objective was to facilitate negotiation 
between fishing communities, the government and fishing companies during the 
post-apartheid policy reform process (1994); 
 the Fisheries Policy Development Committee (the ‘Mandla Commission’), where 
OV Veteran Fisher 5 represented the small-scale fishing sector (1995-1998); 
 a conference in Johannesburg held by the ANC Fishing Desk to discuss the 
fisheries policy reform process (1996); 
 meetings with the Food and Allied Workers Union in Gugulethu, Cape Town, 
where the focus was again on the policy reform process  (1996); 
 the Trytsman Commission of Inquiry which reviewed and assessed South Africa’s 
fishing industry, in which OV Veteran Fisher 5 gave a verbal testimony, and 
submitted written statements (1999); 
 assisting MCM to assist their verification unit with the identification of fishing 
rights applicants who met the necessary criteria (1999);  
 the national Subsistence Fisheries Task Group, whose role was to establish a 
baseline picture of coastal fishing communities in South Africa, and whom OV 
Veteran Fisher 5 assisted by arranging meetings and field research in the Ocean 
View area (1999-2000); and 
 as a member of the delegation of fishers from the Cape Peninsula who 
represented the small-scale fishing sector at the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development hosted by the government in Johannesburg (2000)89. 
As chairperson of DFO, OV Veteran Fisher 5 represented local small-scale fishers during 
the formulation of the Marine Living Resources Bill, the design of the Table Mountain 
                                                 
89 This list of participatory activities is drawn from OV Veteran Fisher 5’s affidavit for the Equality Court 
case. 
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National Park marine protected area, as well as a number of sector-specific processes 
such as the Interim Relief Co-Management Committee, where he served as one of the 
designated representatives of interim relief fishers in Ocean View. Among OV Veteran 
Fisher 5’s most noteworthy contributions as a fisher representative was his participation 
as an applicant in the Equality Court case, in which his affidavit and verbal testimony 
contributed to securing this historic legal victory for small-scale fishers in South Africa. 
His credentials as a representative of fishers are thus established and well-recognised.  
As a representative of DFO, OV Veteran Fisher 5 found his greatest support in those 
fishers who had the longest experience, and who had been most directly involved in 
Ocean View’s fisheries. In the view of one veteran fisher in his seventies: “he only speaks 
the truth … he is never unfair. He fights for you, because he knows about you” (OV 
Veteran Fisher 13, pers comm 13/07/12). Another local veteran fisher affirmed this 
assessment, exclaiming proudly that “we will always be DFO!” (OV Veteran Fisher 13, 
pers comm 24/06/12). One veteran fisher who has known and fished alongside OV 
Veteran Fisher 5 since the late 1970s, told me that OV Veteran Fisher 5 had been at the 
forefront of the local small-scale fisher struggle “from the beginning” (OV Veteran Fisher 
16, pers comm 09/02/12). He also described OV Veteran Fisher 5 as a person of 
integrity, and pointed to the 2005 long term fishing rights application process, in which 
OV Veteran Fisher 5 apparently refused to ‘distort’ a particular piece of information in 
his WCRL quota application to improve his chances of success: “He knew this would be 
a disadvantage for his application, but he refused to budge” (OV Veteran Fisher 16, pers 
comm 09/02/12). A younger nearshore WCRL quota holder and lifelong Ocean View 
resident affirmed this claim, arguing that OV Veteran Fisher 5 “refused to bend” to the 
pressures of submitting distorted information (as many other applicants had done) (OV 
Fisher 13, pers comm 09/02/12).  One of the most senior fisher in Ocean View (who 
was in his seventies and participated in the linefish and trek fisheries), also expressed a 
similar view of OV Veteran Fisher 5: “he is the man who … works for fishermen … he 
battles, for fishermen. That’s what I like about him … ask him, he was one of my 
crewmembers … I was the skipper of the boat … and he and my two partners worked 
together on one boat, that’s why I appreciate him, because he works for us [as a 
representative]” (OV Veteran Fisher 15, pers comm 13/07/12).  
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Led by people such as OV Fisher 5 - who was both a knowledgeable and experienced 
representatives and fulltime fisher - the DFO provides a stark contrast with the 
Association of Ocean View Fishers, a newer grouping of community-based 
representatives that had come to play an increasingly prominent role in the 
representation of small-scale fishers in Ocean View. 
5.4.2. The Association of Ocean View Fishers  
The Association of Ocean View Fishers (AOVF) was formally established in 2005 by 
three closely linked residents. It is one of the main groupings representing local small-
scale fishers in Ocean View, and its leadership claims to represent over 100 members 
(AOVF Rep 2, pers comm 28/09/12). Most members are interim relief permit holders, 
but a number of members also have commercial fishing rights for linefish, WCRL and 
abalone. The chairperson (referred to here as AOVF Rep 1) is the most prominent of the 
AOVF leadership, and does most of the daily work of running the organisation.  AOVF 
Rep 1 is supported by AOVF Rep 2, who plays an influential but less conspicuous role; 
and by AOVF Rep 3, who provides organisational support, and also attends meetings 
and speaks for the AOVF.  
The AOVF leadership symbolically positions themselves as being of the small-scale 
fishing community in Ocean View, and thus as legitimate representatives of this fishing 
community. AOVF Rep 2 explained that he was born and raised in Simonstown, and 
stated that he’d been involved in fisheries since the age of sixteen90. He described that his 
late mother was born in Buffelsbaai (before it was incorporated into the former Cape 
Peninsula National Park), and that she participated in trek fishing at Smitswinkelbaai; 
while his late father had also been involved in local fishing activities, working as a 
skipper and crew member on various traditional and commercial vessels.  AOVF Rep 2 
explained that he had lived in Ocean for 44 years.  He also claimed that AOVF Rep 1 
was deeply embedded in the local small-scale fishing community, pointing to the fact 
that she moved into one the first houses to be built in Ocean View, and that she had “a 
passion for the industry” (AOVF Rep 2, pers comm 28/09/12). By her own estimation, 
AOVF Rep 1 had been involved in fisheries for thirteen years91. AOVF Rep 3 also made 
                                                 
90 This claim of having been involved in fisheries since the age of sixteen was made in response to one of 
our survey questions. 
91 Local weekly community newspaper. 2013. The name of this publication, and its date of issue have been 
withheld to preserve anonymity of research participants. 
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claims to be deeply rooted in the local fishing community of Ocean View, asserting that 
“I’m coming from a fishing community, I have lived there all my life” (AOVF Rep 3, 
pers comm, 29/03/11). 
The AOVF leadership each had a commercial fishing right, and owned several small 
vessels which were rented out to AOVF members. (AOVF Rep 2, pers comm 28/09/12). 
AOVF Rep 2 sometimes skippered on his vessels, but it was observed during this 
research that the participation of the AOVF leadership in small-scale fishing activities 
was both relatively recent, and overwhelmingly land-based. It was only after 2004 that 
they became involved in the local field of fisheries as means to generate an income, and 
this involvement excluded direct participation in the harvesting of marine resources.  
Both AOVF Rep 2 and AOVF Rep 1 worked in government employment on a fulltime 
basis for nearly thirty years, until they retired in 2004. 
According to AOVF Rep 1’s formal written submission to the DAFF Portfolio 
Committee during public hearings in 2013, “The Association of Ocean View Fishers is a 
registered NPO that has been involved in the socio-economic development and 
represents fishers from the surrounding community of Masiphumelele, Ocean View, Red 
Hill who solely derive their livelihoods from the sea”92. The AOVF leadership conducts a 
number of activities in their role as representatives of local small-scale fishers. These 
activities include political representation in fisheries governance processes such as 
interim relief and the SSF policy, as well as more practical services such as facilitating 
access to, and administering fishing rights; facilitating access to their own vessels and 
gear; negotiating marketing agreements; assisting with the formation of co-operatives; 
providing loans; and delivering general administrative support to AOVF members.  
AOVF Rep 2 explained that the AOVF was originally established to meet the demand 
among local fishers for consultants who could provide assistance to navigate the 
increasingly complicated bureaucratic maze associated with commercial fishing rights 
application processes (AOVF Rep 2, pers comm 28/09/12). At the time of this research, 
the AOVF leadership had also become actively involved in the interim relief process: 
AOVF Rep 1 and AOVF Rep 2 were among the (between two and four) formally 
recognised representatives of interim relief fishers in Ocean View on DAFF’s Interim 
Relief Co-Management Committee. According to AOVF Rep 2, AOVF Rep 1 attended 
                                                 
92 AOVF Rep 1. Letter (i). 2013.  
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meetings at DAFF’s offices in Cape Town every Friday, and reported back to AOVF 
members every Monday. AOVF Rep 2 explained that the AOVF leadership is closely 
involved with the relevant agencies managing the development of these co-operatives, 
claiming that “we sit down with government, DTI, and StratConsult” (AOVF Rep 2, 
pers comm 28/09/12). According to AOVF Rep 2, the AOVF leadership has close 
working relationships with high level officials, and explained that these relationships 
were crucial to the grouping’s success in representing their members93. At this point is 
necessary to indicate that the AOVF leadership are members of the ANC, and one of the 
representatives has close ties to a prominent individual in the ruling party’s provincial 
branch. There is a high probability that the AOVF leadership’s alignment to the ANC is 
not unrelated to their ability to foster a close working relationship with government 
officials. AOVF Rep 2 was overwhelmingly positive about the ANC government’s role 
in supporting coastal communities, arguing that the government had created many 
opportunities for fishers to better their own lives, citing the allocation of limited 
commercial fishing rights, the SSF Policy, and the DTI’s Co-operative Incentive Scheme 
(CIS) as evidence of this positive role (AOVF Rep 2, pers comm 28/09/12).   
AOVF Rep 2 emphasized that the AOVF leadership’s relationships with government 
officials has enabled them to access considerably more information about fisheries 
governance processes than other representatives in Ocean View. He claimed that fishers 
“have a right” to this information, and explained that AOVF Rep 1 honoured this 
obligation to her constituency by transmitting relevant information to AOVF members in 
a regular and transparent manner: “the right information is being passed down”. He also 
explained that the AOVF leadership had started sharing information with fishers outside 
of their constituency, stating that “we used to have closed meetings, but now we have 
more open meetings” (AOVF Rep 2, pers comm 28/09/12). 
According to AOVF Rep 2, AOVF Rep 1’s efficacy as a fisher representative is based on 
the knowledge and skills she developed in her previous profession. Compared to most of 
the fishers she represented, AOVF Rep 1 had higher levels of cultural capital in the 
institutional field in terms of the reading, writing, communication and administrative 
knowledge and skills, according to AOVF Rep 2: “because of the work she used to do … 
                                                 
93 During this research, a rapport and familiarity was clearly observed in the interactions between AOVF 
Rep 1, AOVF Rep 2, and particular DAFF officials such as DAFF Director 6 (for example body language, 
tone of voice, and electing to sit next to each other during meetings). 
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she’s a bit more … brainy”. AOVF Rep 2 also explained that AOVF Rep 1’s work 
experience had equipped her with the skills needed to control a room full of fishers group 
of loud, uncooperative and unfocused people. As a result of AOVF Rep 1’s approach, 
AOVF Rep 2 asserted that “the fishermen respect her”, adding proudly that most of the 
AOVF membership addressed AOVF Rep 1 as “Ma’am”. He made the claim that 
AOVF Rep 1 used to advise fishers to ask questions during AOVF meetings, but because 
they trusted and respected her so much, they would reply: “Ma’am, we don’t want to ask 
questions” (AOVF Rep 2, pers comm 28/09/12).  
AOVF Rep 2 asserted that this trust and loyalty was partly based on the AOVF 
leadership’s ability to provide tangible results for their members, most specifically by 
facilitating access to commercial and interim relief permit, and by negotiating favourable 
marketing arrangements. He explained that many fishers were exploited when they tried 
to market their WCRL to buyers on their own, claiming that some received as little as 
ZAR60per/kg; but according to AOVF Rep 2, AOVF Rep 1 is able secure better prices, 
usually between ZAR150-160per/kg. He also claimed that we “always get a 100% 
success rate” when applying for fishing rights on behalf of AOVF members. When asked 
if the applications they submitted were ever unsuccessful, AOVF Rep 2 immediately 
replied – “nooit, never!” In addition to securing fishing rights, the AOVF leadership is 
also ‘producing results’ for local people in Ocean View by assisting them to form fishing 
co-operatives. He explained that AOVF had been working directly with StratConsult, the 
DTI and DAFF, and claimed that the DTI Minister said ‘you must get rich!’”. AOVF 
Rep 2 stated that the AOVF leadership had assisted 120 people to formally register 
twelve co-ops in Ocean View94, and explained that he and AOVF Rep 1 had each formed 
a co-operative with other commercial rights holders in Ocean View in anticipation of the 
implementation of the SSF Policy, exclaiming that “we are very hyped about this!” 
(AOVF Rep 2, pers comm 28/09/12).  At a DAFF road show in August 2013, AOVF 
Rep 1 claimed that the members of these co-operative were positive about their 
prospects: “this is their choice … and they feel good” (AOVF Rep 1, pers comm 
19/08/13). A young fisher and AOVF member affirmed this claim during an interview, 
where he told me that “It can work for us … If you have the [fishing] right then no-one 
can stand in your way” (OV Fisher 9, pers comm  27/09/12).  
                                                 
94 Six vessels were delivered to six of these co-operatives in early 2013 (see Chapter Four). 
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As AOVF Rep 2 described, this proven track record is what made the AOVF particularly 
successful in relation to other representative groups in Ocean View. He argued that 
residents of Ocean View were awakening to the fact that the AOVF produces results, and 
supported this by pointing to the fact that the AOVF gained twenty new members at the 
recent interim relief representative elections held in September 2012. AOVF Rep 2 
argued that, despite this realisation of the AOVF’s efficacy, some fishers in Ocean View 
remained with other groups (specifically DFO) out of stubborn loyalty. He asserted that 
the loyalty of these fishers was to their own detriment, because these representative 
groups could not provide tangible results for their members in the way that the AOVF 
could. According to AOVF Rep 2, these fishers were being negatively affected by their 
continued alliance with “the same people that make them dead at the department”. 
AOVF Rep 2 contrasted this with the benefits of being a member of the AOVF, 
exclaiming that “our fishers are empowered!” (AOVF Rep 2, pers comm 28/09/12).  
Describing his vision for the AOVF leadership, AOVF Rep 2 explained that their plan 
was to slowly move away from participating directly in fishing activities, and to expand 
to become general “service providers for my community”, supplying all of the local 
fishing community’s people’s fisheries needs, including the provision of fishing gear, 
vessel maintenance and repair, assistance to apply for fishing rights, marketing and 
general administrative support, as well as assisting fishers with new structures being 
introduced by the government such as co-operatives and community-based fishing rights 
(AOVF Rep 2, pers comm 28/09/12). He expressed the belief that the implementation of 
the SSF policy would facilitate the conditions for local people to develop their fishing 
operations, and that this would in turn generate an increased need for reliable access to 
the ‘tools of the trade’ (AOVF Rep 2, pers comm 28/09/12). 
5.4.3. The AOVF from the perspective of non-members 
The AOVF leadership portrayed the AOVF as a community organisation with effective, 
dedicated and legitimate leaders, and which was run democratically, and in the interests 
of its members and the broader fishing community in Ocean View. However, this 
portrayal was strongly contested by non-AOVF affiliated fishers encountered in this 
research - a group which constitutes the majority of bona fide fishers in Ocean View. In 
particular, it was the respected fishing veterans who most stridently contested the AOVF 
leadership’s claim to be legitimate fisher representatives. These counter-claims were so 
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prevalent during this research that the collection of data was quickly and inexorably 
‘saturated’ with the view that the AOVF leadership were not legitimate representatives of 
local fishers. In Ocean View, the AOVF was widely described by research participants as 
a ‘household forum’, or ‘kitchen committee’, the local terms for an organisation run by, 
and in the interests of a small group of tightly-connected individuals (often kin relations). 
The common perception expressed by local non-AOVF fishers during this research was 
that the AOVF was a vehicle for the AOVF leadership to pursue their own agendas and 
interests, rather than those of its members. In one of his email letters, OV Veteran Fisher 
5 described the AOVF leadership as: “self-styled fisher leaders” who “masquerade as 
‘friends’ and ‘voices’ of the fishers …”95 
From the perspective of research participants who were not affiliated to the AOVF, but 
who had been personally involved in fishing activities on a fulltime basis for most of 
their lives, there appeared to be unanimous consensus that the AOVF leadership were 
not as deeply rooted in the local fishing community they claimed to be. Most of these 
fishers, who would be considered ‘bona fide’ by even the most stringent criteria, argued 
that the AOVF leadership did not personally harvest marine resources, and did not have 
a history of ‘getting their hands wet’, yet, according to these fishers, these relative 
newcomers had managed to occupy a central position in the representation of local 
fishers through a number of strategies and tactics (see discussion below). According to 
one veteran fisher, AOVF Rep 1 and AOVF Rep 2 “were working for all these years for 
the government … then when this thing came in [post-apartheid commercial fishing 
rights] then they left all of that … now they’re the main … they’re the fish forum - 
everything” (OV Veteran Fisher 13, pers comm 13/07/12).  Another veteran fisher who 
was in his early eighties during the time of this research, argued in relation to the AOVF 
leadership: “they don’t know the fishers! AOVF Rep 2 … comes out of [government 
employment] ... now he thinks he’s the boss of the beach! He’s not a fisherman!” (OV 
Veteran Fisher 1, pers comm 02/11/12). The claims of the AOVF leadership to be part 
of the local fishing community were  also questioned by a skipper at the Smitswinkelbaai 
trek site who has been fishing and diving for most of his life: “How can you represent 
me, and you don’t know my background?” (OV Fisher 1, pers comm 03/07/12). OV 
Veteran Fisher 5 confirmed this commonly-held perception in one his regular letters to 
                                                 
95 OV Veteran Fisher 5. Letter (i). 18/09/2011. 
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fisheries stakeholders: “I ask myself, where were these long-term commercial fishing 
right holders. The answer is very simple - they were in their cushy government jobs …”96 
During this research, there was also strong contestation regarding AOVF Rep 3’s 
credentials as an individual who was deeply rooted in the local fishing community, and 
who had knowledge, skills and experience of harvesting marine resources. Many 
research participants questioned how she had obtained an abalone quota given her lack 
of participation in abalone diving. The Research Associate, who as a teenager used to 
dive abalone on a legal and illegal basis, described his surprise upon learning of AOVF 
Rep 3’s abalone quota. He explained that he had never seen her swim, dive, or go 
fishing, and expressed doubt that she could have legitimately obtained an abalone quota 
(Research Associate, pers comm 22/06/12). This claim was affirmed by a local fisher 
who pointed to the local rumour that AOVF Rep 2 had used his social connections to 
help AOVF Rep 3 obtain a scuba diving licence (a pre-requisite for obtaining an abalone 
quota) because she was unable to pass the test due to her lack of diving skills (OV Fisher 
1, pers comm 03/07/12).  
The self-depiction of the AOVF leadership as committed community leaders who served 
their fisher constituency was at odds with the depiction of them put forward by a wide 
cross-section of fishers encountered in Ocean View, who belonged to various 
representative groups (including the AOVF), or who were not affiliated to a particular 
group. My own observations seemed to confirm the claims of AOVF by non-members, 
which depicted the AOVF leadership’s approach to their constituency as undemocratic. 
During an interview and survey with one AOVF member, AOVF Rep 2 answered many 
of the questions for him, while the latter sat silently. Significantly, when I asked this 
member about his views on the AOVF, AOVF Rep 2 quickly interrupted before he could 
answer, and re-interpreted the question for him, asking: “do you think that Ma’am has 
done good things for you?” (AOVF Rep 2, pers comm 08/09/12). To which the AOVF 
member silently nodded in the affirmative. 
This seemed to reflect the way the AOVF leadership perceived and interacted with their 
fisher constituency. As was indicated earlier by AOVF Rep 2 himself, the AOVF 
leadership appeared to have a strategically paternalistic approach to the fishers they 
represented. In this approach, fishers were infantilised - they were perceived to be unable 
                                                 
96 OV Veteran Fisher 5. Letter (ii). 26/09/11. 
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to help themselves, as well as lacking adequate knowledge of their own best interests; 
therefore, they required the guidance and support of suitably capable representatives. As 
AOVF Rep 1 stated at a DAFF road show in August 2013:  “they’re not business people 
… they need to move with people they can trust” (AOVF Rep 1, pers comm 19/08/13).   
However, for critics of the AOVF leadership, this strategically paternalistic approach 
undermined the democratic rights of AOVF members, and opened the way for their 
economic exploitation by the AOVF leadership. One of the most esteemed veteran 
fishers on the Cape Peninsula at the time of this research, and an Applicant in the 
Equality Court case, described how AOVF Rep 1 once told him in a meeting that “You 
[fishers] must just go to sea, and let us talk, because you don’t have the right mind-set for 
this sort of thing”. According to him, AOVF Rep 1’s implied reasoning behind this 
statement was “because you are incompetent” (OV Veteran Fisher 17, pers comm 
09/02/12).  
The claim that the AOVF leadership viewed fishers in a patronising way was illustrated 
by an infamous story about AOVF Rep 1, which was recounted by on numerous 
occasions during this research.  On one of these occasions, a young diver (who harvested 
abalone illegally) told me that during the early 1990s he observed AOVF Rep 1 
admonishing one of his friends for underperforming in their schooling. According to this 
research participant - AOVF Rep 1 apparently warned his friend that “you better pull up 
your socks, or else you’ll end up as a fisherman!” (OV Fisher 11, pers comm 14/05/12).  
5.4.4. Strategies and tactics of the AOVF: elite capture of Ocean View’s 
small-scale fisheries through community-based representation  
For the majority of non-AOVF members encountered during this research, the AOVF 
leadership was perceived as a local elite grouping who employed various strategies and 
tactics in order to capture opportunities emerging in the local field of small-scale 
fisheries, such as those associated with the interim relief and SSF policy processes. One 
veteran fisher (who had been excluded from interim relief because of his age), argued 
that: “those people are just out for themselves … they’re stirring Ocean View up … how 
did they come into their position? And they’re people who received thousands of rands 
… they’re stirring Ocean View up now” (OV Veteran Fisher 13, pers comm 13/07/12).  
Another veteran fisher who held a nearshore WCRL quota, explained knowingly that 
“they’re like sharks … they just eat you up” (OV Veteran Fisher 7, pers comm 
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02/07/12). These claims were affirmed by  a young fisher who worked in the tuna pole 
and linefish sectors, noted in relation to the AOVF leadership’s representative activities: 
“The wrong people, they’re always a step ahead” (OV Fisher 4, pers comm 23/10/12). 
Another veteran fisher who shared this view expressed concern about being openly 
critical of the AOVF leadership: “We used to belong to them [AOVF] … but as I said … 
the criminality that went on there … now someone else sits with the bread! But anyway 
… I don’t want to talk too much … in case they eat me up” (OV Veteran Fisher 1, pers 
comm 02/11/12).  
It was evident from this research in Ocean View that the AOVF leadership had 
employed a number of strategies to generate legitimacy for themselves, and to capture a 
central position in the local fisheries field. These strategies included: i) the accumulation 
and exploitation of cultural and social capital in fisheries and civic engagement; ii) the 
building of a large constituency of ‘bona fide’ and thus legitimate fishers; iii) and 
facilitating the entry of non-fishers into ocean view’s small-scale fishery. 
5.4.4. a) Accumulating and exploiting cultural and social capital  
Speaking at a public event held in Ocean View during March 2013, AOVF Rep 1 
explained that: “Fishing is a tradition, an inheritance” (AOVF Rep 1, pers comm 
22/03/13)97. In the context of small-scale fisheries governance in South Africa, it was 
often observed during this research that representatives would make claims to this 
‘tradition’ or ‘inheritance’ as a means to legitimise their role as a representative of small-
scale fishers (see Chapter Six).  To this end, the AOVF leadership seem to have 
employed the strategy of accumulating fisheries-specific cultural capital to bolster their 
claims to be rooted in the local culture and practices of fishing, and thus to be legitimate 
representatives. This strategy involves interacting with those who were embedded in the 
local fishing community, with the purpose of extracting information about local fishing-
related practices, beliefs, values, history, social relations, and discursive patterns. 
Through this strategy, the AOVF leadership was able to accumulate, and thus 
demonstrate to outsiders the requisite amount of fisheries-specific cultural capital, 
creating the impression that they were deeply embedded members of the local fishing 
community whom they represented.  
                                                 
97Local weekly community newspaper. 2013. 
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Several research participants in Ocean View observed this vicarious accumulation of 
cultural capital. During one interview, a lifelong resident in his early sixties whose son 
had an abalone quota, described how “clever people” like the AOVF leaders had visited 
fisher households in Ocean View “to take people’s histories” for their own opportunistic 
purposes (OV Non-Fisher 1, pers comm 02/07/12). One of the established women 
fishers in Ocean View also described how AOVF Rep 1 had exploited the identity and 
heritage of veteran fishers in Ocean View, exclaiming that: “she’s gliding over our 
legacy!”(OV Fisher 2, pers comm 22/10/12).  On another occasion, one of the founding 
members of DFO observed that the local fishing culture was increasingly being viewed 
as a strategic resource: “it’s only now” that non-fishers are desire to claim this heritage:  
“now there’s new people coming in, they want to give people the impression that they knew all these 
things from the past. And what happens is … they come to my mother, they come to people, and they ask 
questions, they start talking, she wants to share. And then they use that same information for their 
applications, as the knowledge she had … What gets you normally is, when they say the amount years 
they’ve been involved in the industry. And which you know it’s not the truth, because you know where the 
person comes from … how can you have been for 25 years in the industry, but you were 20 years in 
another industry?!” (OV Veteran Fisher 3, pers comm 22/06/12).  
It was also apparent that the AOVF leadership had employed the strategy of 
accumulating cultural capital (knowledge and skills) and developing social capital 
(relationships) in the broader field of civic engagement. Several research participants in 
Ocean View indicated that the AOVF leadership were involved in a number of local 
civic structures related to community development: as OV Veteran Fisher 5 put it: 
“Whatever you start, people like them latch onto it” (OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 
03/02/12). He explained that the AOVF leadership’s civic engagement has enabled 
them to accumulate knowledge about community representation, to establish their 
identity as ‘community leaders’, and to build their social networks within the field of 
civic engagement - all vital resources to reinforce claims to be legitimate representatives 
of the local fishing community. Through this process, their position as representatives 
has become institutionalised, giving them a veneer of legitimacy to those without 
detailed knowledge of Ocean View’s community dynamics.  
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5.4.4. b) Building a large constituency of ‘bona fide’ fishers  
Claiming to represent a large constituency of bona fide fishers was another key strategy 
observed during this research. It was apparent that many representatives made the claim 
to represent a large number of bona fide fishers as a means to support their own claims to 
legitimacy. Recognition of this claim by external actors (such as DAFF management 
officials) provides a rich resource for representatives, potentially facilitating their 
inclusion in fisheries governance processes, and enabling them to exercise a degree of 
political leverage in those processes. In the case of community-based representation in 
Ocean View, one veteran trek fisher explained in relation to AOVF Rep 2’s use of this 
strategy:  “the more people he can send to the department, the stronger he is” (OV 
Veteran Fisher 14, pers comm 13/07/12).  There are also financial opportunities that 
emerged from representing a large number of people. The AOVF leadership were known 
to charge a fee for securing interim relief permits and commercial fishing rights for 
members, negotiating marketing arrangements, and for conducting general 
administrative services on their behalf for these members - as one veteran fisher argued: 
“It’s about money” (OV Veteran Fisher 16, pers comm 09/02/12).  
The AOVF leadership employed a number of tactics to build the size of their 
‘constituency’. The first was the tactical use of information. In their role as mediators of 
the flow of information between their constituency and external actors (government 
officials, industry representatives, NGOs and fisheries scientists), the AOVF leadership 
were in a potentially powerful position from which they were able to mediate this flow of 
information in accordance with their interests and agendas.  This advantage was 
multiplied in a context of information scarcity - as OV Veteran Fisher 5 noted: “There’s 
no direction coming from DAFF, and this is sowing confusion in communities” (OV 
Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 15/06/12). Given that this research was conducted during 
a period of rapid and dramatic change in the governance of South African fisheries, the 
lack of communication from DAFF officials had contributed to deep and widespread 
uncertainty among fishers in Ocean View regarding processes that fundamentally 
affected their lives. In the words of one fisher: “information is very important! If you 
don’t get the information, you don’t know what’s going on” (OV Fisher 1, pers comm 
03/07/12).    
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In this context, information was a valuable commodity, and a powerful political tool. 
With their formal and informal access to government officials (through their political 
relationships), the AOVF leadership was able to obtain information which they used to 
increase their constituency, and to build, exercise, and reinforce power over them. It was 
often observed by research participants in Ocean View that fishers would gravitate 
towards those representatives who had more information - as OV Veteran Fisher 5 put it, 
“Fishers migrate according to which community organisation has information. Even if 
that information is incorrect or distorted … just as long as that organisation has 
something to tell” (OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 09/04/12). One fulltime linefisher 
(aligned to DFO) argued that it was common knowledge among Ocean View fishers that 
the AOVF leadership had the most information regarding the formation of co-operatives. 
However, he described his unsuccessful attempt to obtain some of this information from 
them, exclaiming in frustration: “they’re holding it tight!” (OV Fisher 3, pers comm 
23/10/12).   Two veteran fishers in their late fifties (who were affiliated to DFO) also 
noted that on several occasions during 2011 and 2012, they had attempted to attend 
AOVF meetings to seek information about co-operatives, interim relief, and the SSF 
policy, but were told that non-members were not allowed to attend (OV Veteran Fisher 
11, 12, pers comm 24/06/12). 
As discussed earlier, the AOVF leadership’s ability to attract members was largely based 
on producing tangible results. In the context of widespread economic insecurity among 
many Ocean View residents, the ability to produce results was particularly valuable as a 
means of expanding the ranks of the AOVF. According to several non-members, one of 
the main tactics employed by the AOVF leadership to build their constituency was that 
of the monetary advance, which was referred to locally by the Afrikaans term ‘voorskot’ 
(OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 23/09/11; OV Fisher 1, pers comm 03/07/12; OV 
Veteran Fisher 3, pers comm 14/07/12). A ‘voorskot’ usually takes the form of an 
advance on the money a fisher expects to earn from their commercial fishing right or 
interim relief permit, and is usually paid during the off-season, when many fishers are 
financially desperate, and thus vulnerable. The Research Associate described his 
perception of the power of the voorskot as employed by the AOVF leadership:  “It’s like 
they’ve brought this fast track … they are able to bail people out … to bring quick 
solutions to people’s immediate needs … And that’s what people in our situation need 
now in South Africa” (Research Associate, pers comm 22/06/12). The use of the 
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voorskot tactic appears to have contributed to the AOVF’s strategy of building their 
constituency, while simultaneously establishing a debtor-creditor relationship through 
which to impose obligations of loyalty, and to defend against dissent. As one veteran 
fisher explained in relation to the AOVF leadership’s use of the voorskot: “Yes … it’s 
money that talks” (OV Veteran Fisher 14, pers comm 13/07/12). 
As discussed earlier, the AOVF leadership was had a proven ability to produce tangible 
results by securing commercial fishing rights and interim relief permits. Since the 
Equality Court case in 2007, they had focused their efforts on interim relief - both AOVF 
members and non-members encountered during this research expressed the view that if 
you desired an interim relief permit, your chances were significantly improved if you 
sought the AOVF leadership’s assistance. One veteran fisher observed how AOVF Rep 2 
had gathered people into the AOVF fold with the promise of securing interim relief 
permits for them: “Yes …then he walks with books … he drives around the area, then he 
goes to the homes … ‘man, you can get something’ [a fishing permit]” (OV Veteran 
Fisher 13, pers comm 13/0/712). Another veteran fisher described similar observations: 
“they’re just scratching [people] together. They drive around the area, they’ve got lots of 
money to buy petrol, and all that … Ocean View, Site Five, and there at the back, Red 
Hill, all those places that he drives … to go collect people” (OV Veteran Fisher 1, 
02/11/12).  
There was a perception among many non-AOVF members that the AOVF leadership 
have also been using the development of fishing co-operatives to build their membership, 
while simultaneously securing personal economic gains. According to these research 
participants, the AOVF had been approaching residents (both fishers and non-fishers) in 
Ocean View and surrounding areas, promoting the idea of co-operatives as a viable 
economic opportunity, and offering administrative support and organisational guidance 
to assist with co-operative formation. One AOVF member and fulltime fisher was being 
assisted by the AOVF leadership to form a co-operative with several of his colleagues. 
He acknowledged that the AOVF leadership were playing a lead role in this process, and 
noted that he and his fellow co-operative members: “still haven’t seen the constitution” 
(OV Fisher 9, pers comm 27/09/12).  
Two veteran fishers described being courted by the AOVF leadership, who tried 
(unsuccessfully) to convince them to form co-operatives. According to these fishers, 
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AOVF Rep 1 and AOVF Rep 2 told them they needed a minimum of ten people to 
register the co-operative, and that each co-operative member would be required to pay 
ZAR60 to AOVF Rep 1 and AOVF Rep 2 for them to register the co-operative on the 
members’ behalf, following which, the members would be required to pay ZAR120 for 
AOVF Rep 1 and AOVF Rep 2 to apply for a commercial fishing right on behalf of the 
co-operative (OV Veteran Fisher 11, 12, pers comm 24/06/12). This tactic was also 
observed by a young linefisher, who added that the AOVF leadership exploited the 
emotive discourses of ‘community’ and ‘empowerment’ in their efforts to convince 
fishers of the potential of co-operatives: “they promise you through the heart, and 
through the mouth” (OV Fisher 4, pers comm 23/10/12).   
This research encountered considerable uncertainty and scepticism among non-AOVF 
members in Ocean View, regarding the claims being made by the AOVF leadership 
regarding the potential of co-operatives as vehicles for economic empowerment, as one 
veteran fisher exclaimed: “co-ops won’t work, they didn’t work in the past” (OV Veteran 
Fisher 7, pers comm 02/07/12).  While the scepticism of these fishers appeared to be 
informed by experiences of unsuccessful collective fishing enterprises that were 
established in the late 1990s, it was also based on their assessment of conditions in 
Ocean View at the time of this research. Several fishers (including some AOVF members 
who were in the process of establishing co-operatives) expressed concern because of the 
lack of clarity regarding: the possibilities for these co-operatives to secure fishing rights; 
the form these rights would take; the species to be included; and the quantum of these 
allocations. As one fisher explained, if there was greater clarity on these issues, then at 
least “you know you’re safe” (OV Fisher 3, pers comm 23/10/12).   
These fishers also expressed apprehension in relation to the issue of co-operative 
membership. They argued that there were many non-fishers in Ocean View who were 
joining co-operatives despite having little or no experience of fishing, and without having 
shed “the same blood, sweat and tears” as fulltime fishers had shed - yet they would 
potentially stand as colleagues of those who had “paid their dues” (OV Fisher 3, pers 
comm 23/10/12). These fishers articulated a concern that ‘bona fide’ fishers might have 
to carry the burden of the inexperienced members by catching the bulk of the fish, as well 
as taking the time to train the newcomers (OV Fisher 3, 4, pers comm 23/10/12). 
Without greater certainty, these fishers were sceptical of the claims being made by the 
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AOVF leadership regarding the desirability and viability of co-operatives. Yet the AOVF 
leadership’s claims have found a more sympathetic audience in the form of non-fisher 
residents in Ocean View who are attracted by the economic opportunities emerging in 
relation to co-operatives, interim relief, and the SSF policy. By formally assisting non-
fisher residents to pursue these opportunities, the AOVF leadership has been able, not 
only to enlarge their constituency, but also to secure private economic gains for 
themselves. 
5.4.4. c) Facilitating the entry of non-fishers into Ocean View’s small-scale fishery 
At a DAFF road show in August 2013, AOVF Rep 1 argued strongly that “we must 
prioritise bona fide fishers!” (AOVF Rep 1, pers comm 19/08/13). However, in their 
effort to expand their constituency, and to capture greater benefits from their position as 
representatives, the AOVF leadership appear not to have discriminated between those 
people who were fully dependent on personally harvesting marine resources for a living, 
and those who had little or no personal history in fisheries. By securing commercial 
fishing rights and interim relief permits for people who did not fish, the AOVF 
leadership are alleged to have secured economic benefits for themselves, while 
facilitating the entry of non-fishers into the local field of small-scale fisheries at the 
expense of many bona fide fishers in Ocean View.  
In the context of interim relief, the entry point for non-fishers is the verification process, 
whereby prospective permit applicants were required to ‘prove’ their credentials as ‘bona 
fide fishers’, in accordance with the government’s policy focus on restoring the rights of 
small-scale fishers who had been excluded by the MLRA and apartheid era fisheries 
policies (see Chapter Four).  As one DAFF management official explained during a road 
show to discuss the implementation of the SSF policy:  
 “We will have to look very closely at who is a small-scale fisher … Let me be very clear, we intend to 
target fisher folk, who’ve made a living from the sea”, this is “not for the lawyers, doctors, teachers … 
Because of the financial benefits people have been seeing in these processes, people are infiltrating and 
causing chaos … and only for their own benefit” (DAFF Director 1, pers comm 19/08/13).  
One fisher explained that representatives who resided in the community - and thus 
participated in verification - had an incentive to endorse their own members in 
verification meetings, because they would later take a percentage of the price per 
kilogram which they arrange on behalf of those members: “the more people you can 
146 | P a g e  
 
control, the better for you” (OV Fisher 13, pers comm 09/02/12)98. Another fisher 
alleged that the AOVF Rep 1 and AOVF Rep 2 had been submitting verification lists 
composed largely of non-fishers: “they just want to go for the numbers … you want to 
run as many people as possible” (OV Veteran Fisher 16, pers comm 09/02/12). Echoing 
the views of fishers who did not belong to the AOVF, one fisher described the AOVF 
leadership’s modus operandi: “they want your vote, they want your name, and then they 
take it from there …”, however, he stressed that “it’s only a fisherman who can identify a 
fisherman … we all know each other  ... we know ‘he is catching fish’” (OV Fisher 1, 
pers comm 03/07/12).  
The indiscriminate facilitation of access to commercial fishing rights and interim relief 
permits by the AOVF leadership had contributed towards the broader trend in Ocean 
View, in which fishing has become an increasingly attractive option as a source of 
income in a context of widespread poverty and unemployment (see Chapter Four). As 
one veteran fisher explained: “Look, like here in Ocean View, here there’s almost 2000 
fishermen who aren’t fishermen, where do they come from? … The whole of Ocean 
View is now full … just fishermen … but they’re not fishermen!” (OV Veteran Fisher 13, 
pers comm 13/07/12). Another veteran fisher argued that “the department, the 
government just gives to everybody, it’s not, in a sense, just purely for fishermen ...” (OV 
Veteran Fisher 3, pers comm 22/06/12). A local trek fisher also observed that 
“nowadays, everyone wants to be a fisher … The department made one mistake, by 
giving the wrong people permits. Now the clever people come in … it’s not [supposed to 
be] about literacy, it’s about giving people a fair chance” (OV Fisher 1, pers comm 
03/07/12). This claim was affirmed by a veteran fisher, who claimed that: “Now they’re 
smuggling themselves in … now that they hear about the quotas, they comes, everybody 
comes … They apply for quotas, and they get it … and my friend here [OV Veteran 
Fisher 2] sits with nothing …” (OV Veteran Fisher 1, pers comm 02/11/12).  
There was consensus among the non-AOVF members encountered during this research 
the majority of the AOVF’s membership was composed of non-fishers.  Some veteran 
fishers mentioned going on several occasions to AOVF meetings, only to be told that 
non-members were not allowed. From the doorway, they claimed to have observed a 
                                                 
98 Based on OV Veteran Fisher 5’s sources in the fishing industry, he asserted that they received a 
commission of about ZAR300 per permit holder per month from fishing companies who are seeking raw 
product (mainly WCRL) (OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 13/09/11).  
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significant percentage of non-fishers at these meetings (OV Veteran Fisher 11, 12, pers 
comm 24/06/12). It was also alleged that the AOVF leadership “say they’re representing 
fishers, but who are the fishers they’re representing?” (OV Fisher 1, pers comm 
03/07/12).  One veteran fisher explained that, as a highly knowledgeable and 
experienced fisher, he was not recognised or taken seriously at AOVF meetings:  “Yes, I 
was already at the meetings. But those meetings of the AOVF, I don’t worry about them 
anymore … what will I do with myself sitting there? You don’t even get seen” (OV 
Veteran Fisher 15, pers comm 13/07/12).   
To mitigate against the claim that their constituency was largely composed of people 
who were not legitimate fishers, the AOVF leadership employed a manoeuvre 
sometimes referred to as the ‘poster-fisher’ tactic. In simple terms, the ‘poster-fisher’ 
tactic involved the presentation to external actors, of people who were, or appeared to be 
‘bona fide’ veteran fishers, and portraying these people as though they were a reflection 
or sample of the broader AOVF membership (OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 
15/06/12; OV Veteran Fisher 3, pers comm 22/06/12; OV Veteran Fisher 13, pers 
comm 13/07/12). The apparent legitimacy of these veteran fishers was thus used to 
create the perception that the broader constituency was also legitimate. Crucially, this 
tactic had the instrumental effect of communicating an implied claim that the AOVF 
leadership were also legitimate. This research suggested that the reasons why these and 
other fisher-members did not challenge the exploitation of their identities and status are 
related to their relatively vulnerable position in relation to the AOVF leadership, 
specifically their disadvantage in terms of cultural capital in the institutional field (as 
discussed earlier), as well as their insecure economic position. It is also likely that they 
may have had a lack of faith in the formal mechanisms of accountability within the 
AOVF, and more broadly within DAFF, and other non-fisheries bodies such as the 
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee and the Human Rights Commission.  
The claims being made by non-AOVF members regarding the AOVF leadership’s 
activities as community-based representatives can be well illustrated by two case studies. 
These case studies describe two of the key moments in the institutionalisation of the 
AOVF’s leadership in the local field of small-scale fisheries. They also indicate some of 
the AOVF’s strategies and tactics in practice.  
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5.4.5. The capture of the Atlantic Fishers Organisation 
The story of the Atlantic Fishers Organisation (AFO) illuminates the kind of strategies 
and tactics pursued by the AOVF leadership in their bid to control the field of small-scale 
fisheries in Ocean View, and to intercept the benefits intended for the fishers they claim 
to represent. There are two conflicting narratives of the AFO’s history. According to a 
generic sponsorship letter signed by AOVF Rep 1 in 2005 (and featuring the AFO 
letterhead):  
“The AFO is a non-profit organisation whose main purpose is to uplift and alleviate poverty amongst 
fishermen in the Ocean View community. A group of poverty stricken fishermen and fisherwoman (sic) 
were given some hope when I successfully managed to obtain funding from [Company X], and that was 
the birth of one of the greatest organisations in Ocean View … Thanking you - AFO Chairperson”
99
.  
Despite AOVF Rep 1’s positive portrayal of her own role as AFO chairperson, this 
portrayal was contested by the original chairperson (OV Fisher 2).  OV Fisher 2 was one 
of about a dozen recognised women fishers in Ocean View who personally caught fish. 
She explained that she had been fishing since the age of thirteen (1990), and had worked 
in both the linefish and WCRL fisheries (at the time of this research she had an interim 
relief permit). OV Fisher 2’s late husband had also been a fulltime fisher, but he had 
drowned while fishing near Scarborough in 2001. She observed that from that time, she 
and her daughters had depended on her fishing activities and child grants as their means 
of survival. During an interview in October 2012, OV Fisher 2 described her version of 
the AFO’s history, and her understanding of AOVF Rep 1’s role in this now-defunct 
organisation (using a variety of documentation to illustrate and support her claims). The 
following narrative is drawn from this interview, as well as from various letters written 
by OV Fisher 2 and AOVF Rep 1. 
According to OV Fisher 2, the AFO was born from the initiative of a group of local 
fishers, who sought to create a legal structure to represent the interests of fishers in 
Ocean View, to facilitate their access to fishing rights, and to provide organisational 
support for their fishing activities. As OV Fisher 2 explained, the AOVF leadership 
initially made contact with this group of fishers in November 2000, and provided 
assistance in the formal establishment of the AFO, and in the application for commercial 
fishing rights. In 2001, the AFO was registered as a non-profit organisation, with OV 
                                                 
99 AOVF Rep 1. Letter (ii). Undated. ‘Company X’ is a pseudonym used for the purpose of anonymity. 
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Fisher 2 as its first chairperson. OV Fisher 2 observed that AOVF Rep 1 was initially 
very friendly, and seemed sincere in her desire to help - in a letter written to AOVF Rep 
1, she explained that: “In good faith we trusted you … where you came in … by using 
your knowledge … you made yourself available … for 70% of fishers cannot write or 
read, and that was in your advantage …”100. OV Fisher 2 contended that several months 
after the establishment of the AFO, AOVF Rep 1 declared themselves chairperson of the 
AFO, and began to involve AOVF Rep 2 and AOVF Rep 3 in the management of the 
organisation. OV Fisher 2 exclaimed in one her letters that: 
“You claim you ease our poverty … How did you manage to obtain funding? Answer - you used us 
disadvantaged fishermen and fisherwomen’s historical background and legacy, our poverty livelihood, and 
draft sponsorship letters to … established companies … you manage the money … boats and equipment. 
What Company X gave on behalf of us fishermen and fisherwomen you took everything for yourself and 
left us with nothing … you … used us fishermen and fisherwomen for your success in life”
101.  
OV Fisher 2 alleged that AOVF Rep 1 had not acted transparently (OV Fisher 2, pers 
comm 22/10/12). For example AOVF Rep 1 had apparently refused to grant AFO 
members’ requests regarding the price at which their catches were sold: “we never saw 
documents or price agreements of crayfish marketing”102. According to OV Fisher 2, the 
buyers would pay AOVF Rep 1 on behalf of the AFO members, but deposited the 
money directly, thus preventing OV Fisher 2 from determining how much was actually 
being paid (OV Fisher 2, pers comm 22/10/12). As OV Fisher 2 explained, AOVF Rep 
1: “kept all the receipts and invoices … we never saw our company’s code of conduct … 
mostly I had to sign blank cheques, I only cashed once a cheque of R80 000 for advance 
loans to members … we never got a chance to read what we signing!”103 Once again, it 
should be noted that AOVF Rep 2 was able to achieve this without serious resistance 
from the AFO membership was likely a result of the empowered position that this 
representative held in relation the membership in terms of cultural and economic capital. 
According to OV Fisher 2, AOVF Rep 1 made another unilateral decision in 2005 to 
formally dissolve the AFO. OV Fisher 2 alleged that no shares were paid to the 
members, though money still remained in the AFO’s bank account. OV Fisher 2 also 
explained that the AFO’s assets (which included office equipment, fishing gear, and 
                                                 
100 OV Fisher 2. Letter (i). Undated. 
101 OV Fisher 2. Letter (i). Undated. 
102 OV Fisher 2. Letter (iii). Undated. 
103 OV Fisher 2. Letter (iii). Undated. 
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several small vessels) were moved to the AOVF leadership’s home, and eventually 
absorbed into their current fishing and organisational operations. OV Fisher 2 alleged 
that when she started asking for information, AOVF Rep 1 became hostile towards her, 
and initiated a campaign to silence and discredit her. This apparently included a veiled 
threat in a letter formally addressed to MCM, but which also appeared to be directed at 
OV Fisher 2 personally. This letter featured the AFO letterhead and was apparently 
written and signed by AOVF Rep 1 as AFO chairperson in 2006104.    
During this period, the AOVF was formally established, and registered as a non-profit 
organisation, having apparently cannibalised the AFO as a means to its own 
development, hijacking the identities, histories, finances and assets of its fisher members. 
For the next six years, the AOVF continued to expand its constituency, and to reinforce 
its position in the local field of small-scale fisheries, eventually emerging as one of main 
groupings representing fishers in Ocean View. OV Fisher 2 asserted that the AOVF 
leadership continued to operate without accountability: “for 12 years they have been 
getting away with this … since 2001 …”, but they “walk freely” in Ocean View (OV 
Fisher 2, pers comm 22/10/12).  
5.4.6. The Capture of the Democratic Fishers Organisation 
This case study describes how the AOVF leadership employed similar strategies and 
tactics to capture the DFO. The material presented here was drawn from numerous 
discussions with fishers affiliated to DFO, including the former chairperson (OV Veteran 
Fisher 5) and former vice chairperson of DFO (OV Veteran Fisher 3), as well as from 
various letters written by the former chairperson. As already described above, the DFO 
was the most established grouping representing fishers in Ocean View. Since its 
inception in the early 1990s until 2011, DFO held annual general meetings at which OV 
Veteran Fisher 5 was elected chairperson by the association’s membership, as stipulated 
by the DFO constitution. According to fishers encountered during this research, these 
elections corresponded with the preferences of DFO’s membership, and reflected their 
confidence in OV Veteran Fisher 5’s credentials as a fulltime fisher, and as a 
representative (OV Veteran Fisher 16, 17, pers comm 08/03/12; OV Veteran Fisher 11, 
12, pers comm 24/06/12; OV Veteran Fisher 13, 14, 15, pers comm 13/07/12). 
                                                 
104 AOVF Rep 1. Letter (iii), 4/05/2006. It is significant that AOVF Rep 1 was, by this time, also the 
chairperson of the AOVF. 
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However in late 2010, OV Veteran Fisher 5 and the vice chairperson (who was also a 
fulltime fisher) were unilaterally deposed, and their positions occupied by AOVF Rep 1 
and AOVF Rep 3 respectively. The nature of this coup d’état was shrouded in secrecy, 
but according to OV Veteran Fisher 5:  
“I was arbitrarily removed, as the … legitimately elected fishers’ representative of the DFO.  I had to learn 
through outside sources that I was no longer representing artisanal fishers in Ocean View, and that the post 
… of representative … had been awarded to a group with close connections to the ANC … and with 
interests in the off-shore and the near-shore sectors … like, for example quotas, tenders and permits”
105.  
In a June 2013 letter to the Minister of DAFF, OV Veteran Fisher 5 described “the 
DFO-SA chairperson’s official ‘election’ as well as his personal ‘endorsement’” of the 
AOVF leadership106. According to OV Veteran Fisher 5 and OV Veteran Fisher 3, when 
they asked the AOVF leadership about their election to leadership positions in the DFO, 
the AOVF leadership explained that they were elected at a meeting convened by the 
DFO-SA chairperson and general secretary (OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 08/12/11; 
OV Veteran Fisher 3, pers comm 26/06/11)107. According to OV Veteran Fisher 5, these 
“so-called elections were in total contempt of the DFO constitution because when they 
‘held’ in secret, outside of the membership’s area … and the registered DFO members 
were un-informed … absent … and not notified of the ‘election’ process … and  the 
existing AGM was still in force”108. In addition, the AOVF were already leading their 
own organisation at the time (AOVF) - their election was thus illegitimate according to 
DFO’s constitution, as well as placing them in an egregious conflict interest. As OV 
Veteran Fisher 5 explained: “democratic processes are being over-ruled!” (OV Veteran 
Fisher 5, pers comm 24/01/12).  
OV Veteran Fisher 5 alleged that when he confronted the DFO-SA chairperson in early 
2011, the chairperson acknowledged that the ‘election’ was conducted in a telephone 
conversation between himself and AOVF Rep 1. OV Veteran Fisher 5 claims that when 
questioned further, the DFO-SA chairperson began “accusing OV Veteran Fisher 3 for 
                                                 
105 OV Veteran Fisher 5. Letter (i). 18/09/11. 
106 OV Veteran Fisher 5. Letter (i). 18/09/11. 
107 I observed AOVF Rep 1 and AOVF Rep 3 opting to sit next to the DFO-SA general secretary at a 
WCRL Data Management Workshop (4/11/11); and  over three days of public hearings on the 
amendment of the MLRA held at the national parliament in Cape Town (October 2013). There was a 
clearly observable familiarity in the way the AOVF leadership interacted with the DFO-SA general 
secretary. 
108 OV Veteran Fisher 5. Letter (i). 18/09/11. 
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having introduced the AOVF leadership to him as legitimate fisher leaders”109. OV 
Veteran Fisher 3 categorically denied this, and explained that, in the context of his 
knowledge and experience of the AOVF leadership, this would have amounted to a 
wilful abdication of his and OV Veteran Fisher 5’s leadership of DFO, and the 
abandonment of their obligations to the fishers they represented (OV Veteran Fisher 3, 
pers comm 14/07/12). OV Veteran Fisher 5 also pointed to the documented fact that 
“while chairperson of the AOVF lodged objections on behalf of near shore commercial 
fishing right holders, against the Equality Court Applicants” - the very people the AOVF 
leadership were now seeking to represent. According to OV Veteran Fisher 5, his 
continued efforts to obtain information from the DFO-SA chairperson regarding his 
ousting as DFO chairperson were met, first with silence, and then with a threat of legal 
action (OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm, 17/12/12).   
After these ‘elections’, the AOVF leadership began to operate under the banner of the 
DFO, while still acting in leadership positions in the AOVF. However soon after having 
hijacked - and thus neutralised - the DFO, they began to operate exclusively as the 
AOVF. During the time of this research, the formal status of the DFO was unclear, and 
OV Veteran Fisher 5 reverted back to working under the banner of the WFO. However, 
having been deposed from his formal position as DFO chairperson, OV Veteran Fisher 5 
had been increasingly excluded from participation in fisheries governance process. This 
exclusion directly undermined the democratic rights of the fishers whom he represented. 
OV Veteran Fisher 5’s ostracisation was attested to by many DFO and non-DFO fishers 
in Ocean View encountered during this research.  According to one veteran fisher and 
DFO member, OV Veteran Fisher 5 “was kicked out. He almost can’t even attend a 
meeting … since this thing started” (OV Veteran Fisher 13, pers comm 13/07/12).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
109 OV Veteran Fisher 5. Letter (ii). 26/06/11. 
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5.5. Conclusion: power and disempowerment in community-based 
political representation   
This chapter has presented an ethnographic study of community-based political 
representation among small-scale fishers in Ocean View. It began by sketching the broad 
context of political representation in the field of fisheries governance in post-apartheid 
South Africa. This was followed by a brief discussion of some of the key dynamics 
between community-based political representatives and their small-scale fisher 
constituencies on the Cape Peninsula.   
Having provided a broad overview of small-scale fisher representation, the chapter 
honed in on the micro-politics of community-based political representation of small-scale 
fishers in Ocean View. It provided a detailed depiction of the real-life practices through 
which some individuals come to occupy the position of representatives, and through 
which they construct an appearance of legitimacy for themselves. Although community-
based political representation in Ocean View is an extreme case (see Chapter Three), it 
provides insights that have implications for the broader field of small-scale fisheries 
governance in South Africa. This study of Ocean View reveals how the political space 
for democratic representation that has recently emerged for small-scale fishers can be 
captured by local elites in the community. From this empirically-grounded depiction, we 
gain a clear view of how community-based representation can potentially serve as a 
mechanism for empowered local actors to gain and exercise power, while undermining 
(rather than supporting) the democratic rights of bona fide small-scale fishers.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
A STUDY OF THE POWER DYNAMICS AND MICRO-
POLITICS OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN SMALL-SCALE 
FISHERIES GOVERNANCE ON THE CAPE PENINSULA 
6.1. Introduction: participation as a potential instrument of, and 
barrier to democratic fisheries governance  
In this chapter, the focus shifts from community-based political representation to public 
participation, another central element of democratic fisheries governance in post-
apartheid South Africa. Participation is framed in national policy and legal discourse as 
the primary means to facilitate the equitable inclusion of both marginalised fishers and 
fisher representatives in policy and management processes. However, like political 
representation, participation also constitutes an arena of fisheries governance where 
power and strategic practices manifest with stark intensity. As this chapter will 
demonstrate, there is a dark side to participation in fisheries governance processes: like 
political representation, participation can potentially serve to undermine the democratic 
efforts of small-scale fishers and community-based fisher representatives, and thus 
reinforce existing inequalities of power and benefit distribution.  
To explore how the politics of participation unfold in practice, this chapter discusses 
participation in the context of fisheries governance in post-apartheid South Africa. Here 
the focus of the chapter shifts from community-based fisher representation as practiced by 
a few individual representatives (see Chapter Five), to participatory processes which are 
open to the active involvement of multiple actors, including not only representatives but 
also fishers themselves. Drawing on ethnographic research conducted on the Cape 
Peninsula, this chapter describes some of the ways that power manifested in direct, 
formal participatory encounters between a range of different actors, including small-scale 
fishers, community-based fisher representatives (both those perceived to be legitimate 
such as OV Veteran Fisher 5, and those perceived to illegitimate), state officials, fisheries 
scientists, commercial fishing company representatives, and NGO representatives 
involved in conservation and small-scale fisher advocacy. In particular, this chapter 
describes the micro-political practices that these divergent actors employed as they 
engaged with each other during these participatory encounters. Primary attention is 
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placed on the strategic manoeuvres of powerful political and economic actors during 
participatory events, and how these manoeuvres undermined the democratic 
participation of citizens such as fishers and community-based representatives, thus 
having the effect of reinforcing existing asymmetries of power and benefit distribution.  
6.2. A general overview of public participation in South African 
fisheries governance 
The notion that citizens should participate directly in political processes goes back at least 
as far as the democratic theory and practice Ancient Athens. However, it is only in the 
last thirty years that ‘public participation’ become a highly prominent concept among 
policy-makers, researchers, and development practitioners, many of whom view 
participation as a panacea for the failures of conventional models of governance to 
improve the lives of people living in poverty (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997, Rowe and 
Frewer 2004, Gaventa 2004, Mosse 2007). From the orthodox perspective, participation 
is a primary means for implementing inclusive and collaborative forms of governance. 
Yet the practical value of participation for those who are disempowered is unclear. It is 
widely acknowledged that participatory processes often create the appearance of 
equitable and collaborative political engagement, while simultaneously serving to 
legitimise and reinforce existing imbalances of power. In other words, participatory 
processes can potentially disempower the disempowered, while empowering the 
empowered (Arnstein 1969, Comaroff and Comaroff 1997, Rowe and Frewer 2004, 
Gaventa 2004, Bene and Neiland 2006, Mosse 2007).   
In the South African context, participation is a fundamental component of fisheries 
governance in the post-apartheid dispensation. Participation is mandated by the 
Constitution, the NEMA, the ICMA, the MLRA, the SSF policy, and a range of multi-
lateral environmental and fisheries agreements such as the FAO Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
Protocol on Fisheries. For instance, Article 12 of the SADC Protocol requires that 
member states “shall facilitate broad based and equitable participatory processes to 
involve artisanal and subsistence fishers in the control and management of their fishing 
and related activities”110. 
                                                 
110 SADC Protocol on Fisheries. 2001. Article 12.6. 
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All of these statutory mechanisms require state agencies to include marine resource users 
in governance processes that affect their lives, with the ostensible aim of achieving 
sustainability, equity and economic growth (Hauck and Sowman 2003, Branch and 
Clarke 2006, Van Sittert et al. 2006, Isaacs 2012). Yet in the discourse of these laws, 
policies, and multilateral agreements, participation in fisheries governance is framed in 
apolitical terms that reflect the broader orthodox conception of political practice. In this 
apolitical discourse, participation facilitates inclusive and equitable fisheries governance 
by serving as the means through which relatively disempowered actors such as small-
scale fishing communities and their representatives are able to engage directly with state 
management agencies, fishing companies, civil society organisations, conservation lobby 
groups, and the scientific research fraternity. It is presumed that fishing communities and 
their representatives are able to actively shape fisheries governance processes through this 
participatory engagement, and that their direct involvement leads inexorably towards 
more democratic and sustainable fisheries governance. However, this ‘mutual gains’ or 
‘win-win’ approach to participation in fisheries governance tends to conceal significant 
conflicts and asymmetries of power, and may “not always the best one for all involved … 
a situation that preserves the appearance of harmony can nevertheless have clear winners 
and losers” (Fay 2007: 83).  
This is particularly the case when we consider that participation in fisheries governance is 
subject to the political, economic and ideological power of the state, capital and science, 
which has shaped the governance of marine resource utilisation in South Africa since at 
least 1895 (Van Sittert 1995). The interests and agendas of state-based management 
agencies, large-scale fishing companies, and fisheries scientists in South Africa are 
intertwined, and converge largely around economics: the state seeks to extract resource 
rent while ensuring equitable and sustainable resource use; fishing companies seek to 
ensure the maximisation of profit; and fisheries scientists seek to ensure maximum 
sustainable yield (Van Sittert 2002, Ponte and Van Sittert 2007). This trinity continues to 
exercises considerable power in the field of fisheries governance in South Africa, and 
influences to a significant degree, the nature and outcome of participation processes.  
However, the unity and dominance of the alliance between state officials, company 
directors and fisheries scientists has been unsettled to a certain extent since 1994, as a 
consequence of the post-apartheid state’s pursuit of a ‘transformation’ agenda.  The dawn 
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of a democratic dispensation in South Africa signalled the opening of political space for 
previously marginalised people - such as small-scale fishers and fisher representatives in 
impoverished coastal communities - to obtain equitable access to fisheries resources, and to 
partake in, and influence fisheries governance processes (Hauck and Sowman 2003, Branch and 
Clarke 2006, Van Sittert et al. 2006, Isaacs 2012). This newly-opened political space is 
characterised by the principles of democracy, racial transformation, human rights, equity, 
and justice, all of which support the efforts of small-scale fishing communities in 
processes of participation. As people who were oppressed by the apartheid regime, and 
who continue to be excluded from accessing and benefitting from the country’s marine 
resources on an equitable basis, this set of principles grants considerable symbolic power 
to fishing communities, which they are able to utilise as a means to access and influence 
participatory processes. The efficacy of this symbolic power was most strikingly 
evidenced in the victory of small-scale fishers and fisher representatives in the Equality 
Court case. Although the status quo was still intact at the time of this research, the 
Equality Court victory has tilted the balance of forces in the field of fisheries governance, 
towards small-scale fishing communities and away from the large-scale fishing 
companies - David has gained strength at the expense of Goliath111. The unprecedented 
participation of small-scale fishers and fisher representatives in the formulation of the 
SSF policy exemplified their newfound potential to influence fisheries governance 
processes (Sowman et al. 2014).   
Participation in the field of South African fisheries governance is not only shaped by 
internal dynamics such as the political contest between the industrial and small-scale 
fishing sectors, but also by the broader material and symbolic structures and processes in 
which this field is itself embedded. This broader field of power is arranged concentrically 
at multiple scales, and determines to a significant degree the limits of possible action for 
both state and non-state actors participating in South African fisheries governance. Of 
greatest significance is the global system of capitalism. As was discussed in Chapter Two, 
the driving force of this system is capital, which constitutes a global force field, ordering 
the way societies conduct their political and economic affairs; shaping ontologies, 
epistemologies, beliefs and practices; and thus determining the ways that people relate to 
each other, to themselves, and to the natural world (Kovel 2005). The structures and 
                                                 
111 David and Goliath is the analogy commonly used to refer to the small-scale and large-scale fishing 
sectors respectively. 
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processes of capitalism compel an adherence to a particular mode of economic 
production and political organisation - the institutional emphasis in South African 
fisheries policy and management on capital intensive, export-driven fisheries is a direct 
corollary of the country’s location within the global system of capitalism (Crosoer et al. 
2005). In participation processes pertaining to fisheries governance, the boundaries of 
acceptable thought and discussion correspond to the cosmology and imperatives of 
capitalism (Norton 2014). Powerful global discourses provide the words, images, 
concepts and narratives - or discursive ammunition - that participants use when engaging 
in these processes. These discourses serve as discursive ‘trump cards’ that are invested 
with significant symbolic power (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2001). They include: 
‘sustainability’, ‘gender equity’, ‘economic efficiency’ and ‘economic growth’, ‘authority 
of science’, ‘community’, ‘governance’, ‘participation’, ‘democracy’, and 
‘empowerment’.     
The central issues being contested in the participatory processes observed during this 
research were related to access, use and management of coastal and marine resources. As 
described in Chapter One and Chapter Four, the opening of political space at the end of 
apartheid catalysed expectations that the regime of access would be ‘transformed’ in line 
with the new democratic dispensation. From that time onward, there have been 
conflicting political pressures to retain the current distribution of fishing rights, and to re-
distribute fishing rights from industrial fishing companies to small-scale fishers. Since 
2007, participatory processes associated with interim relief and the SSF policy have been 
heavily contested by both small-scale fishers, fisher representatives and industrial fishing 
companies, who have sought, through participation, to influence the distribution of 
fishing rights.  
This research focused on two basic forms of participation. The first will be referred to as 
‘citizen-initiated’ participation, where small-scale fishers and community-based fisher 
representatives attempted (for democratic or strategic reasons) to engage directly with 
government officials at the ground level, usually in the form of face-to-face meetings. 
Citizen-initiated participation is a primary means for fishers and community-based fisher 
representatives to communicate with DAFF officials, though obtaining such access was 
generally observed to be difficult for these citizens, and was therefore a relatively rare 
occurrence. This research also focused on participation as it manifested in the form of 
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‘invited participatory events’, which were characterised by formal meetings, public 
consultations (‘road shows’), roundtable debates, and parliamentary hearings, and were 
hosted variously by government officials, as well as fisher organisations and conservation 
organisations. These events (or encounters) featured the direct participation of multiple 
actors, including residents of coastal communities, fulltime fishers, community-based 
fisher representatives (legitimate or otherwise), state management officials, ministers of 
parliament, fishing company directors, fisheries scientists and conservationists.  We 
could conceptualise these formal ‘invited events’ as symbolic crystallisations in space and 
time, which dramatise with particular clarity the competing ontologies, epistemologies, 
interests, and agendas that define fisheries governance in South Africa. It is these 
processes that constitute the focus of the empirical basis for this discussion of the politics 
of participatory encounters at the high level. 
6.3. Participation in fisheries governance on the Cape Peninsula: 
dynamics of power at the ground level   
The experiences and perceptions of small-scale fishers and community-based 
representatives provide the starting point for this discussion of participation in fisheries 
governance on the Cape Peninsula. Some representative groupings (such as AOVF) 
claimed to have been empowered through participatory engagement. However, a 
significant number of fishers and community-based representatives expressed a sense of 
alienation, frustration and disempowerment in relation to participatory processes. These 
perceptions and experiences are described below, and will be illustrated by the 
presentation of two case studies of participatory engagement initiated by fishers and 
community-based fisher representatives. 
6.3.1. Perceptions and experiences of participation among small -scale 
fishers and community-based fisher representatives in the case sites  
Contrary to the positive depiction of participation expressed by relatively empowered 
community-based representatives such as the AOVF leadership, many small-scale fishers 
and community-based fisher representatives on the Cape Peninsula expressed a feeling of 
disempowerment when attempting to participate in fisheries governance processes. They 
articulated a critical analysis of the basic structures of power that encompass these 
processes, and the way these structures undermined their ability to influence fisheries 
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governance through democratic participation. One female fisher argued that “the 
government always makes the rules … they just want to control us, but we make their 
money …” (OV Fisher 2, pers comm 22/10/12). This sense of disempowerment was also 
described by OV Veteran Fisher 5, who argued that “decisions are made by a few and 
imposed on us without genuine consultation” (OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 
15/02/11). According to him, fishers were sometimes given an opportunity to 
communicate with DAFF through formal participatory processes, but he argued that 
their views are not integrated into the final decisions taken. This perception was affirmed 
by another Ocean View fisher, who argued that the outcomes of these processes were 
predetermined by DAFF officials, whose task was to guide their plan safely through the 
gauntlet of participation: “Officials shouldn’t come to the community with notes, they 
must come and take notes … then we can come to a solution” (OV Fisher 6, pers comm 
24/10/12).   
This sense of disempowerment was fuelled by perceptions that government officials - 
who were mandated to engage with citizens - exhibited a lack of responsiveness. During 
a late night discussion in Ocean View with OV Veteran Fisher 5, he expressed the 
common view that fisheries department officials were unresponsive when fishers attempt 
to engage directly with them on critical issues: “If we had to depend on them to breathe 
we would have suffocated long ago!" (OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 08/12/11). On 
another occasion, during a focus group with some veteran fishers in Imizamo Yethu, 
they described their long struggle to engage democratically with government officials, to 
seek re-dress for their exploitation by third parties, and to lobby for equitable access to 
fishing rights (IY Focus Group, pers comm 06/04/12). These fishers, most of whom 
were over forty years of age, asserted that they had communicated with many high level 
officials over the past fifteen years, but that this had yielded no meaningful results. One 
of the veteran fishers and representatives explained that “we have been to the 
government so many times … to claim our fishing right … since Mbeki” (IY Veteran 
Fisher 1, pers comm 06/04/12). At this point, his colleague interrupted, “no … from the 
time of Mandela!” (IY Veteran Fisher 4, pers comm 06/04/12). After a brief discussion 
of how DAFF officials were subject to higher authority, and the way this undermined 
their ability to be responsive to fishers in Imizamo Yethu, one of the fishers interjected: 
“but that’s no excuse! They should stand up for fishers” (IY Veteran Fisher 1, pers comm 
06/04/12).  
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The lack of responsiveness of government officials has contributed to a sense of 
disconnection, and thus alienation from these officials and the formal channels of 
participation which they administered. Fishers and community-based representatives on 
the Cape Peninsula regularly expressed a desire for high level officials to come into their 
communities to see the conditions they live in first-hand, and to allow fishers to express 
their views directly to these officials. As one fisher and representative from Imizamo 
Yethu exclaimed: “you can’t feel our pain through the phone!” (IY Veteran Fisher 2, pers 
comm 06/04/12). Another fisher from Hangberg explained that many local fishers have 
attempted to participate meaningfully in processes relating to the establishment of the 
Karbonkelberg Restricted Zone, commercial fishing rights allocation processes, and other 
governance decisions that have impacted on the lives of local fishers (HGB Fisher 3, pers 
comm 01/08/12). He argued that the government makes, and implements its decisions 
unilaterally: “They just tell you: ‘It’s the law’ … what can you do?” (HGB Fisher 3, pers 
comm 01/08/12).  
This sense of disconnection and alienation among fishers and community-based 
representatives was exacerbated by the perceived ineffectiveness of participatory 
processes to ensure accountability. Though these processes were ostensibly established 
with accountability as a central principle, many fishers and representatives expressed the 
view that formal channels of participation were ill-equipped to realise this principle. 
These research participants held little hope that direct interaction with government 
officials offered a means to ensure accountable fisheries governance, as one Ocean View 
fisher put it, “the government … doesn’t like the truth!” (OV Veteran Fisher 1, pers 
comm 02/11/12). Affirming this view, OV Veteran Fisher 5 explained that his attempts 
over the years to hold particular actors accountable through rational engagement with 
government officials, journalists, and civil society organisations had yielded little success: 
“we enjoy no audience … what hurts most is that there's nowhere to turn to … we are 
literally being thrown to the wolves” (OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 21/01/11).  
For the majority of fishers and community-based representatives encountered in the case 
sites, these experiences and perceptions culminated in a profound sense of frustration 
with participatory processes. During a private meeting in Hangberg, a female fisher 
representative from Imizamo Yethu observed that she was “tired of going to meetings, 
meetings, meetings, with no outcome” (IY Fisher 3, pers comm 09/04/12). On another 
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occasion, two veteran fishers in Ocean View observed that they had participated in 
innumerable surveys, interviews, meetings, workshops and stakeholder dialogues, but all 
to no avail, as one of these fishers explained: “We are tired of meetings and filling in 
papers and that kind of thing!” (OV Veteran Fisher 12, pers comm 24/06/12). They both 
expressed a lack of faith in the formal channels of participation to facilitate their 
democratic involvement in fisheries governance, or to enable them to obtain more 
equitable access to marine resources (OV Veteran Fisher 11, 12, pers comm 24/06/12).  
With profound frustration, the one fisher exclaimed that “the government is very unjust 
… Does the government hate the fishers or what?” (OV Veteran Fisher 12, pers comm 
24/06/12).   
6.3.2. Citizen-initiated participation: two case studies  
On the Cape Peninsula, there are many fishers and community-based fisher 
representatives who are endeavouring - as citizens - to arrange face-to-face meetings with 
senior DAFF officials, where they could express their views and concerns directly to 
high-ranking government officials, rather than waiting for these officials to visit them in 
their community. By definition, public participation is effectively open fishers and to 
community-based representatives who are perceived by fishers as illegitimate, as well as 
to representatives who are perceived by fishers to be legitimate. In the case of 
community-based fisher representatives such as AOVF, it was apparent that ‘citizen-
initiated’ participation offered a means to promote their own private interests by gaining 
privileged access to information, and by creating the perception of being an active - and 
therefore legitimate representative. However, it was also clear that other fishers and 
community-based fisher representatives pursued ‘citizen-initiated’ participation as a 
potential means to promote the interests and those of their fellow fishing community 
members, to obtain accountability by presenting allegations and evidence of 
transgressions, and more broadly, to contribute towards more equitable and sustainable 
fisheries governance and management. These fishers and representatives often 
encountered considerable obstacles when seeking to initiate direct engagement with 
senior DAFF officials, and expressed a desire for greater engagement with these officials, 
though they also expressed some doubt regarding the potential of citizen-initiated 
participatory moments to produce practical results. 
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The experiences of several of these fishers and community-based fisher representatives 
are illustrated below by presenting two ethnographic case studies of citizen-initiated 
participation on the Cape Peninsula. These case studies describe instances of 
participation in practice - they detail the attempts of fishers and representatives to 
exercise their democratic rights by engaging directly with government officials, and 
illustrate the bureaucratic barriers that repelled and diverted their participatory efforts.  
6.3.2. a) A meeting between Hout Bay fishers and community-based representatives 
and a member of parliament  
The first case study is based on participant-observation conducted with members of the 
Hout Bay fishing community (five people from Hangberg, including three female fishing 
community members, and two male fishers who also acted as community-based 
representatives; as well as thirteen male fishers from Imizamo Yethu, three of whom 
were community-based representatives).  It describes their attempt to obtain face-to-face 
engagement with a DAFF Portfolio Committee member, with the purpose of 
communicating their views and needs regarding equitable access to marine resources. 
After repeated attempts by members of United Fishermen’s Association (UFA), and the 
Atlantic Fisherwomen’s Forum (AFF) to obtain an audience with a member of the 
DAFF Parliamentary Portfolio Committee, a meeting was finally arranged to be held on 
the 13th of April 2012 at the Portfolio Committee’s offices at parliament. At the request of 
these research participants, my role as activist-researcher was to: gather testimonies from 
these individuals, take their photographs (if possible), compile these testimonies into a 
document, print several copies to be submitted to the Portfolio Committee member, 
provide a lift to some of the fishers from Hout Bay to the parliamentary buildings and 
back, and to accompany them into the meeting as a witness. The process of organising 
for this engagement was exhausting for all involved, with fishers holding several 
gatherings to plan their strategy, and I worked hurriedly with the support of a few of the 
Imizamo Yethu fishers to gather testimonies, compiling them late into the night in the 
days leading up to the meeting. It was hoped that these strenuous efforts would yield 
tangible results. What follows is an ethnographic description of events on the morning of 
this particular instance of citizen-initiated participatory endeavour: 
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The meeting was scheduled for 10:30am. After some final preparations that morning, our group 
(two fishers, three UFA representatives, and two AFF representatives from Imizamo Yethu, and one 
representative from Hangberg) set off from Hout Bay. Arriving at the parliamentary buildings just in 
time, we were met by a pastor, and about six UFA members from the townships of Khayelitsha and 
Gugulethu The group of about a dozen people gathered in the main reception area of parliament, 
and after passing through an x-ray machine, we presented ourselves to an official working behind the 
reception counter. She informed us that the Portfolio Committee member who was to meet the group 
was in Tshwane, and was thus unavailable to speak with the fishers, despite having confirmed their 
attendance a few days prior112. This caused the fishers and their representatives to become visibly 
agitated. However, they soon regained their composure, and demanded an audience with a 
representative of the Portfolio Committee member’s office. The receptionist finally relented, and 
began to pursue their demand. Over two hours passed, while the official made several phone calls, 
and gave intermittent feedback on the progress of her efforts.  
While they waited for a response from the official at reception, one of the fishers asked aloud how 
this confusion regarding the absence of the Portfolio Committee member could have occurred, and 
who might be responsible. Instead of placing all the blame on the official in question (as I expected 
they would do), another of the fishers speculated that two of the AFF representatives were involved. 
Accusations were made that one of these representatives had information the others did not. It was 
claimed that a few days prior, this representative had said the meeting would be cancelled, and that 
this indicated that she had knowledge which she was not sharing with the others.  
Later, while standing outside the entrance to parliament and awaiting a response from the 
Minister’s office, one of the young UFA representatives expressed his frustrations regarding the 
absence of the Portfolio Committee member. He explained that if they did not achieve satisfactory 
progress before leaving parliament today, “we will go to the streets and toyi-toyi” (IY Fisher 5, pers 
comm 13/04/12).  A few moments later, this representative received a phone call from the Portfolio 
Committee member’s personal assistant, instructing him, and a few others to go to DAFF Portfolio 
Committee offices. The fishers gathered again in the reception area, where a thirty minute 
negotiation ensued as with the official behind the desk to decide who would be permitted to go up to 
the office, and under what conditions. This was a disempowering experience - despite being a 
relatively low-level government official, she appeared to hold the democratic possibilities of the 
moment in her hand. Based on her body language, facial expressions and tone of voice, this official’s 
                                                 
112 Tshwane (formerly named Pretoria) is the national administrative capital, and is located in Gauteng 
Province.  
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manner could justifiably be described as intimidating and capricious, forcing the fishers to increase 
the volume and vigour with which they made their demands. 
There was much negotiation about who and how many people would be allowed in. The official at 
reception demonstrated her power in this regard: in a grave tone, she told us that it was vital that 
whoever went inside had a “contribution to make” (Parliamentary Official 1, pers comm 
13/04/12). A sticking point was whether I should be allowed in - three of the UFA representatives, 
and a representative from Hangberg wanted me to accompany them, but the official was reluctant. 
She sternly instructed us that only three people would be permitted entry, but eventually let four of 
us in. We were given the name and number of an employee in the Portfolio Committee office, with 
whom we were to meet. After thanking her with overt politeness, we made our way to the office. 
Although we were buoyed by this small victory, I also felt a sense of having been bullied by this 
official. From their body language and facial expressions it was apparent that some of the fisher 
representatives shared this feeling.  
The fisher representatives and I made our way via the main security checkpoint into the disorienting 
vastness of the parliamentary building complex. We passed through many doors, checkpoints and 
passageways, until we were thoroughly insulated from the outside world. Upon entering the DAFF 
Portfolio Committee office corridor, we were greeted by large framed photographs of the various 
DEAT and DAFF Ministers: Pieter Mulder, Martinus Van Schalkwyk, and Tina Joemat-
Peterson. We found the official’s office went inside. It was slightly dishevelled, with piles of paper-
filled boxes opposite his desk where chairs for visitors would ordinarily be positioned. As we stood in 
front of his desk and introduced ourselves to the employee, we discovered that the person with whom 
we had been granted a meeting was a junior office administrator, who was effectively standing in 
temporary substitution for the Portfolio Committee member. The administrator explained that most 
of the officials from the DAFF Portfolio Committee office were in Pretoria, but that they would be 
returning the following month. Two of the representatives began to explain who they were, and why 
they wanted to meet the Portfolio Committee member. The administrator stood and listened, but 
clearly had no knowledge of their scheduled meeting with the Portfolio Committee member, and 
appeared to have very limited knowledge of local fisheries governance issues.  He also had no power 
to influence the Minister, or the Portfolio Committee member, and had no authority to make 
decisions, yet the representatives continued to put their case to him with sincere determination. The 
representatives expressed their desire to pursue their meeting with the Portfolio Committee member, 
and requested that he ensure delivery of the testimony document, and their contact details to the 
relevant person. They also requested the name and contact details of someone with whom they could 
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communicate in this regard. The administrator obliged, and made a solemn guarantee that he 
would deliver the information, and give them feedback the following Monday. With that, we 
thanked him enthusiastically and left.  
After almost three hours, the fishers walked away with the name and details of the DAFF office 
administrator, and one of the Portfolio Committee member’s personal assistants, backed by a 
guarantee that the administrator would pass on their request for an audience. When we walked out 
of the office, the representatives seemed encouraged - at least they were able to get into the offices and 
speak to someone who represented the DAFF Portfolio Committee office, and they could take 
something back to their constituencies in Imizamo Yethu and Hangberg. The rest of the group also 
seemed positive when they heard what occurred in the meeting. I was intrigued as to why the group 
seemed so positive, after all, they had been ‘stood up’ after an exhausting week of preparation. 
Whatever my own subjective reservations, the progress achieved on this morning were sufficient for 
the group to agree to return home, and wait patiently within the confines of the formal process of 
participation, rather than organise protest marches. In this sense, the bureaucratic wall of thorns 
served its ‘repel and diversion’ role effectively113.  
6.3.2. b) A meeting between Ocean View fishers and community-based representatives 
and a fisheries management official 
The second case study of citizen-initiated participation is based on the efforts of the 
fulltime fisher and DFO representative (OV Veteran Fisher 5), in his bid to meet with 
senior DAFF official (DAFF Director 4). It is drawn from this representative’s own 
reports of the chain events as they unfolded over a period of several months, and my own 
observations of his preparation process. My small role was to support OV Veteran Fisher 
5 by editing a document that would serve as the basis for his submission to Director 4, as 
well by assisting him with the formulation of a strategy for the meeting: 
After attempting to engage with a range of government and non-government agencies with the 
purpose of addressing some of the critical challenges faced by fishers in Ocean View, OV Veteran 
Fisher 5 made a decision in early 2013 to contact DAFF Director 4, in the hope that she would be 
more responsive than other actors whom he had already sought for support. A meeting between OV 
                                                 
113 Post-script – One of the Imizamo Yethu representatives received a call from the Minister’s office on the 
19th of April, informing him that the junior administrator had forwarded their information. He and the 
other representatives from Hout Bay met with the Portfolio Committee member a month later. The 
committee member gave assurances that previously disadvantaged fishers in Cape Town would be 
supported in their efforts to gain equitable access to marine resources (IY Fisher 5, pers comm 20/05/12). 
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Veteran Fisher 5, two of his fisher colleagues and DAFF Director 4 was arranged for the 13th of 
March 2012. This was rare opportunity to engage face-to-face with a potentially sympathetic high 
level DAFF official, and so it was vital to make it count. In the weeks leading up to the meeting, OV 
Veteran Fisher 5 spent many long days and nights at his computer in preparation, trying to distil an 
enormous amount of information into a single page of key points that could be addressed within the 
time constraints of this meeting. Upon arrival at DAFF’s office on the 13th of March, the director’s 
personal assistant informed him of its postponement until the 20th of March, so he and his 
colleagues drove the 40km back to Ocean View. When they returned to DAFF’s offices on the 20th, 
they were again informed that the meeting was postponed, this time until the 3rd of April. Yet again, 
upon their arrival on the 3rd, they informed by an employee substituting for the director’s assistant, 
that the meeting would not transpire. Unable to explain the reasons for this, she was forced by OV 
Veteran Fisher 5 to check her computer, where she subsequently found an email from DAFF 
Director 4, which stated that she had to attend an urgent meeting with Minister Tina Joemat-
Peterson. And so OV Veteran Fisher 5 and his fisher colleagues drove home again for the third time 
without having met with the director. During this period, OV Veteran Fisher 5 expressed measured 
scepticism regarding the potential results that this meeting might yield, and argued that DAFF 
Director 4 was ultimately constrained by actors with greater political authority than her own.  
Finally, on the fourth attempt, the meeting took place in early May 2012. Yet OV Veteran Fisher 5 
explained to me that, even in the last moments leading up to the meeting, there were some strange 
‘coincidences’ that threatened to sabotage it. When they arrived at DAFF’s offices on this occasion, 
OV Veteran Fisher 5 and his fisher colleagues were sent to the teleconference room which had been 
agreed as venue for the meeting. After an hour of waiting, one of the director’s associates happened to 
walk past, and the fisher representative approached her. After which, she managed to reunite the 
estranged meeting participants. It later emerged that DAFF Director 4 had also been waiting for the 
past hour in another room. OV Veteran Fisher 5 expressed suspicion at this confusion, and 
explained to me that it could have been a simple clerical mistake, but given the context, the timing of 
this confusion could easily been seen as a conscious tactic of evasion by someone within DAFF.  
According to this fisher representative, when they eventually got to sit down in the same room, 
DAFF Director 4 engaged with the fishers in a “reasonable” manner (OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers 
comm 14/05/13). He noted that the director was the only government official in the meeting, and 
that this was conducive for frank engagement, with the fishers being able to discuss sensitive political 
dynamics. He also observed that the director asked intelligent questions, and gave the impression 
that she was making a sincere effort understand the information presented to her.  During the 
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meeting, OV Veteran Fisher 5 submitted a 43 page document to the director, which described in 
detail the most critical issues facing small-scale fishers in Ocean View. He explained to the director 
some of the problems relating to community-based representation in Ocean View, and emphasized 
that unresolved issues relating to interim relief should be prioritised because winter was approaching 
fast, and fishers would soon have few opportunities to go to sea. OV Veteran Fisher 5 also pointed to 
the lack of communication between DAFF and small-scale fishing communities, and suggested to 
the director that there should be a structure within DAFF dedicated to liaising with small-scale 
fishing communities. According to him, the director expressed a degree of recognition of some of these 
issues, and agreed to pursue these issues, but she also stressed that there were no immediate 
solutions, and that a delicate strategy was needed on her part. OV Veteran Fisher 5 also recounted 
the director’s instruction by that he should forward all relevant information directly to her, and 
interpreted this to be a reference to political interference at DAFF. Nevertheless, his assessment was 
that there was meaningful communication at this meeting. 
From his observations, this fisher representative argued that the director was “under the pressures” 
(OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 14/05/13). During their meeting, DAFF Director 4 was 
receiving calls from people who were meant to have a meeting with her, and OV Veteran Fisher 5 
recounted that it was clear she had an excessive workload for one individual, and that this had 
obvious implications for her ability to execute her functions effectively. He acknowledged the difficult 
position she was in - caught between fishing communities, and her superiors in DAFF and the 
higher levels of government.  
Ten days later, DAFF Director 4 was suspended under peculiar circumstances114. OV 
Veteran Fisher 5 suspected this is because she was trying to hold some of her colleagues 
to account. This would mean having to repeat this process with another official - the 
progress made with this director was erased.  
 
 
                                                 
114 DAFF brought a case against this official to the General Public Service Sector Bargaining Council, 
where charges were made that the official was guilty of various technical transgressions. However these 
charges were found to have no merit, and the case was thrown out (with costs awarded to the official). The 
official was re-instated in April 2013 (see ‘Statement by the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries, on [official’s name removed] arbitration award’. 16 April 2013. www.polity.org.co.za.) 
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6.3.2. c) Strategies and tactics for citizen-initiated participation: evasion and co-
option  
These case studies also suggest some of the strategies and tactics that were employed by 
government officials, in their direct engagement with fishers and fisher representatives. 
Primary among these was the strategy of evasion, which involved a set of manoeuvres 
employed to delay or avoid having to engage directly with fishers and fisher 
representatives. The analogy of a game of ‘cat and mouse’ is apt in this regard: officials 
appeared to walk a fine line between being ‘captured’ by, and ‘escaping’ from fishers and 
their representatives. Through the tactics of arranging ambiguous meeting times and 
durations, and regularly postponing meetings, officials were able to achieve two strategic 
outcomes simultaneously. The first was that the officials avoided having to meet with 
these citizens. The second is that the officials were not seen to be formally rejecting their 
requests to engage, but merely delaying them until a later date. In this way, the fishers 
and their representatives were given just enough hope to maintain their engagement with 
formal channels of participation. The strategy of evasion can thus be seen to have had a 
co-opting effect on fishers and their representatives. This strategy also had an 
instrumental effect that could be described as ‘wearing down the civic energy’: the 
participatory vigour of fishers and their representatives is gradually worn out by having to 
regularly repeat what is for them a financially, physically, and emotionally exhausting 
process. 
Another tactic was that of ‘musical chairs’. This refers to the regular replacement of high 
level DAFF officials – a phenomenon observed several times during this research it 
(directors and deputy directors DAFF generally occupied their positions in a temporary, 
or ‘acting’ capacity).  Fishers and their representatives often spent considerable time and 
effort engaging with a particular ‘acting’ official, informing them of their specific issues, 
and building a relationship of trust and rapport. When such an official was replaced, all 
of this time and energy was effectively wasted, and citizens were forced to begin their 
efforts anew with the next official, patiently re-explaining their views and concerns, and 
re-establishing trust and rapport. As with the tactics employed in the strategy of evasion, 
the tactic of ‘musical chairs’ appeared to have an instrumental effect that could be 
described as ‘wearing down the civic energy’. This tactic also allowed officials to evade 
direct engagement with citizens without having to formally decline such engagement, 
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thus reinforcing the impression that officials remain steadfast in their desire to meet with 
them.  
The case studies of citizen-initiated participation discussed above suggest some the 
reasons for widespread sense of frustration and disempowerment among many small-
scale fishers and their representatives on the Cape Peninsula in relation to formal 
processes of participation. They illustrate some of the challenges faced by small-scale 
fishers and their representatives when trying to initiate direct engagement with 
government officials.  
At the same time, the democratic participation of fishers and community-based 
representatives was constrained by a range of strategies and tactics employed by 
empowered actors during high level participatory events initiated by government 
agencies, NGOs, and commercial companies. The following section draws on 
participant-observation conducted in a wide range of ‘invited’ participatory encounters to 
illustrate the micro-politics of participation in small-scale fisheries governance on the 
Cape Peninsula.    
6.4. Participation in fisheries governance on the Cape Peninsula: 
dynamics of power at the high level 
A wide range of participatory encounters (21) were studied from September 2010 until 
August 2013. These included workshops, meetings, road shows, stakeholder 
consultations, and roundtable discussions relating to the SSF Policy, interim relief, and 
the allocation of fishing rights, which were organised and facilitated by various 
governmental and non-governmental agencies, such as DAFF, the DAFF Parliamentary 
Portfolio Committee, DEA, SANParks, the WCRL Association, WWF and 
Masifundise. As argued earlier in this chapter, these participatory encounters are 
crystallisations in space and time, of broader political, economic and ideological contestations 
regarding the utilisation of fisheries species. For this reason these participatory moments 
illuminate the fundamental political underpinnings of South African fisheries 
governance. The results of participant-observation conducted at a number of these 
encounters are discussed below, with particular attention paid to events that were 
initiated and facilitated by DAFF and other state agencies.  
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6.4.1. Basic architecture of invited participatory events   
The discussion of invited participatory events on the Cape Peninsula begins with a sketch 
of the people who participated in various ways at these events, and spaces in which these 
events were held. A wide range of actors engage in formal processes of participation. 
Their interests and agendas exist in varying degrees of alignment and conflict. They also 
operate with divergent, often conflicting cosmologies. These cosmologies determine the 
values and beliefs of these actors, and inform their engagement in participatory processes 
unfolding in the field of fisheries governance. In the processes studied during this 
research, these actors included:   
 residents of coastal communities, particularly small-scale fishers from various 
areas in Cape Town, including Ocean View, Hangberg, and Imizamo Yethu 
(such as interim relief permit holders, nearshore WCRL right holders, traditional 
linefish right holders)  
 small-scale fishing community representatives 
 NGO representatives  
 officials of varying rank within DAFF, DEA and SANParks 
 DAFF Portfolio Committee members 
 marine and fisheries scientists 
 industrial fishing company representatives 
 labour union representatives 
The various participants all hold a different composition of capitals, and are located in 
different positions in the field of fisheries governance in South Africa. Government 
officials and industry representatives draw on vast reserves of economic, social, and 
institutional-specific cultural capital, and wield political power from their position in the 
field. Others, such as small-scale fishers, have less economic, social and institutional-
specific cultural capital, but they have considerable fisheries-specific cultural capital, and 
thus symbolic power in the field of fisheries governance. Invited participatory spaces are 
shaped fundamentally by the political dynamics at the national level, such as the 
‘transformation’ agenda, the longstanding domination of the fishing industry; and the 
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‘sustainability agenda’. These invited spaces are also shaped by the multi-scale structures 
and processes of capitalism, which constrain and enable the participatory efforts of 
industrial fishing companies, government departments, fisheries scientists small-scale 
fishing communities and their representatives.     
Invited participatory spaces observed during this research usually manifested in the form 
of meetings, which were held at range of venues from small community halls to 
parliamentary chambers and luxurious hotels. Venue location had a significant influence 
on the participatory space: fishers and community-based representatives generally 
appeared to feel emboldened when venues are situated on their ‘home turf’; forcing 
government officials and other external actors to adjust their approach accordingly. 
When participatory spaces were located in more formal venues, such as parliament, the 
advantage shifted in favour of government officials and other actors such as scientists and 
fishing company representatives, who generally feel more comfortable in such spaces.  
The ways in which these spaces were arranged was also a key factor shaping the 
experience of participation. For example, DAFF road shows held in community halls 
were usually adorned with an array of props that gave the appearance of a grand 
democratic event. Large glossy posters emblazoned with progressive rhetoric formed the 
backdrop in front of which officials were seated, often on a raised platform (thus 
symbolising their hierarchical relation to participants). Hired photographers and 
videographers were present to document ‘democracy in action’, and were often supported 
at larger events by journalists from the popular media. Sound systems were operated by 
technicians seated behind complicated mixing boards, while others roamed around 
handing microphones to members of the audience when they stand to speak. And there 
was usually a projector machine casting a sequence of digital slides onto a screen or wall 
in the venue. All of these props created the impression of an important formal event. As 
attendees at such an event, the participants were themselves inclined to feel a sense of 
importance, and that they were being taken seriously in the democratic process. 
However, as will be discussed below, some of these props also served to disempower and 
alienate attendees from small-scale fishing communities.  
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6.4.2. Strategic themes: the play of power in participation  
From the stage upon which high level participatory encounters played out, the discussion 
now shifts to the drama itself. Here the focus is placed on the activities that constitute 
these participatory encounters. Three critical activities are discussed in turn: i) 
facilitation; ii) symbolic performance; iii) and the contest to ‘define reality’.  These 
activities are central to the politics of participation in fisheries governance. In particular, 
they offer a strategic means for people to reinforce or contest particular relations of 
power, and associated patterns of benefit distribution.  
6.4.2. a) Facilitation: arbitrating discussion in the participatory space 
The role of facilitating, or ‘chairing’ these participatory events was one of considerable 
power. Within the space and time of the participatory event, all participants were required to 
submit to the authority of those who facilitate, and this placed facilitators in a position to 
guide and control the proceedings in accordance with particular interests and agendas. 
They arbitrated discussion in the participatory space, and were formally empowered to 
have ‘the final say’. The general result was a clear hierarchy between participants and 
those who facilitated. 
The identity and characteristics of those who facilitated the event was also inevitably of 
great import to the nature of invited participatory spaces, and the engagements that 
unfold within them. Facilitators exhibited varying levels of knowledge regarding the local 
context of participants, the general context of fisheries governance in the province, and 
South Africa more broadly, as well as the subject matter of the participatory event. The 
level of knowledge held by facilitators had direct implications for their ability to engage 
substantively with participants. In the case of DAFF road shows for example, it was 
observed that many officials had limited knowledge of these three dimensions, and were 
often unable to provide satisfactory responses to the inquiries of participants. At a road 
show in Imizamo Yethu in July 2012 to discuss the review of the MLRA, facilitation was 
conducted by a senior DAFF official responsible for aquaculture management (‘DAFF 
Director 3’). As such, this official was not equipped to engage meaningfully with 
participants, who were concerned with wild-capture fisheries, and not aquaculture. The 
result was that he often said things like “that is as much as I can say”, “I believe that”, 
and “as far as I know … but I stand to be corrected” (DAFF Director 3, pers comm 
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19/07/12) While some DAFF facilitators exhibited greater knowledge of the general 
context of fisheries governance in South Africa, and the subject of the participatory event 
itself, there were few who seemed to have detailed knowledge regarding the local 
contexts of those who were participating, making it difficult to engage substantively 
within the time constraints of the road show.  
The formal authority held by facilitators was also a critical dynamic shaping these 
participatory spaces. In this research, it was observed that some facilitating government 
officials had low-ranking authority, and thus lacked the capacity to give definitive 
responses to participant’s inquiries, or to influence governance decisions on the 
participant’s behalf.   On other occasions, the facilitators held high degrees of authority, 
and were able to respond in more categorical manner, as well as having the ability to 
potentially influence decisions that affected the lives of participants. The formal authority 
of facilitators related directly to the relations of power between them and fisher 
participants. When the facilitator had a high degree of formal authority, they were more 
likely to retain control of a participatory space throughout the duration of the 
proceedings. Conversely, when the facilitator had a low level of formal authority, the 
participatory space is more vulnerable to being ‘captured’ by participants. 
The manner and style of facilitation also shaped the participatory spaces observed during 
this research. The ways in which facilitation was enacted depended largely on the 
knowledge, authority and personality of the individual facilitator, as well as the context 
of a particular participatory process. In cases where the facilitator was a low-ranking 
official who lacked the requisite knowledge, the participatory space often took on the 
form of an ‘information session’, where the facilitator spent most the time reading to the 
participants from a ‘script’ (in this case a digital slide presentation). For example, the 
DAFF SSF policy road shows in Hangberg and Ocean View were facilitated by two 
middle-level officials (referred to here as DAFF Official 1 and DAFF Official 2). DAFF 
Official 1 (a fisheries scientist), presented the policy information, while DAFF Official 2 
(an administrative official) managed the participants, and intermittently summarised and 
translated this information into Afrikaans for them. DAFF Official 1 spent most of the 
time conveying information regarding the policy - there was limited time for discussion, 
prompting one of the fishers at the Ocean View road show to ask: “Is this an information 
session or a public participation session?” (OV Fisher 14, pers comm 29/09/10). At the 
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Kalk Bay road show, DAFF Official 1 explained that “we are not here to defend this 
policy, I am a government employee and it’s my job to present this to you” (DAFF 
Official 1, pers comm 01/10/10).  
Yet even on these terms, the facilitation of the road shows was found wanting. The 
information was mostly presented in English (though the first language of most of the 
participants was Afrikaans), and was characterised by a preponderance of academic and 
policy jargon, featuring terms and concepts that were unfamiliar to a large proportion of 
participants. This jargon included: ‘holistic’; ‘bold paradigm shift’; ‘implementation’; 
‘pillars’; ‘suite’; ‘empowerment’; ‘progressive realisation of livelihood rights’; ‘co-
management’; and ‘integrity of ecosystems’. Despite DAFF Official 2’s best efforts to 
interpret for participants, much of the information being conveyed was lost in translation.  
At the SSF policy road shows, fishers were also alienated by the style of DAFF Official 
1’s presentation. This presentation consisted of roughly two dozen slides, all packed with 
policy-related text. DAFF Official 1 essentially read through all of the slides, pausing 
between each section so that DAFF Official 2 could summarise the information into a 
few sentences. The result was a long presentation whose monotony exhausted the 
patience and attention of the participants. The general sense of alienation among 
participants was further exacerbated by the use of digital slides as the medium for 
conveying information. For most of the small-scale fishers (who lacked cultural capital in 
the institutional field), digital slides were an intimidating artefact that represented a social 
world in which they felt disempowered. Their lack of engagement with the digital 
presentation was clearly evidenced at the Ocean View road show: projected high onto a 
wall, the slides were unintelligible to all but those seated in the front row, and yet none of 
the participants requested for this to be rectified. At the Hangberg road show, a local 
community-based representative gave an assessment of how the style, discourses, and 
medium of communication used at the road show had the effect of alienating 
participants: “this nice stuff keeps the people in bondage. Our people don’t understand 
this nice stuff - you must speak low like us” (HGB Fisher 13, pers comm 27/09/10).  
Yet it is also the case that facilitators with higher levels of knowledge and authority are 
able to break from their script, and engage more directly with fisher participants. These 
facilitators are usually skilled at managing large, antagonistic groups. Two such 
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facilitators were DAFF Director 1 and DAFF Director 2115. For example, DAFF 
Director 2 demonstrated considerable charisma, which enabled him to defuse dissent at a 
number of participatory events observed during this research. As the chairperson, he was 
lively and charming, and spoke in a style reminiscent of an evangelical preacher, or a 
politician on the campaign trail. DAFF Director 2 also peppered his statements to black 
people and coloured people with appropriate colloquial phrases - a practice that was well-
received by these participants. His approach seemed to infuse participatory events with a 
sense of conviviality, informality, and frankness which appeared to soothe the high 
tensions that were bubbling away in the audience. Based on these observations, it could 
be argued that DAFF Director 2’s role as chairperson was partly one of public relations. 
The primary strategy employed by facilitators of invited participatory spaces was that of 
policing the boundaries of acceptable discussion. ‘Acceptable discussion’ in this context refers 
simply to the values, images, concepts and theories that conform to the logic and interests 
of powerful actors.  This ideological framework could be described as the ‘doxa’ (or 
‘orthodoxy’) of the field of fisheries governance. Using their authority to direct 
proceedings, facilitators ensure that participants are constrained from pursuing avenues 
of inquiry that stray outside the boundaries of acceptable discussion.  Failure to shepherd 
the discussion within safe ideological territory often resulted in the participatory space 
being ‘claimed’ by participants, who seized on the opportunity to assert ideas that were 
usually suppressed.  
A few brief ethnographic examples will be presented to illustrate the strategy of policing 
the boundaries of acceptable discussion. In July 2011, a series of ‘Nearshore WCRL 
Right Holder Consultations’ were held in various coastal communities along the Cape 
Peninsula. Their purpose was to enable discussion between DAFF and nearshore WCRL 
right holders regarding the past fishing season, and how to improve the management of 
the following season. These consultations were facilitated with a mixture of charm and 
sternness by DAFF Director 1. At the consultation in Hangberg, one of the fishers 
brought up the issue of over-fishing by the offshore WCRL sector. DAFF Director 1 
quickly responded: “OK, let’s leave that for now” (DAFF Director 1, pers comm 
06/07/11). However, by the time the proceedings had concluded, he had not addressed 
this fisher’s concern.  The following day, the consultations moved to Ocean View, where 
                                                 
115 It is worth noting that both these senior DAFF officials were members of the ANC. 
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one of the fishers asked DAFF Director 1 about the possibility of being permitted to 
harvest an outstanding quantum (126kg) of his allocation; to which the director smiled 
and replied with gentle sarcasm: “we can talk about that later” (DAFF Director 1, pers 
comm 07/07/11). The participants in the hall erupted in laughter - they recognised from 
his tone that that DAFF Director 1 was joking, and had no serious intention of 
considering this request (by the close of proceedings, he had not addressed this fisher’s 
concern).  
The strategy of policing the boundaries of acceptable discussion was also evidenced in 
April 2013 during a DAFF road show in Cape Town to discuss the ‘General Policy for 
the Allocation of Commercial Fishing Rights’. This event was facilitated by DAFF 
Director 2. At one point in the proceedings, a community-based fisher representative 
from Ocean View asked DAFF Director 2 a series of critical questions about 
maladministration within DAFF. The protocol was that the facilitator should wait until 
the next four participants from the floor had spoken, before responding to their questions 
and comments. However, the director broke the protocol and responded directly to the 
representative, deftly preventing the representative from further pursuing this line of 
inquiry, while pre-empting any accusations that they were censuring discussion by 
referring to a prior meeting with the representative (which the latter asserted had yielded 
no conclusive outcome). In a beseeching tone, DAFF Director 2 exclaimed:  
“please … help us, focus on this matter at hand … You know we’ve had many meetings, on those others 
matters you’ve raised … but we’ll try to isolate those ones that are … really relevant to this conversation … 
not to suppress the other matters … … so please … I don’t want to be unpopular, you know, that is … 
stifling debate … but I want, also for all of us, let’s try to be focused … and make this thing constructive. 
We note your comments, thank you very much …” (DAFF Director 2, pers comm 23/04/13). 
On a more mundane level, the unilateral declaration of time limits for a participatory event 
served as a procedural mechanism that enabled facilitators to control the participatory 
space, and to police the boundaries of acceptable discussion, thus undermining the ability 
of participants to engage rigorously with government officials. Participants are instructed 
to restrict their communication to one or two short points, and facilitators had a very 
brief opportunity to respond to them. It was often the case that heated discussions were 
cut short by a facilitator because of considerations of time. These limitations were 
reinforced by the ‘problem of concision’ - participants faced the obstacle of condensing an 
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often vast amount of complex information into a few sentences116. For small-scale fishers, 
the need to be ‘concise’ was particularly challenging because the information they wished 
to convey had implications for their livelihoods, and was thus filled with strong emotion.   
Another prosaic, but nonetheless critical tactic that served to de-limit the boundaries of 
acceptable discussion was the imposition of pre-determined agendas. Government officials 
unilaterally determined the subjects permitted for debate, and thus by implication, the 
subjects that were prohibited. In this way, the agenda set the boundaries of acceptable 
discussion, providing the facilitator with a seemingly neutral procedural mechanism to 
keep debate within safe ideological territory. For example, at the nearshore WCRL right 
holder consultations, DAFF Director 1 made it clear to participants that the agenda was 
limited to the fishing activities and bureaucratic technicalities of the previous commercial 
WCRL season. Throughout the three consultations observed on the Cape Peninsula in 
July 2012, DAFF Director 1 repeatedly drew on this restrictive agenda to police the 
boundaries of acceptable discussion. At the Ocean View consultation, one of the fishers 
asked the director about the relation between the offshore and nearshore WCRL sectors. 
The director responded immediately, arguing forcefully that this question was “not on 
the agenda” (DAFF Director 1, pers comm 07/07/11).  
In addition to the tactics for ‘policing boundaries’ described above, facilitators also 
utilised what could be called the tactic of selective amnesia to navigate safely through the 
participatory space. This tactic involved government officials - as facilitators - expressing 
unfamiliarity or ignorance regarding a particular question or comment, despite there 
being a high likelihood that they did in fact have knowledge of that issue. In this sense, 
the official appeared to be misrepresenting the true state of their knowledge as a means to 
manipulate the discussion - they were seen to acknowledge a particular issue, while at the 
same time avoiding a direct engagement with it. The tactic of selective amnesia was 
clearly evidenced by DAFF Director 1 at the nearshore WCRL right holder 
consultations. For example, he inquired why participants relied upon third parties to 
complete quota application and performance review forms on their behalf, noting at the 
Ocean View consultation that “I have picked up that problems arise with the 
involvement of third parties” (DAFF Director 1, pers comm 07/07/11). At the Hangberg 
consultation, he asked in a tone of disbelief: “are the forms too … complicated?” (DAFF 
                                                 
116 See ‘Noam Chomsky: Activism, Anarchy and Power’. 2002. Conversations with History. 24 June. 
Interview, University of California Television (UCTV).  
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Director 1, pers comm 06/07/11).   The vast majority of participants responded loudly in 
the affirmative. One of the fishers explained his reason for relying on consultants: “I 
cannot read and write very well” (HGB Fisher 12, pers comm 06/07/11). That the 
director was genuinely unaware of the bureaucratic difficulties faced by these fishers 
seemed highly improbable - it was common knowledge that a significant proportion of 
fishers struggle with bureaucratic processes, a fact that had been well documented (see 
Hersoug and Isaacs 2001). A reasonable observer is thus forced to conclude that the 
ignorance reflected by his question was in fact a calculated use of the tactic of selective 
amnesia. 
Selective amnesia is closely related to the tactic of deflection, where facilitators avoided 
engaging on a particular issue by indicating that this issue was outside of their 
jurisdiction, and could only be addressed by another official who was not present at the 
event.   For example, at the DAFF road show in Imizamo Yethu, DAFF Director 3 
repeatedly deflected questions regarding small-scale fisheries to DAFF Director 6, 
exclaiming at one point that: “I wish DAFF Director 6 was here to respond to your 
question!”  (DAFF Director 3, pers comm 19/07/12). At the nearshore WCRL right 
holder consultation in Ocean View, many participants asked DAFF Director 1 questions 
about interim relief. Although these questions had direct relevance for the nearshore 
WCRL fishery, DAFF Director 1 cited the technical fact that interim relief was not 
within his jurisdiction, and that such questions should be directed towards the relevant 
official: “I’m not the person to speak to about interim relief, that person is DAFF 
Director 6” (DAFF Director 1, pers comm 07/07/11). 
One of the most powerful and ubiquitous manoeuvres used by facilitators to navigate 
safely through the participatory space was the tactic of deferment. In this tactical 
manoeuvre, participants who raised challenging questions or comments were instructed 
to submit further information in writing to relevant government officials. This instruction 
was accompanied by the explicit or implicit assurance to participants that their comments 
will be seriously considered by the relevant officials subsequent to the conclusion of the 
participatory event. The tactic of deferment allowed a facilitator to postpone their 
response to the participant’s question or comment to another time and place, while 
leaving indeterminate the matter of how and when the participant’s comments would be 
responded to.  We can see the tactic of deferment in action in the following examples. At 
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the DAFF road show for the general re-allocation of commercial fishing rights in April 
2013, DAFF Director 4 responded to a question asked by a community-based 
representative from Imizamo Yethu regarding the allocation of community-based rights:  
“please send us your comments, to assist us with what could be a controversial decision” 
(DAFF Director 4, pers comm 23/04/13).  
That most participants recognised the strategic nature of the injunction to ‘write us a 
letter’ was poignantly illustrated during the rights allocation road show. One fisher 
representative from Mitchells Plain on the Cape Flats made the argument that his group 
of forty members should be allocated fishing rights to the value of “maybe 10 million 
[ZAR] … we need something real for Mitchells Plain” (MP Fisher 1, pers comm 
23/04/13). DAFF Director 2 laughed in a friendly manner, congratulating the 
representative for his forthright approach, and explained to him with heavy irony: “write 
down your comments” (DAFF Director 2, pers comm 23/04/13). This sparked much 
hilarity among the participants - from the director’s tone it was clear to them that he was 
joking, and did not seriously intend to engage further on this request.  
Aside from disempowering fishers and fisher representatives within the participatory 
moment by enabling a facilitator to avoid responding directly to difficult questions or 
comments, the tactic of deferment also disempowered them after the event has 
concluded. Submitting written comments required fisher participants to exercise a degree 
of reading and writing skills which many do not possess. It also required access to 
administrative resources which many fishers lack, such as faxes, computers and internet 
connections. But most of all, the tactic of deferment required fishers to trust that officials 
would engage seriously with their questions and comments after the participatory event 
had ended, and the officials were ensconced in the seclusion of their offices.  In the 
participatory moment, fishers had little choice but to accept on faith, the assurances given 
by officials that their written submissions would be considered. This was illustrated in 
April 2013 during the DAFF road show to discuss the allocation of commercial fishing 
rights, when a senior DAFF official assured participants that “we will consider your 
comments ...” (DAFF Director 5, pers comm 23/04/13). And at the nearshore WCRL 
consultation in Kalk Bay, DAFF Director 1 explained to one of the participants: “look, 
the department will consider your comments, and once we have understood the issue, we 
will decide whether there is sufficient reason” (DAFF Director 1, pers comm 08/07/11). 
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Later, when one of the fishers alleged that his permit was always issued late, the director 
told him: “Give me your details, let me follow this up” (DAFF Director 1, pers comm 
08/07/11). 
However, despite these assurances, there was a perception among many fishers and 
community-based representatives encountered during this research that officials tended 
not to consider questions and comments raised in participatory spaces. Speaking to me 
just after the conclusion of the nearshore WCRL consultation in Hangberg, a local fisher 
explained that he had been monitoring the junior officials when DAFF Director 1 
periodically instructed them to record questions and comments from participants. This 
fisher claimed that there were several occasions where these junior officials neglected to 
write these submissions down, and argued that these kinds of omissions were routine, 
and that fishers’ inquiries are rarely followed up (even if written down) (HGB Fisher 3, 
pers comm 06/07/11).   
The discussion so far has largely focused on DAFF officials in their role as facilitators of 
participatory spaces. However, the focus is now expanded to include the role of other 
actors such as parliamentary portfolio committee members, small-scale fishers, fisher 
representatives, scientists, conservationists, labour unionists, as well as high level 
representatives of industrial fishing companies. Specifically, the following discussion will 
explore their strategic use of symbolic performance, of which the tactics of ‘symbolic 
positioning’, and ‘symbolic demonstrations of power’ are central.  
6.4.3. b) Symbolic performance: positioning and demonstrations of power 
The activity of participation involves a degree of symbolic performance. During the 
participatory events observed during this research, participants and facilitators used 
specific discourses, accents, tones of voice and body language to project themselves in a 
particular light, thus making implicit claims about their legitimacy and position in the 
field, what Bourdieu (1989) calls ‘strategies of condescension’. Many community-based 
scale fisher representatives appeared to consciously use these participatory moments to 
present themselves as being deeply rooted in the fishing communities they were 
representing. Through this performative manoeuvre, they were infused with the symbolic 
power - in this case the moral legitimacy - of ‘previously disadvantaged’, ‘bona fide’ 
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small-scale fishers. Once infused with this symbolic power, their claims became 
proportionately more potent and compelling.  
In their symbolic performances, community-based representatives used the rich and 
vividly expressive linguistic style popularly associated with Afrikaans-speaking fishers 
along the Cape coast. This unique, culturally-specific linguistic style is characterised by 
the merging of metaphor, humour and pathos, and can be sophisticated and profoundly 
poetic in its form and content.  Many community-based representatives exploited this 
linguistic style as a central feature of their symbolic performance, effectively positioning 
themselves as being firmly rooted in the culture and relationships of their local fishing 
communities. Speaking in this way, these community-based representatives were often 
seen to articulate clichés such as ‘the lament of the fisher’ (a discourse based on the 
tactical recitation of their own impoverishment as a means to establish their credentials 
as legitimate members of a small-scale fishing community). The following example 
illustrates this tactic in action. During parliamentary hearings in October 2013, the 
DAFF Portfolio Committee, DAFF officials, and a wide range of representatives from 
coastal communities and fishing companies submitted their views regarding the review of 
the MLRA. One community-based representative from a southern Cape coastal village 
introduced herself as deeply embedded in the fishing community she formally 
represented, explaining that her father was a fisher who died at sea, leaving his wife and 
eight children behind, and exclaimed that “I was born in poverty, I don’t want to die in 
poverty!” (SC Rep 1, pers comm date 16/10/13). She described herself as “a leader in 
this industry”, and asserted that “We are traditional fishing people”, adding in a knowing 
tone that she had this tradition “in my head … that’s what makes me clever!” (SC Rep 1, 
pers comm 16/10/13). Critical observation suggested that this representative was giving 
a strategic symbolic performance, carefully calculated to position herself as a legitimate 
community-based representative of small-scale fishers.  
It was not only community-based fisher representatives who used the tactic of symbolic 
positioning to make implicit claims about their legitimacy. Several actors in high-ranking 
positions within the government and industrial fishing companies also positioned 
themselves as being ‘of the fisher folk’. In March 2011, during a roundtable discussion 
co-hosted by WWF and MDT, a DAFF Parliamentary Portfolio Committee member 
exclaimed with pride that: “I come from a fishing community. God bless us, that some of 
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us are now in parliament” (DAFF PC Member 1, pers comm 29/03/11). On another 
occasion, at the parliamentary hearings in June 2011 to discuss the transformation of the 
fishing industry, the founder and director of a controversial industrial fishing company, 
positioned herself symbolically as a “community-worker” in Kalk Bay, and a progressive 
businesswoman117 (Company Director 1, pers comm 14/06/11).  Two years later at the 
parliamentary hearings regarding the amendment of the MLRA, she began her 
submission by fervently stating that she was “a 4th generation fisher woman … The 
history is there … if you want to check my history” (Company Director 1, pers comm 
15/10/13).  
It was also common for members of parliament and labour unionists to demonstrate, at 
the symbolic level, that they are positioned closer to small-scale fishing communities, 
than to DAFF or industrial fishing companies and fisheries scientists. At the WWF-
MDT roundtable discussion mentioned above, the DAFF Portfolio Committee member 
decried the domination of industrial fishing companies, and called for economic and 
racial reform, exclaiming: “There will be no ‘business as usual’ … Why are they still 
giving out large tonnages to the commercial companies, to the capitalist monopolies? … 
We are talking about transformation without apologising …” (DAF PC Member 1, pers 
comm 29/03/11). Labour unionists were also observed employing the tactic of symbolic 
positioning for the purpose of appearing ‘on the side’ of disenfranchised coastal 
communities. During a speech at a small-scale fisher rally hosted by Masifundise and 
Coastal Links in March 2011, the provincial leader of the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU) made unabashed use of populist rhetoric, decrying the 
excesses of industrial fishing companies, and the racial oppression of coloured and black 
fishing communities by the “boere”118 (Union Rep 1, pers comm 23/0311). He repeatedly 
employed the words “our”, and “we”, to locate himself close to the position of fishers 
and fish workers: “NO! We must change everything … We must take away from those 
who have no place in the industry” (Union Rep 1, pers comm 23/0311).  
Participatory events also featured the use of symbolic performance to demonstrate 
particular relations of power. As discussed earlier, it is usually the case that facilitators 
                                                 
117 This company had an infamous reputation according to several research participants in Imizamo Yethu 
(IY Veteran Fisher 1, 2, pers comm 06/04/12; IY Veteran Fisher 3, pers comm 10/04/12; IY Veteran 
Fisher 5, pers comm 11/04/12).  
118 ‘Boere’ is the Afrikaans word for ‘farmers’. However, in contexts such as the example described here, 
this word carries a racially derogatory meaning. 
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(or chairpersons) play a dominant role. When it appears that an invited participatory 
space is under threat of being ‘claimed’ by participants, the facilitator will reinforce their 
authority over the space by symbolically asserting their power in relation to these 
participants, thus reminding them who is in control. During the nearshore WCRL 
consultation in Kalk Bay, DAFF Director 1 was explaining to participants the reasons for 
his department’s reluctance to extend the WCRL season. At one point in his explanation 
he adopted a stern tone, and asked fishers: “are you going to jeopardise the chances for 
future generations. Or are you going to make the most of the opportunities we have given 
you?” (DAFF Director 1, pers comm 08/07/11).  Later during the proceedings, a young 
fisher asked the director when the proposed allocation of snoek to nearshore WCRL right 
holders was to be implemented. To which the director firmly replied: “I can’t give you a 
time-line, it will take its course” (DAFF Director 1, pers comm 08/07/11).  
The symbolic demonstration of power was also evidenced at the SSF policy road shows, 
when DAFF Director 5 attempted to convince a fisher participant that it was not possible 
to consult every individual fisher when formulating the policy. When the fisher 
continued to protest his exclusion from the policy process, the director adopted a tone of 
thinly veiled sarcasm: “I am sorry we never consulted you personally …” (DAFF 
Director 5, pers comm 01/10/11). There was very little that the fisher could say in 
response to such a statement - the director had made it clear that this particular line of 
inquiry would no longer be pursued - and so the fisher became silent and returned to his 
seat.  
During this research, it was clear that the symbolic demonstration of power in 
participatory spaces always depended on who the facilitators were, and who the 
participants were. In the examples cited above, the facilitators were DAFF officials, and 
the participants were small-scale fishers. However, it was also the case that members of 
parliament gave symbolic demonstration of power in relation to representatives from 
large commercial fishing companies. During the public hearings held at parliament in 
June 2011, the chairperson of the DAFF Parliamentary Portfolio Committee 
admonished the director of one of these companies for breaking procedural protocol by 
speaking out of turn, and advised him to “raise your hand not your mouth” (DAFF PC 
Chair, pers comm 15/06/11). Later the director emphasised the contribution that his 
company made to employment in coastal communities, and that radical reform the 
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fishing industry would undermine the company’s ability to provide these jobs (Company 
Director 2, pers comm 15/06/11). The chairperson responded to the director by 
chastising him in a sarcastic tone: “OK OK, there is no need to repeat that point to re-
motivate your existence” (DAFF PC Chair, pers comm 15/06/11). Once again, the 
chairperson symbolically demonstrated to all present that, within the parliamentary 
chamber, the chair held power over the director.  
The symbolic demonstration of power was also evidenced during a meeting between 
small-scale fisher representatives and representatives from one of South Africa’s largest 
industrial fishing companies, who had gathered together to discuss the SSF policy. This 
meeting was facilitated by the company’s director, who explained in to the 
representatives that “my concern is that there needs to be much more clarity before I can 
sign off on this document”, adding in an authoritative tone that if the term ‘traditional’ 
was included in the definition of small-scale fishing: “I will sign off on it” (Company 
Director 2, pers comm 02/03/11). The company director had no formal authority to 
‘sign off’ on government policies, fisheries-related or otherwise, but by making this 
statement in the manner in which he did, he was making a thinly-veiled allusion, 
demonstrating symbolically the considerable political-economic power of his company in 
relation to the fisher representatives, not only within the space of the meeting, but more 
broadly in relation to fisheries governance in South Africa.  
6.4.3. c) The contest to define reality: rationality and power  
As discussed in Chapter Two, the principal aspect of political engagement is the act of 
depicting - or representing - particular people, things and relationships. This aesthetic act 
can best be viewed in terms of ‘making claims’ (Saward 2006).  These claims do not 
correspond perfectly to the ‘objective reality’ or ‘truth’ of that which they represent - they 
are an approximation and not the fact itself. A particular claim is thus subject to 
contestation by those who choose not to recognise it, and who put forward their own 
counter-claims. Actors in participatory spaces compete to gain recognition for their 
claims as the definitive rendering of reality - the way ‘things really are’.  Their aim is to 
provide symbolic support for material action (or inaction): defining the perception of a 
societal issue is necessary to influence the course of action (or inaction) in relation to that 
issue (Bourdieu 1977, Flyvbjerg 1998).  
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 From the perspective of political philosophy founded in the western Enlightenment, the 
basis for making and contesting claims is ‘rationality’ - the assumption is ‘the more 
rationality the better’ (Flyvbjerg 1998). In participatory processes, rationality is valued 
because it is seen as the best means to achieve effective and efficient solutions. But more 
importantly, it is also valued as the basis for facilitating open democratic engagement: 
rationality is seen as the opposite of politics, power, strategy and tactics - it is neutral, 
objective, and thus apolitical. Therefore, the notion of rationality carries considerable 
symbolic power in the participatory space. Claims that appear rational are thus infused 
with this symbolic power, and tend to be recognised as a definitive rendering, and 
therefore legitimate or authoritative. At the same time, a claim can be contested, and 
potentially dismissed as ‘illegitimate’ on the grounds that it is ‘irrational’.  
Yet, the competition to declare some claims as rational is itself irrational. As Foucault 
(1977, 1991) has argued, ‘rational’ or ‘true’ knowledge, though seemingly about than 
objective facts outside of politics, is very often implicated in the discursive imposition of 
dominant values and beliefs, serving as a symbolic form of power that exerts political 
force while being ‘invisible’ in its operation.  Applying Foucault’s theoretical perspective 
to fisheries governance context, Jentoft (2007: 443) highlights the fact that the discursive 
contestation between different claims is fundamentally shaped by asymmetrical relations 
of power, and can itself reinforce and extend those asymmetries, stating that: “the 
outcome, who wins, and whose perception of reality becomes valid, are not so much 
questions of which of the communicating parties ‘is right’, but who at the end of the day 
‘gets right’ ... The best argument does not always win”. In the participatory events 
observed during this research, it was apparent that rationality was not necessarily about 
apolitical reason, but rather, it was a matter of power relations, hidden interests and 
agendas, strategies and tactics; in other words, of politics. The recognition of claims as 
rational or irrational seemed to correlate closely with the logic, interests and agendas of 
powerful actors, rather than with those of less powerful groupings - there appeared to be 
an alignment between the dominant version of what is ‘rational’, and the doxa of the 
field.  
Through a process of what Bourdieu calls ‘symbolic violence’, alternative visions were 
suppressed by facilitators, and the doxa of the field made to appear rational, natural, 
inevitable, and thus legitimate. Claims appeared more likely to be recognised as objective 
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fact if the claim-maker gave a compelling performance. This was achieved through for 
example, symbolic self-positioning, and the use of technical discourses, graphs and 
statistics. These performative tactics created the impression of a rational and thus 
apolitical claim. In the context of the participatory events observed during this research, 
people made competing claims to define, for example, the objective possibilities of 
particular management interventions, the abundance or scarcity of fisheries stocks, and 
the value of a specific event to those who participated. Some of these claims and counter-
claims are presented below. 
It was common for particular representations of reality to be supported or dismissed on 
the basis that were ‘realistic’ or ‘unrealistic’. This tactic was usually used by government 
officials, fisheries scientists, conservationists, and representatives of industrial fishing 
companies, who assumed the role of ‘rational’ actors in opposition to small-scale fishers, 
who they deemed ‘irrational’. Words such as ‘objective’, ‘facts’, ‘responsible’, ‘realistic’ 
and ‘reality’ served to categorise particular claims as ‘rational’ or ‘irrational’, and thus 
worthy of consideration or not. 
This tactic was observed at the nearshore WCRL consultations, where one of the fisher 
participants claimed that he had not been able to catch his quota allocation before the 
end of the season because DAFF had issued his permit late. DAFF Director 1 explained 
to him that his allegation would be rationally assessed to determine whether it was an 
accurate rendering of reality: “we will look at the facts of the story objectively” (DAFF 
Director 1, pers comm 08/07/11). When the discussion turned to the decision to protect 
nearshore right holders from decreases in the WCRL TAC, the director explained that, 
because of this decision, these right holders could not expect larger quotas if the TAC 
was increased, because this would require DAFF to decrease the size of the quotas 
allocated to the industrial offshore sector – and “that would be irresponsible" (DAFF 
Director 1, pers comm 08/07/11).  
At a January 2011 workshop between SAN Parks, DEA, DAFF and fishers from 
Hangberg to discuss Karbonkelberg Restricted Zone, the fisher participants argued that 
the hoop nets used by small-scale fishers to catch WCRL were less harmful than the traps 
used by the offshore vessels. In response, a DAFF fisheries scientist stated that both 
forms of gear have an impact on the ecosystem, asserting that it was vital to “deal with 
the facts" (DAFF Scientist 1, pers comm 28/01/11). On another occasion, during a 
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meeting between small-scale fisher representatives and an industrial fishing company, the 
company’s director asserted with authority that the demands of fishers for fishing rights 
re-distribution should be "practical" and "realistic", and argued that they should "take a 
pragmatic view … We need to be realistic, not idealistic" (Company Director 2, pers 
comm 02/03/11). Later during this meeting, a lawyer for the fisher representatives 
claimed that: "We are approaching a level of rationality here!" (Lawyer 1, pers comm 
02/03/11). 
During participatory events observed during this research, there was intense competition 
to define the status of fisheries resources. Claims and counter-claims were made 
regarding the abundance or scarcity of these resources, and the knowledge that supported 
these claims. It was apparent that DAFF officials, fisheries scientists, and 
conservationists used the symbolic authority of scientific knowledge to portray the reality 
of fisheries resources as one of scarcity, and used this to justify a conservative approach 
to determining the TAC, and the allocation of fishing rights. On the other hand, small-
scale fishers drew on their experiential knowledge to contest these claims, and the 
scientific knowledge upon which they were based. The following ethnographic examples 
serve to illustrate this contest. 
At the Karbonkelberg Restricted Zone workshop in January 2011, DAFF Fisheries 
Scientist 1 gave a digital presentation to participants that outlined the status of WCRL 
stocks. He showed graphs and statistics to make the claim that WCRL stocks levels were 
highly threatened, and stated that this commercially valuable species was “estimated at 
3.2% of pristine” (DAFF Fisheries Scientist 1, pers comm 28/01/11). The portrayal of 
WCRL as a highly overfished species was affirmed at a DAFF workshop to discuss 
WCRL data management in November 2011, which was attended by fisheries scientists 
and managers from DAFF, as well as scientists from independent consultancies, small-
scale fishers and their representatives. One of the independent fisheries scientists 
presented a series of graphs representing the abundance of WCRL around Port Nolloth 
in the Northern Cape. From this data, he concluded that WCRL in this area had declined 
by 95% over the last century (Fisheries Scientist 1, pers comm 04/11/11).  DAFF 
Director 1 used this scientific picture as his point of departure when engaging with fishers 
at the nearshore WCRL consultations in 2011. In response to calls by participants in 
Hangberg for the nearshore WCRL season to be extended, the director drew on the bleak 
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scientific portrayal of WCRL decline to assert that an extension would negatively affect 
the TAC for the following season. He emphasised that “this isn’t me making these 
decisions because I feel like it, there are biological reasons” (DAFF Director 1, pers 
comm 06/07/11). Affirming this point at the Kalk Bay consultation, he declared that 
“socio-economics can never be the only consideration … we [DAFF] will be guided by 
the interests of the resource” (DAFF Director 1, pers comm 08/07/11). 
The scientifically-based representation of fisheries stock levels was regularly contested by 
small-scale fishers, who challenged the methods and theories used to support the claim 
that these species were highly threatened - an epistemological contestation that has been 
extensively documented in a many fisheries governance contexts around the world 
(Berkes 1977, Johannes 1978, Hauck and Sowman 2003). During the small-scale fisher 
rally in Kalk Bay in March 2011, a prominent fisher representative declared to the 
attendees that fishers know the limits of the resource because they are on the sea every 
day:  “the scientists say there is not enough fish - nonsense!" (Roving Rep 1, pers comm 
23/03/11). On another occasion, at the workshop to discuss the management of WCRL 
fisheries data, a skipper in the offshore sector noted during the previous season, average 
catches had increased from 300kg to 500kg per trip: “things are not as bad as some are 
saying” (HGB Fisher 1, pers comm 04/11/11). Later during this workshop, a young 
Community Network (CN) representative questioned the reliance of fisheries scientists 
on mathematical models and equations. He stated that scientists should spend more time 
in the field to gain a more accurate understanding of WCRL dynamics, arguing that they 
should “stop estimating!” (CN Rep 1, pers comm 04/11/11). 
On numerous occasions during high level participatory events, government officials and 
industry representatives sought to depict a specific participatory process as something of 
value to participants. These claims were usually made at the end of proceedings, at which 
point they appeared as the ‘final assessment’ of that particular participatory event. Of 
significance in this regard was the notion of ‘synergy’, which was sometimes used to 
define the event as one in which actors with divergent views and interests had found 
common cause through constructive engagement with each other. The purpose of this 
tactic appeared to be the co-option of participants through the symbolic legitimisation of 
formal processes of participation. Fishers encountered during this research would often 
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use the Afrikaans phrase ‘smeer jam op jou mond’ (to ‘spread jam on your lips’) to refer 
to this co-opting effect.  
The tactic of positive portrayal was observed at the conclusion of the aforementioned 
meeting between representatives of small-scale fishers and an industrial fishing company, 
(where the topic of discussion was the SSF policy). Enthused by the outcome of the 
meeting, and the possibilities of engaging directly with a sector whose interests were 
generally seen to be in conflict with those of established industry, the company director 
asserted that: “we can provide an example for other companies – the Holy Grail!” 
(Company Director 1, pers comm 02/03/11). At the WWF-MDT roundtable discussion, 
a lawyer for the same industrial fishing company made the claim that there was “synergy 
between big business and community” (Company Lawyer 1, pers comm 29/03/11).  
The tactic of positive portrayal was also clearly discernible at the WCRL consultations. A 
pattern was observed at the close of each consultation on the Cape peninsula, where 
DAFF Director 1 and an industry association representative made an effort to represent 
these events in favourable light. The director would conclude with the claim that the 
consultation had been worthwhile for all involved: “Thank you to the rights holders who 
attended, I think this has been a valuable and successful meeting” (DAFF Director 1, 
pers comm 07/07/11). After he had formally closed proceedings, the industry 
representative would start clapping, while nodding at the participants to join in. Only a 
few participants started to clap with him, but the sound of the clapping created a vague 
impression that the event had been meaningful in some way.  
The notion of synergy was closely related to the metaphors of ‘inside’ and outside’, 
which referred to the exercise of democratic rights within formal channels of participation 
(such as invited participatory spaces’), and outside of these channels (for example through 
street protests). This research suggested that when fishers and their representatives 
remained ‘inside’, it was easier their antagonisms and dissent to be managed by powerful 
actors in government and industry. Conversely, this containment appeared more difficult 
when fishers decide to exercise their democratic rights outside the formal channels of 
participation. This alludes to the co-opting effect which appeared to be at the heart of the 
participatory processes observed during this research. The importance of keeping fishers 
‘inside’ was illustrated with particular clarity during the Karbonkelberg Restricted Zone 
workshop in January 2011. Paddy Gordon, head of the TMNP, vigorously expressed his 
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appreciation to the fishers from Hangberg for their attendance, and his relief that fishers 
were engaging in this participatory process, and that they were “not outside toyi-toying 
…Though you’d be justified in doing so … Just because something is hard to do, it 
doesn’t mean we shouldn’t do it” (TMNP Manager 1, pers comm 28/01/11).  
6.5. Conclusion: power and disempowerment in participation 
Drawing on ethnographic data from the micro-politics of citizen-initiated and invited 
participatory processes in the context of small-scale fisheries governance on the Cape 
Peninsula, this chapter demonstrated how the democratic efforts of small-scale fishers 
were compromised by the dynamics of real politik: when fishers and their representatives 
attempted to initiate direct engagement with powerful state and non-state actors, they 
were disempowered through the use of evasive and co-opting strategic practices. At the 
same time, the engagement of fishers and their representatives in invited spaces of 
participation was undermined by strategic manoeuvres employed to legitimise - and thus 
- de-politicise existing relations of power and benefit distribution.  
In consequence, many small-scale fishers and fisher representatives encountered during 
this research on the Cape Peninsula expressed a profound sense of disempowerment and 
frustration in relation to formal modes of participation. They articulated a keen 
awareness of the power dynamics that constrain their ability to influence fisheries 
governance through participation. From their experience, participation is often used as a 
means to disempower them through co-option and legitimation - to ‘spread jam on your 
lips’. This sense of disempowerment and frustration has contributed to a widespread 
scepticism among many small-scale fishers and community-based representatives on the 
Cape Peninsula regarding the value of formal participation, and its potential to ensure 
accountability.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
POWER VERSUS DEMOCRACY IN FISHERIES 
GOVERNANCE: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
“Whatever you do … you'll have to take politics with it” (Cape Peninsula fisher, September 2011) 
7.1. Introduction: orthodox and real politik perspectives on power and 
democracy in fisheries governance 
This study of fisheries governance on the Cape Peninsula highlights the tensions between 
power and democracy that are fundamental not only to the democratisation of fisheries 
policy and management processes in post-apartheid South Africa, but also to the broader 
policy and theory shift towards new forms of de-centred, inclusive and equitable political 
engagement. By exploring how unequal power relations and strategic practices manifest 
in processes of political representation and public participation on the Cape Peninsula, 
this study demonstrates that while processes such as representation and participation 
have the potential to facilitate democratic forms of fisheries governance, they also have 
the potential to facilitate the maintenance and extension of existing regimes of power 
and benefit distribution. 
Consequently, this research raises questions regarding the apolitical conception of 
governance which informs fisheries law and policy discourse in South Africa, and which 
is promoted by prominent theoretical approaches to fisheries governance such as co-
management, Interactive Governance Theory (IGT) and the Ecosystem Approach to 
Fisheries (EAF). In this conception, representation and participation are viewed 
primarily as democratic mechanisms to facilitate inclusive and collaborative partnership 
between those who are relatively disempowered (such as small-scale fishers and 
community representatives), and those who are relatively more empowered (such as 
local elites, state officials, fisheries scientists, and industry representatives).  Yet as the 
ethnographic research presented in the previous two chapters suggests, this apolitical 
conception of the politics of governance does not account sufficiently for the ways that 
strategic practices and asymmetrical power relations served to undermine the role of 
representation and participation as mechanisms for facilitating democratic fisheries 
governance processes. Chapter Five described the micro-politics of community-based 
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small-scale fisher representation among a specific group of residents in the coastal 
community of Ocean View (the ground level), and suggested that community-based 
political representation served as a mechanism for local elites to gain and exercise power, 
while undermining the democratic rights and practices of small-scale fishers in their 
community. Chapter Six explored public participation as another element of democratic 
fisheries governance processes on the Cape Peninsula. It described the micro-politics of 
formal participatory encounters (the high level) between a wide range of actors, 
including small-scale fishers, community-based fisher representatives, state management 
officials, fishing industry representatives, fisheries scientists, and politicians, revealing 
the potential of participation to be serve as a means to defuse popular dissent, and 
legitimise existing imbalances of power.  
To consider the implications of this research for the theorisation of power and 
democracy in fisheries governance, this final chapter will analyse and discuss the 
ethnographic material presented in Chapter Five and Chapter Six in relation to the 
literature presented in Chapter Two. The chapter begins by revisiting the orthodox 
approach to fisheries governance theory (see Ostrom 1990, Berkes et al. 2001, Pomeroy 
2001, Bavinck et al. 2005, Jentoft et al. 2007, Kooiman et al. 2008, Mahon et al. 2009). 
This is followed by a theoretical discussion of the power dynamics and strategic practices 
of small-scale fisher representation and participation on the Cape Peninsula, drawing on 
the work of Bourdieu (1986, 1989, 1998), and other critical scholars such as Flyvbjerg 
(1998), Lukes (2005), Swyngedouw (2005) and Saward (2006, 2009), as well as the work 
of fisheries scholars such as Bene and Neiland (2006) and Davis and Ruddle (2012). The 
chapter concludes by offering some suggestions for incorporating power dynamics into 
the analysis and theorisation of fisheries governance by adopting a ‘real politik 
perspective’.   
7.2. The apolitical orthodoxy: politics without politics?  
This study of power in representation and participation on the Cape Peninsula calls into 
question the orthodox conception of politics that informs new approaches to fisheries 
governance theory and policy in South Africa, and internationally. To briefly revisit the 
basic argument laid out in Chapter Two: this orthodox conception of  is advocated by 
international funding agencies, development practitioners, policy-makers and academics 
operating from global centres of power in the North, whose neoliberal policies and 
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theories promote a break with the antagonistic, zero-sum political models of the past. 
This orthodox perspective posits the advent of a form of governance without unequal 
power relations and strategic contestation, in other words, a form of politics without 
politics defined by inclusive, de-centred and collaborative engagement between state and 
non-state actors. The orthodoxy promotes an apolitical vision of a “shared power, no-
one-in-charge, interdependent world”, in which “no one person, group or organisation 
has the necessary power or authority” to address societal problems, and therefore 
“organisations and institutions must share objectives, resources, activities, power, or 
some of their authority in order to achieve collective gains or minimize losses” (Bryson 
and Crosby in Kooiman, 1999: 74).  
This apolitical conception of the politics of governance has become increasingly 
prevalent in a wide range of social fields, including the field of fisheries theory and policy 
(Davis and Ruddle 2012). As was argued in Chapter Two, policy-makers at institutions 
such as the World Bank and FAO, as well as prominent international fisheries scholars 
promote an apolitical view of political processes associated with fisheries management 
and policy-making. They assert that equitable and sustainable fisheries governance can, 
and should be pursued through inclusive, non-hierarchical and collaborative engagement 
between state management agencies, scientists, small-scale fishers, fisher representatives, 
large-scale fishing company representatives, and conservationists. From this view: “A 
key assumption is that … interactions are horizontal … There is a certain degree of 
equality in how participating entities relate to each other … parties co-operate, co-
ordinate and communicate … without a central or dominating governing actor” 
(Bavinck et al. 2005: 44).  
Despite the value of this perspective as a normative ideal in the context of fisheries 
governance (and processes of societal regulation more broadly), the recent trend towards 
promoting inclusive, de-centred and collaborative political engagement has been 
critiqued for its apolitical conception of politics (Bene and Neiland 2006, Davis and 
Ruddle 2012). As discussed in Chapter Two, this conception of politics effectively 
conceals the continued role of power dynamics in determining the nature and outcome 
of political engagements between multiple and divergent social actors. In the discourse of 
this apolitical orthodoxy, the terms ‘governance’, ‘public participation’ and ‘political 
representation’ have been emptied of their political meaning, and infused with apolitical 
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notions such as interaction, collaboration, and partnership, while remaining silent on the 
realities of capitalism, class, domination and inequality (Bourdieu and Wacquant 2001). 
The orthodox conception of politics therefore serves to de-politicise social processes that 
are intrinsically political, and in so doing, overlooks the fundamental tensions between 
power and democracy.  
Contrary to the apolitical orthodox conception of politics, political processes which 
appear on the surface to be democratic (such as participation and political 
representation) can potentially undermine democratic practices, and reinforce 
asymmetrical relations of power and benefit distribution.  Yet contemporary theories of 
fisheries governance strongly reflect the orthodox model, leading some scholars to 
conclude that the “[f]ailure to locate power relationships, particularly those associated 
with economic exploitation and appropriation, at the very centre … means that recent 
governance approaches are not empowering for small-scale fisheries”   (Davis and 
Ruddle 2012: 251). The research presented in this thesis demonstrates that many small-
scale fishers on the Cape Peninsula were disempowered by the micro-politics of 
community-based representation and formal participatory encounters. Representation 
and participation were defined by strategic practices rather than collaboration, and 
instead of there being no single ‘dominating actor’, there were in fact multiple actors 
who exercised some form of domination. Furthermore, these micro-political processes 
unfolded in a context of national and global structures of political-economic power.  
Developing a rigorous analysis of how power dynamics manifest through potentially 
democratic processes of representation and participation on the Cape Peninsula is thus 
crucial for gaining a deeper understanding of the tensions between power and democracy 
that define fisheries governance, and political engagement more broadly. The following 
section discusses how multiple scale political-economic contexts shape the politics of 
fisheries governance that were studied on the Cape Peninsula. It describes some of the 
structural mechanisms of power that determine, to a significant extent, the range of 
possible action of small-scale fishers and fisher representatives, and thereby undermining 
their ability to democratically influence fisheries law, policy and management.  
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7.3. Small-scale fisher representation and participation within 
broader fields of power  
The micro-politics of community-based fisher representation and participation on the 
Cape Peninsula that were presented in this thesis did not occur in a vacuum, but rather, 
they were embedded in, and shaped by broader fields of power (see Bourdieu 1989). 
Analysing the role of power in processes of representation and participation therefore 
requires that these processes are situated within the broader fields of power, namely 
those of fisheries governance in post-apartheid South Africa, national macro-economic 
policy frameworks, and the global structures and processes of neoliberal capitalism.  
The post-apartheid transition signalled the start of a process to democratise fisheries 
governance in South Africa, opening political space for previously marginalised fishing 
communities to assert their right to access the marine commons, and to influence how 
the marine commons are governed (see Chapter Four). However this space has been 
constrained by the relations of power through which fisheries governance in South 
Africa is structured. In terms of fisheries legislation and policy, both the MLRA and the 
SSF policy affirm the state’s authority over the marine commons by vesting final 
decision-making power with the Minister. Consequently, the democratic engagement of 
small-scale fishing communities in fisheries governance processes is ultimately subject to 
the Minister’s authority. The ability of small-scale fishers and their community-based 
representatives on the Cape Peninsula to assert their political and economic rights 
through participatory processes is also constrained by the political-economic power of 
industrial fishing companies, whose de facto monopoly over South Africa’s fisheries is 
well documented (Hersoug and Isaacs 2001, Van Sittert 2002, Ponte and Van Sittert 
2007). Relative to small-scale fishing communities, these companies have considerable 
economic power, which they use to exert disproportionate political influence on the state 
in fisheries governance processes. The power of the state and industry in relation to 
small-scale fishing communities is bolstered by fisheries science, whose ideological 
power serves as a strategic means to protect the existing structural inequalities of fisheries 
governance in South Africa (Van Sittert 1995, 2003).  
These asymmetries of political-economic and ideological power constrain the efforts of 
small-scale fishing communities on the Cape Peninsula to engage collaboratively with 
more empowered state and industry actors during fisheries policy and management-
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related processes. Despite the Constitutional imperative to democratise fisheries 
governance processes, small-scale fishers and community-based representatives engage 
with state officials and industry representatives from a position of significant 
disadvantage.  
The field of fisheries governance in South Africa - which is configured according to the 
power of the state and capital - is itself embedded in, and shaped by the broader national 
political economy (see Chapter Two). In particular, the South African government’s 
neoliberal macro-economic policy approach has had the effect of securing the dominance 
of the industrial fisheries sectors, while fundamentally undermining the political and 
economic rights of small-scale fishing communities (see Van Sittert 2006, Crosoer et al. 
2006, Ponte and Van Sittert 2007, Sowman et al. 2014). This tension is epitomised by 
South Africa’s overarching macro-economic policy, the National Development Plan 
(NDP) of 2011, which has consolidated the basic structure of the field of fisheries 
governance in South Africa by prioritising capital intensive, export-oriented industrial 
fisheries production, while largely ignoring the small-scale fisheries which sustain the 
livelihoods of tens of thousands of coastal residents.  
The Constitutional rights of small-scale fishing communities on the Cape Peninsula to 
obtain equitable access to fishing rights, and to have democratic representation and 
participation in fisheries governance processes are thus compromised by the 
government’s neoliberal macro-economic policy framework. While the Minister of 
DAFF has ultimate authority within the field of fisheries governance, they are 
themselves subject to broader macro-economic imperatives that constrain their ability to 
fully accommodate marginalised small-scale fishing communities as required by the 
Equality Court Order and the SSF policy (Sowman et al. 2014).  
Ultimately, the tension between power and democracy that was observed in the context 
of community-based fisher representation and participation on the Cape Peninsula is 
located within the global field of power, which is constituted by the political-economic 
and ideological system of neoliberal capitalism (see Chapter Two). While South Africa’s 
fisheries are officially governed by the state, whose responsibility is ensure equitable 
access for small-scale fishers to the marine commons, and to democratic inclusion in 
policy and management processes, the power of state institutions to pursue this mandate 
is subject to the material and symbolic power of global organisations such as the 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), as well as the power of international banks and corporations. 
These entities administer and control the global web of production, trade, and debt in 
which South Africa is entrapped, and they directly and indirectly influence the policies of 
the state while operating beyond the reach of public accountability (Fine and Rustomjee 
1996, Bond 2003, 2005, 2009, Carmody 2002, Du Toit 2005).  
This has led to a “narrowing of national sovereignty” in South Africa with regard to 
natural resource and environmental law, policy-making and management (Bond 2003: 
viii). Local political processes are thus increasingly subject to the “disciplinary force” of 
the ideological and political-economic structures of neoliberal capitalism, which place 
“real limits on the practical potential of localised or ‘bottom-up’ political action…” (Peck 
and Tickell 2002: 386). To the extent that the autonomy of the South African state is 
constrained by this global field of power, small-scale fishing communities on the Cape 
Peninsula are proportionately disempowered in their capacity to use democratic 
processes such as representation and participation to influence how the state governs the 
marine commons.  
The democratic efforts of local fishers and fisher representatives are therefore 
disempowered, not only by the national fields of fisheries governance and macro-
economic policy, but also by the global field of capitalist production, exchange and 
regulation.  As Davis and Ruddle (2012) observe, small-scale fishers are disempowered 
“by political and economic circumstances they generally cannot control”, and therefore 
our understanding of power in fisheries governance processes must account for the 
“international political economy of commodity values, wealth distribution and 
accumulation, power, and class …” (Davis and Ruddle 2012: 249). Yet, as was argued in 
Chapter Two, contemporary theories of fisheries governance appear to overlook the 
position of structural disadvantage that small-scale fishing communities occupy within 
the national fields of fisheries governance and macro-economic policy, and within the 
global field of capitalism. These contemporary theories of fisheries governance leave 
little space for theorising the effects of broader fields of political-economic and 
ideological power within which these new forms of political engagement unfold, and 
which are fundamental to the tensions between power and democracy in fisheries 
governance processes. Suggestions of how to address this oversight will be proposed at 
199 | P a g e  
 
the end of the chapter. But first, a discussion of the power dynamics and micro-politics of 
fisheries governance on the Cape Peninsula will be presented below, drawing on the 
literature presented in Chapter Two in order to gain insight into the role of power as a 
fundamental factor shaping the nature and outcomes of fisheries governance processes.   
7.4. The power dynamics and micro-politics of small-scale fisheries 
governance on the Cape Peninsula: community-based representation 
and public participation 
The democratic practices of small-scale fishing communities in South Africa are 
constrained, not only by broader fields of political-economic and ideological power, but 
also by the strategic practices of individual actors. This was demonstrated in the micro-
political study of fisheries governance on the Cape Peninsula that was presented in 
Chapter Five and Chapter Six. These chapters revealed some of the practices through 
which the potentially democratic mechanisms of public participation and community-
based representation were harnessed to protect and extend inequitable relations of power 
and benefit distribution in the field of fisheries. The micro-politics of participation and 
political representation in coastal communities on the Cape Peninsula foreground the 
tensions that can exist between power and democracy in fisheries governance, affirming 
Fay’s (2007) argument that supposedly inclusive, de-centred and collaborative political 
engagement in post-apartheid South Africa “is not always the best one for all involved … 
a situation that preserves the appearance of harmony can nevertheless have clear winners 
and losers” (Fay 2007: 83). The following section will discuss and analyse the micro-
politics of community-based representation and public participation on the Cape 
Peninsula that were presented in Chapter Five and Chapter Six. 
7.4.1. Community-based political representation in Ocean View: a 
mechanism for elite capture?   
Community-based political representation can be seen as a primary mechanism for 
facilitating the democratic engagement of small-scale fishers in fisheries governance 
processes. However, the case of Ocean View suggests that political representation can 
also undermine democracy by serving as a mechanism to reinforce and extend unequal 
relations of power. In this section, the micro-political dynamics of community-based 
fisher representation in Ocean View will be analysed in greater detail using Bourdieu’s 
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notion of field and capitals, and Saward’s notion of representation as ‘the making of 
claims’, in order to better understand the tensions between democracy and power that 
appeared to define process of political representation in this empirical context.   
The ethnographic research on community-based fisher representation in Ocean View 
revealed a highly contested political field, with different groupings competing intensely 
to represent local fishers. Among these various groupings, the leadership of the AOVF 
(who could be described as a local elite) played a prominent role in this competition to 
represent fishers in Ocean View. The AOVF leadership had managed to occupy a 
dominant position in the local small-scale fisheries arena as ostensibly legitimate fisher 
representatives. From this position, they were able to intercept economic opportunities 
emerging in post-apartheid fisheries governance, such as the allocation of commercial 
fishing rights and interim relief permits, the formation of co-operatives, and the 
anticipated allocation of small-scale fishing rights under the SSF policy. In short, this 
research affirmed Rehfeld’s (2006) view that political representation is not an 
intrinsically “democratic phenomenon” (2006: 2). It demonstrated that community-
based political representation in Ocean View served as a means for a local elite grouping 
to gain and exercise power, rather than as a democratic medium to express the views, 
and promote the interests of local small-scale fishers in fisheries governance processes.   
To understand how the AOVF leadership was able to use political representation as an 
instrument for elite capture, let us begin by considering their relationship with the AOVF 
constituency. From a political science perspective, this representational relationship 
could be theorised as one in which the AOVF leadership operated with significant 
autonomy in relation to their constituency, who appeared to have limited capacity to hold 
this leadership accountable through formal procedures of election or censure 
(Mansbridge 2003, Rehfeld 2006, Petit 2009). This local elite grouping managed to 
operate with such a high degree of autonomy as a result of i) the set of powers that this 
elite grouping held in relation to other actors in the local field of fisheries; ii) and the 
strategic practices that this grouping employed in their role as representatives. 
To capture the position of fisher representatives (and the economic benefits that attended 
this position), this local elite grouping harnessed their particular set of capacities - or 
powers. Bourdieu conceptualises these powers as ‘capitals’, which are scarce material 
and symbolic resources that can be utilised, accumulated or lost, and which correspond 
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to a specific social field (Bourdieu 1986). In the case of the AOVF leadership, this local 
elite grouping had a relatively high degree of economic capital (for example money and 
physical assets) when compared with their fisher constituency and other representative 
groupings in Ocean View. Another component of the AOVF leadership’s set of powers 
was social capital in the form of a network of relationships with DAFF and DTI 
officials, and individuals within the ANC Provincial Branch. The leadership of AOVF 
also had considerable cultural capital in the bureaucratic or institutional field, when 
compared with most fisher (and non-fisher) residents in Ocean View. The set of symbolic 
and material capitals (or powers) held by the AOVF leadership provided them with 
considerable strategic advantage in relation to AOVF members, non-members, and 
competing community-based representatives in Ocean View.  
This elite grouping drew on their capitals to employ a range of strategic practices aimed 
at occupying the position of dominant community-based fisher representatives in Ocean 
View, and from this position to capture economic benefits associated with the emerging 
post-apartheid transformation of fisheries governance in South Africa. It was observed 
that the strategic practices of the AOVF leadership were centred on what Saward (2006, 
2009) argues to be the central activity of political representation, namely the ‘making of 
claims’. Saward (2006) conceptualises the act of ‘making claims’ as the depiction, 
portrayal - or representation - of people, things and relationships, in which these 
depictions are presented as definitive renderings of objective fact, with the strategic aim 
of influencing the thought and action of others. The act of depicting or representing 
someone or something involves an element of construction and performance, and is an 
assertion of fact, rather than a transparent presentation of fact (Saward 2006, 2009). As 
such, all claims can potentially be contested, and it is this contestation between 
“competing significations” that is “precisely what political debate and dispute is all 
about” (Saward 2006: 311).  
In the case of the AOVF leadership, it was observed that their strategic practices were 
centred on establishing and defending their claim to be ‘legitimate’ community-based 
representatives of Ocean View fishers. Precisely what is meant by ‘legitimate’ is a matter 
for debate, but from the perspective of fulltime fishers encountered during this research, a 
legitimate community-based fisher representative is an individual who is ‘indicative’ of, 
or analogous with their fisher constituency (Rehfeld 2006, Petit 2009). According to 
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these fishers, legitimacy is fundamentally tied to the premise that: “a fisher can only be 
truly represented by another fisher ...” (OV Veteran Fisher 5, pers comm 23/09/12). 
Viewed through Bourdieu’s theoretical lens, these fishers articulated a view of legitimacy 
in which the fisher representative shares the same position in the field as their fisher 
constituency (in terms of their capitals and habitus).  
The AOVF leadership did not, however, share the same field position as their fisher 
constituents, in the sense that they were not deeply-embedded in the local fishing 
community, and did not have a personal history of harvesting fisheries resources for a 
living.  Consequently, their claims to be legitimate representatives were strongly 
contested by many fishers in Ocean View. To mitigate this deficit, this local elite 
grouping had to expend considerable strategic effort to bolster their claims to be rooted 
in the local culture and practices of fishing, and thus to be legitimate community-based 
fisher representatives. This included the strategy of vicariously accumulating cultural 
capital in the fisheries field, and subsequently demonstrating this cultural capital to 
external actors (such as DAFF officials), creating the impression that they were deeply 
embedded members of the local fishing community whom they represented. The second 
strategy employed by the AOVF leadership to bolster their claims of legitimacy was the 
building a large constituency of bona fide fishers (generally seen by DAFF officials, 
industry representatives and fishers as an important criterion for assessing a 
representative’s claims to be legitimate). To increase the size of their constituency, the 
AOVF leadership made strategic use of their access to fisheries policy and management-
related information, and their ability to produce material results for their members, 
primarily by securing commercial fishing rights and interim relief permits on behalf of 
AOVF members, and by providing monetary advances, which both attracted new 
members, while also serving as a mechanism to impose obligations of loyalty, and to 
defend against dissent (see Mosse 2007).  
Through the accumulation of cultural capital (if only superficially) in the local field of 
fisheries, and the establishment of a large constituency of bona fide fisher members, the 
AOVF leadership was able to construct a foundation to make the strategic claim to be 
legitimate community-based fisher representatives. Yet, as Saward observes: “facts may 
be facts, but claims are contestable … there is no claim … that does not leave space for 
its contestation” (Saward 2006: 302). In the case of Ocean View, the AOVF leadership’s 
203 | P a g e  
 
claim to be legitimate representatives was strongly contested by the overwhelming 
majority of experienced fulltime fishers in Ocean View, who made the counter-claim that 
this local elite were in fact illegitimate. The AOVF leadership was, however, able to 
overcome these counter-claims, in part by gaining formal recognition for their claim to 
legitimacy from their constituency and external actors such as DAFF officials.  
This highlights the importance of Rehfeld’s (2006) observation that an individual is only 
a political representative to the extent that they are recognised as such by a particular 
audience (whether constituency or external actors). Rehfeld (2006) argues that this 
recognition can be granted for different reasons, including on the basis of an assessment 
of the individual’s democratic credentials (however conceived), or for reasons of strategic 
expediency. He also argues that where there are radical imbalances of power, and a lack 
of effective procedures for accountability, the recognition granted to a representative by 
powerful external actors can often supersede the recognition that is granted or withheld 
by a disempowered constituency (Rehfeld 2006). Saward also argues for the significance 
of recognition in processes of claim-making associated with political representation, 
noting that “claims only work, or even exist, if audiences acknowledge them in some 
way” (Saward 2006: 303). According to Saward, the recognition of claims is itself 
constructed, contested, and contingent upon the relation between the audience (who 
receives the claim) and the claim maker, the content of a particular claim, and the 
context in which it is made.   
In the context of this research, there appeared to be a strong element of expediency or 
pragmatism informing the recognition granted to the AOVF leadership by their 
constituency and key external actors (such as DAFF officials). This research suggests 
that many of the fisher and non-fisher members of the AOVF had decided to grant 
recognition to the AOVF leadership because this elite grouping could produce tangible 
results for them (for example by providing monetary advances, or securing commercial 
fishing rights and interim relief permits). It therefore seems that pragmatism was a 
primary consideration for AOVF constituents when granting recognition to the 
leadership of AOVF, rather than an assessment of this elite grouping’s democratic 
credentials, or their knowledge and experience of fisheries.  The same could be said for 
DAFF officials, who, despite being repeatedly presented with evidence of 
misrepresentation by the AOVF leadership, continued to formally recognise this elite 
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grouping’s claims to be legitimate representatives. This suggests that DAFF officials 
granted this recognition for reasons of political expediency, rather than an assessment of 
this local elite grouping’s democratic credentials. The recognition granted by external 
actors such as DAFF management officials (and other empowered external actors) was 
of particular importance, providing this local elite grouping with a rich political resource 
that facilitated their inclusion as representatives in fisheries governance processes. 
Recognition from these while also reinforcing their position of advantage in relation to 
AOVF members, non-members, and other representatives in Ocean View. Recognition 
was thus fundamental for empowering this local elite in their endeavour to capture the 
local field of fisheries. 
The micro-political dynamics of community-based fisher representation in Ocean View 
described in Chapter Five reveal the ‘dark side’ of political representation, namely the 
potential for representation to serve as a mechanism to gain and exercise power, rather 
than to facilitate democratic political processes. This research demonstrates the salience 
of Bourdieu’s (1991) argument that the intrinsic danger of political representation is the 
act of delegation, to the extent that this act opens the space for representatives to 
potentially exploit their position as brokers to further their private interests, and to 
compete with other representatives. As Wacquant (2004) (following Bourdieu) observes, 
the act of delegation “is always pregnant with the possibility of dispossession and even 
usurpation, and all the more so as the group represented is more deprived of economic 
and cultural capital” (2004: 6). This research thus confirms the argument that in a 
context of structural inequalities of power and a lack of effective procedures of 
accountability, there is a considerable risk that community-based representation can 
serve as a mechanism for elite capture (Ribot 1999, Ribot and Agrawal 2000, Bene and 
Neiland 2006, Mosse 2007). In the case of Ocean View, the AOVF leadership captured 
the position of dominant representatives through a process of “competition and strategic 
efforts to maximise the acquisition of power”, rather than through processes that are 
necessarily democratic (Mosse 2007: 22). And as this research demonstrated, once an 
individual or a grouping within the community (such as the AOVF leadership) has 
managed to occupy the position of representative, they are often able to exploit that 
position to intercept a disproportionate amount of the benefits intended for those whom 
they represent (Ribot and Agrawal 2000, Bene and Neiland 2006, Mosse 2007, Gaventa 
and Barrett 2010).  
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7.4.2. Participation in fisheries governance on the Cape Peninsula: a 
mechanism for disempowerment?  
The study of the micro-politics of community-based political representation in Ocean 
View was complemented by a study of the micro-politics of public participation in small-
scale fisheries governance processes on the Cape Peninsula, as they unfolded in the 
context of the post-apartheid democratisation of fisheries in South Africa (see Chapter 
6). Here the focus shifted from the activities of a small number of representatives, to the 
activities of the full spectrum of actors involved in some way in fisheries governance 
processes on the Cape Peninsula. Ethnographic research was conducted during direct 
participatory encounters between fishers, fisher representatives, government officials, 
industrial fishing company representatives, fisheries scientists and conservationists. The 
aim of these encounters was to engage on various fisheries policy and management-
related issues, including the small-scale fishing policy, interim relief, and the allocation 
of commercial fishing rights.  
Despite the progress that small-scale fishers and fisher representatives in South Africa 
have made through democratic participation in fisheries governance processes, the 
research on ‘citizen-initiated’ and ‘invited’ participatory encounters presented in Chapter 
Six demonstrates how the participation of small-scale fishers and community-based 
fisher representatives was at times compromised by unequal power relations and 
strategic practices. This research therefore affirms the established critique of public 
participation made by a wide range of scholars, who argue that participation often 
disempowers marginalised groups of citizens, while reinforcing, rather than transforming 
existing inequalities of power and benefit distribution (Arnstein 1969, Fraser 1990, 
Comaroff and Comaroff 1999, Fung and Wright 2003, Gaventa 2004, Rowe and Frewer 
2004, Pithouse 2006, Fay 2007, Mosse 2007, Taylor 2007).  The following section will 
describe and analyse the findings from Chapter Six in relation to the literature presented 
in Chapter Two.  
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7.4.2. a) Power dynamics and strategic practices in citizen-initiated participation 
Chapter Six presented the experiences of ‘citizen-initiated’ participation among fishers 
and community-based fisher representatives on the Cape Peninsula, who were 
endeavouring to arrange face-to-face meetings with senior state officials. For most of 
these fishers and representatives, the basic aim of ‘citizen-initiated’ participation was to 
express their views and concerns directly to high-ranking state officials (though it was 
apparent that some community-based fisher representatives pursued ‘citizen-initiated’ 
participation to promote their own interests). 
The micro-politics of citizen-initiated participation were illustrated by two ethnographic 
case studies, which demonstrated how fishers and community-based fisher 
representatives on the Cape Peninsula were disempowered through these participatory 
processes. This research showed how these instances of participation were defined by the 
unequal relations of power between citizens (fishers and fisher representatives) and 
senior state officials, affirming the axiom that “spaces for participation are not neutral, 
but are themselves shaped by power relations that both surround and enter them” 
(Gaventa 2004: 34). Empowered by their formal position within the field of fisheries 
governance, state officials had the political power to decide whether or not to meet with 
fishers and fisher representatives, when to meet them, for how long, and the issues to be 
excluded from discussion. In other words, state officials had the power to determine the 
“terms of engagement” during these participatory interactions (Gaventa 2004: 35). 
Furthermore, because there were no agreed procedures of accountability, state officials 
had the power to determine, to a significant extent, the outcomes of their engagement with 
fishers and community-based fisher representatives. Bene and Neiland (2006) describe 
this as “the fundamental flaw” of limited forms of participation, namely that that 
disempowered citizens have a formal right to participation without “a right to determine 
outcomes” (2006: 32). 
The case studies also demonstrated the seemingly neutral procedural manoeuvres (such 
as the repeated postponement of meetings) employed by state officials to delay or avoid 
direct interaction with fishers and fisher representatives, without being seen to formally 
reject their efforts to secure a meeting. These procedural manoeuvres had the 
instrumental effect of exhausting the resources and energy of fishers and representatives, 
and thus weakening the vigour of their participatory efforts, affirming Fung and Wright’s 
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(2003) recognition that active participatory engagement can “demand unrealistically 
high levels of popular commitment” (2003: 33). At the same time, the evasive 
manoeuvres of state officials had the effect of maintaining the engagement of fishers and 
fisher representatives within the bounds of formal channels of participation - whose 
conditions were largely controlled by state officials - rather than through ‘informal’ 
channels of participation such as street protests. This particular effect illustrates the well-
established argument regarding the potential of participation as an instrument for co-
opting the dissent of disempowered citizens (Arnstein 1969, Kohn 2000, Pithouse 2006, 
Taylor 2007, Gaventa and Barrett 2010). In the case of this research, it therefore appears 
that citizen-initiated participation served to disempower, rather than empower fishers 
and community-based representatives in their attempts to engage directly with senior 
state officials.  
7.4.2. b) Power dynamics and strategic practices in invited participatory events  
The second mode of participation explored in Chapter Six was that of formal ‘invited’ 
participatory events, where a wide range of actors came together in one place to engage 
on fisheries policy and management-related issues. Here the focus was placed on 
participatory events initiated and facilitated by state agencies, with specific attention 
given to DAFF road shows and stakeholder consultations.  
Political engagement in these participatory events was fundamentally shaped by the 
significant asymmetries of power between the multiple actors involved, supporting 
Swyngedouw’s (2005: 1998) assertion that “participation is invariably mediated by 
power”. Viewed through the theoretical lens of Bourdieu (1977, 1986), we see that 
government officials, fisheries scientists and industry representatives drew on 
considerable reserves of economic, social, and institutional-specific cultural capital, and 
wielded political power from their position in the field. In contrast, small-scale fishers 
and community-based fisher representatives had relatively less economic, social and 
institutional-specific cultural capital (though they were usually well-endowed with 
cultural capital in the field of fisheries). These asymmetries of power reflect the balance 
of forces in the broader field of fisheries governance in South Africa, affirming Taylor’s 
(2007: 302) observation that “the existing distribution of power is inscribed” in emerging 
spaces of participatory engagement. 
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The physical space of invited participatory events was also crucial in shaping the 
engagement between the multiple actors. Reflecting Gaventa’s (2004) argument 
regarding the critical relationship between place and power in participation, this research 
found that small-scale fishers and community-based fisher representatives were 
proportionately disempowered according to the location and formality of the venue 
where the participatory event was held. In addition, these spaces were ornamented with 
physical props that symbolised a grand democratic event in which the participation of 
fishers and fisher representatives was valued by formal political authorities, providing a 
clear illustration of what Arnstein (1969) describes as “the distortion of participation into 
a public relations vehicle” (Arnstein 1969: 218).  
It is within this basic architecture that the micro-political practices of invited 
participatory events unfolded. Chapter Six focused particular attention on the strategic 
activities employed by those in powerful positions within the field of fisheries 
governance. Three critical activities were observed in this regard: i) the facilitation (or 
chairing) of participatory events, ii) symbolic performance, iii) and the contest to define 
‘reality’.  
The facilitation or ‘chairing’ of participatory events proved to be a key mechanism for 
exercising power during these encounters between multiple and divergent actors. All 
participants were obliged to submit to the authority of the facilitator, who was formally 
empowered to arbitrate discussion in the participatory space. The general result was a 
hierarchical relationship between participants such as small-scale fishers and community-
based representatives, and those who facilitated. A crucial dynamic of facilitation was the 
use of academic and policy jargon by facilitators, which served to exacerbate the 
alienation of participants from small-scale fishing communities, while de-politicising the 
fundamentally political governance issues being discussed. In this way, language served 
to reinforce relations of dominance within formal participatory spaces, rather than 
serving as a neutral medium for democratic communication (Fraser 1990, Kohn 2000). 
This finding highlights Bourdieu’s (1991) conception of language as a type of symbolic 
power through which elite groupings are able to reproduce their positions of advantage 
during processes of political engagement. 
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Language was the basis for the primary strategic practice employed by facilitators during 
invited participatory events, namely policing the boundaries of acceptable discussion. These 
boundaries conformed to the logic, beliefs, values and discourse of powerful state and 
industry actors - or in Bourdieu’s (1994) terms, the ‘doxa’ of the field: the dominant 
framework of ideological and discursive constructs. Facilitators used their position to 
control the discussion within the participatory space, and more specifically, to prevent 
participants from leading the discussion into ideological territory which they deemed 
‘unacceptable’. They used a range of tactics to police the boundaries of acceptable 
discussion, including ‘selective amnesia’, ‘deflection’, and ‘deferment’. The process of 
policing of the boundaries of discussion tactics illustrates Gaventa’s (2004: 34) argument 
that dominant actors use their power “to shape the boundaries of participatory spaces, 
what is possible within them, and who may enter, with which ... discourses”.  
In addition to facilitation, another critical activity observed during invited participatory 
events was that of symbolic performance. Participants and facilitators consciously used 
specific discourses, accents, tones of voice and body language to project themselves and 
their claims in a particular light, alluding to “the role of the political field as theatre for 
the performative representation of the social world” (Wacquant 2004: 6). Relatively 
empowered participants and facilitators were often seen to use the strategy of ‘symbolic 
positioning’, in which they articulated statements using particular phrases and accents 
generally associated with small-scale fishing communities, thus locating themselves 
closer to these communities than to other groups in the field of fisheries governance. The 
strategy of symbolic positioning reflects a set of practices that Bourdieu (1989) calls 
‘strategies of condescension’: “those strategies by which agents who occupy a higher 
position in one of the hierarchies of objective space symbolically deny the social distance 
between themselves and others ... thus reaping the profits of the recognition granted to a 
purely symbolic denegation of distance” (Bourdieu 1989: 16).  
It was also observed during participatory events that relatively empowered actors 
(usually but not always facilitators) symbolically demonstrated their power in relation to 
other actors. Senior DAFF officials, members of parliament, and fishing company 
directors used authoritative, patronising, or sarcastic tones of voice and body language, 
through which they articulated statements of chastisement, command, or dismissal. 
These symbolic demonstrations of power were generally directed towards less powerful 
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actors, as was the case when senior DAFF officials were seen to give categorical 
instructions towards small-scale fishers and community-based representatives during 
road shows and consultations. Following Bourdieu (1991: 235), we can conceptualise 
these symbolic demonstrations of power as a form of performative enactment that 
“contributes to making what existed in a practical state, tacitly or implicitly, exist fully, 
that is, in the objectified state, in a form directly visible to all, public, published, official, 
and thus authorized”.  
Finally, the third critical activity observed during invited participatory events on the 
Cape Peninsula was the contest to define reality. As with political representation, a defining 
feature of political engagement during these participatory events was the practice of 
depicting - or making claims about - particular people, things and relationships. Different 
actors competed to gain recognition for their claims as the rational and definitive 
rendering of reality, with the aim of providing symbolic support for material action (or 
inaction) in relation to the specific issues being discussed. The act of defining reality is 
thus fundamentally political, as Bourdieu (1977) argues: “the specifically symbolic power 
to impose the principles of construction of reality...is a major dimension of political 
power” (Bourdieu 1977: 165). Flyvbjerg (1998) also asserts that during participatory 
encounters between empowered and disempowered groups, those in positions of power 
are “more concerned with defining a specific reality than it is with understanding what 
reality is” (1998: 36).  
The notion of ‘rationality’ was central in the contest to define reality in these 
participatory processes. From the liberal democratic perspective, rationality is seen as the 
basis for facilitating open democratic engagement (Fraser 1990, Kohn 2000, Flyvbjerg 
1998).  Flyvbjerg (1998: 234) notes that rationality is assumed to be “the main means for 
making democracy work”, and thus “the more rationality the better” (1998: 216). 
Consequently, the notion of rationality carried considerable symbolic power in invited 
participatory events observed during this research. It was apparent that ‘rationality’ was 
a pre-requisite for a specific claim to be formally recognised as a definitive rendering of 
reality, and therefore ‘legitimate’. At the same time, claims were dismissed as 
‘illegitimate’ on the grounds that they were ‘irrational’.  
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Yet during these participatory events, the process of recognising claims as rational was, 
itself, irrational. Firstly, formal recognition was determined by the dominant actors (state 
officials, fisheries scientists, industry representatives); and secondly, the boundaries of 
rationality conformed to the doxa of the field of fisheries governance in South Africa. As 
a result, claims were recognised as rational or irrational depending on the extent to 
which they correlated with the logic and interests of these dominant actors, rather than 
with the logic and interests of less powerful groupings. This affirms Flyvbjerg’s (1998) 
argument that in arenas of political contestation, “power produces that knowledge and 
that rationality which is conducive to the reality it wants” and “suppresses that 
knowledge and rationality for which it has no use” (1998: 36).  
During invited participatory events, the knowledge and rationality of dominant actors 
was imposed through a process that Bourdieu (1977, 2001) describes as ‘symbolic 
violence’. In this process, the view of reality held by dominant actors - in which the 
existing relations of power and benefit distribution are ‘rational’, ‘natural’, ‘inevitable’ 
and thus ‘legitimate’ - is imposed on less powerful actors, whose heterodox knowledge 
and rationality is suppressed (Bourdieu 1977, Bourdieu and Eagleton 1992, Bourdieu 
2001, Topper 2001). The symbolic violence that attends the imposition and suppression 
of particular definitions of reality is largely unseen and implicit, to the extent that it 
unfolds on a symbolic level. As Bourdieu (1997) puts it, symbolic violence is “a gentle, 
invisible violence” that is “unrecognised as such” (1977: 127). For this reason, symbolic 
violence is particularly “effective” means of domination (Bourdieu and Eagleton 1992: 
111).  
In the case of this research, DAFF officials, fisheries scientists, and industry 
representatives imposed their definitions of reality upon the participatory space, while 
suppressing the heterodox rationality, knowledge and perceptions of small-scale fisher 
participants. This was particularly apparent in relation to critical fisheries governance 
issues such as the re-distribution of fishing rights, and the abundance of fisheries 
resources. Dominant actors asserted a view of reality in which fisheries resources were 
highly endangered, and thus the radical redistribution of fishing rights was ‘irrational’, 
‘irresponsible’, and ‘unrealistic’. At the same time they promoted a vision of reality in 
which the existing structures of governance, power and benefit distribution were 
‘rational’, ‘objective’, ‘responsible’ and ‘realistic’. Crucially, state officials, industry 
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representatives and fisheries scientists presented a positive depiction of specific 
participatory events as instances of successful democratic engagement  that were of value 
to all present, especially fishers and fisher representatives. The imposition of this positive 
depiction of participation provided symbolic legitimacy to formal processes of 
participation, and thus contributed towards the broader co-opting effects of these 
participatory events. 
Ultimately, this research from the Cape Peninsula suggests that, while participatory 
encounters occurred within a democratic legal and policy framework, and were officially 
framed in terms of democratic engagement, the pervasive manifestation of power and 
strategic practices often served to undermine the democratic rights of small-scale fishers 
and fisher representatives. When the micro-politics of participation are viewed in the 
light of the literature presented in Chapter Two, we see a close alignment between this 
ethnographic research and the critical literature which argues that participation has the 
potential to undermine democracy, rather than facilitate it.  
If we go back to the Arnstein’s (1969) typology of participation, it is clear that the 
participatory encounters described in Chapter Six reflected the categories of ‘token 
participation’ and ‘non-participation’. Fishers and community-based representatives on 
the Cape Peninsula generally had the opportunity to “hear and be heard” without 
necessarily having the power to influence these processes (1969: 217). In the case of 
invited participatory events, these ranged from the unidirectional communication of 
information by state officials, to the inviting of fishing community views and opinions 
without allowing their input to shape policy and management decisions and actions. It 
was also the case that some participatory encounters fell into the ‘non-participation’ 
category, as these encounters appeared to be more focused on legitimising existing 
imbalances of power (Arnstein 1969). 
This research of participatory process on the Cape Peninsula therefore affirms the 
broader critique of participation as a mechanism that can undermine democratic practice, 
and reinforce existing imbalances of power and benefit distribution. The participatory 
encounters explored in this research provide support for Arnstein’s (1969) contention that 
participation can enable “the powerholders to claim that all sides were considered”, while 
making it “possible for only some of those sides to benefit”, and in this way, participation 
“maintains the status quo” (1969: 216). As Rowe and Frewer (2004) argue: “a non-
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consulted public is often an angry one”, and so “involving the public may be one step 
toward mollifying it” (2004: 514). To the extent that participation in fisheries policy and 
management processes on the Cape Peninsula served to legitimise and de-politicise 
decision-making and action, it can thus be argued that participatory processes served as 
potential “instruments for reinforcing domination and control” (Gaventa 2004: 34). 
Despite the real successes of public participation for small-scale fishing communities at a 
regional and national level, this research on the Cape Peninsula demonstrated that in 
practice, participation was often reduced to a “hollow fetish” (Comaroff and  Comaroff 
1999: 33). 
7.5. Disempowered in democracy: the view from small -scale fishers 
on the Cape Peninsula 
The people who were best positioned to confirm the practical effects of these tensions 
between power and democracy in South African fisheries governance were small-scale 
fishers themselves. Many of the small-scale fishers encountered during this research on 
the Cape Peninsula expressed a sense of frustration regarding their experience of 
ostensibly inclusive and de-centred political processes such as community-based 
representation and participation, and articulated a critical analysis of the broader, 
hierarchically-ordered fields of power. Based on their experiences, they also described 
their scepticism with regard to the potential of these processes to facilitate equitable and 
democratic fisheries governance in accordance with the principles of South Africa’s 
Constitution (see Chapter Six). These commonly-expressed views were themselves 
affirmed by the lack of substantial improvement in the material conditions of many 
small-scale fishers encountered during this research, most of whom continued to live in 
poverty despite their efforts to utilise the democratic opportunities of post-apartheid 
fisheries (see Chapter Four). For many of these fishers, the fact that they were still 
economically insecure after almost two decades of democratic engagement was the 
ultimate symbol of how that engagement had failed to facilitate their equitable access to 
the marine commons. The following statements by a fisher in Hangberg provide a 
poignant illustration of how many small-scale fishers on the Cape Peninsula perceived 
the nature of democracy and power in post-apartheid fisheries governance: 
“It’s a heavy question … The Constitution says that every … citizen that lives in this country, has a right 
to the resources of this land, to sustain their families. But at this very moment, we have no right … So 
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where do we stand in terms of the constitution, where it says: ‘you have got the right to sustain your 
family’? Fishing is in the blood of our fishermen … It is … our way of life, for us to catch fish ... Now is 
the time, since the democratically elected system, the wheel should turn …There’s an imbalance, in the 
fishing industry! So what we ask is: what is the value of the constitution, if you say the one thing, but they 
do other thing. So which means, it means nothing, the constitution, where they exclude the poor 
fishermen from their resources” (HGB Fisher 4, pers comm 12/04/12). 
While recognising the crucial democratic victories that small-scale fishers in South Africa 
have won (such as the gazetting of the SSF policy), the sense of frustration expressed by 
this fisher affirms the claim that the post-apartheid political space which has emerged for 
small-scale fishers on the Cape Peninsula has been significantly constrained by strategic 
practices and asymmetrical relations of power.  
7.6. Power versus democracy on the Cape Peninsula: implica tions for 
the orthodox perspective in fisheries governance theory 
The processes of community-based representation and public participation that have 
been presented in this thesis conflict starkly with the apolitical orthodox conception of 
governance (and political engagement more broadly) that appears to underpin 
contemporary theories of fisheries governance.  As the case of Ocean View illustrated, 
community-based representation served as a means for an elite grouping in the 
community to reinforce and extend their position of power. In this way, community-
based representation had the effect of undermining, rather than supporting the 
democratic rights of local small-scale fishers. Similarly, this thesis demonstrated how 
government officials and industrial fishing company representatives utilised formal 
participatory encounters to minimise the concerns and criticisms expressed by small-
scale fishers, and to legitimise relations of power that structured the field of fisheries 
governance in South Africa. This study of community-based representation and public 
participation conflicts even more starkly with the orthodox conception of politics when 
these processes are located within broader fields of power. The micro-politics of small-
scale fisheries governance on the Cape Peninsula that were observed during this research 
were embedded in national and global structures of capitalism, and in this context, the 
political space for inclusive, non-hierarchical and collaborative political engagement  - as 
promoted by the de-politicising orthodoxy - was fundamentally constrained.  
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This research therefore affirms the critique of the recent trend towards apolitical 
conceptions of inclusive, de-centred and collaborative political engagement. It is clear 
from this research that “no amount of ‘trust’, ‘clever institutional design’ … or ‘epistemic 
consensus’ … can compensate for major asymmetries in the interests and powers of the 
different actors” (Lélé 1998: 253). Yet it is these asymmetries which appear to be evaded 
by many prominent contemporary theories of fisheries governance.  
Based on the research presented in this thesis, it therefore seems appropriate to take a 
measured view of fisheries governance theories which emphasise inclusive and 
collaborative political engagement, particularly when seeking to apply such theories to 
fisheries governance contexts that are defined by structural inequality, such as that of 
post-apartheid South Africa. This research suggests that the orthodox approach to 
governance without politics does not provide sufficient analytical tools for grappling with 
the specific ways in which extreme power imbalances and strategic practices operate 
through fisher participation and community-based representation. The radical 
imbalances of power, and the ubiquity of strategic practices observed during this research 
suggests that we can better understand these processes by adopting a real politik 
conception of politics.  
7.7. Bringing power into the study of participation and community -
based in fisheries governance: suggestions for a real politik analysis  
The previous section has argued that the orthodox perspective of fisheries governance 
underestimates the fundamental tensions between power and democracy that were 
observed in small-scale fisheries governance on the Cape Peninsula, and as such, this 
perspective does not provide a sound basis for rigorous analysis.  This thesis therefore 
proposes a real politik perspective as the principal means to bring power into the analysis of 
community-based representation and participatory engagement in small-scale fisheries 
governance. Drawing on the critical theories of power presented in Chapter Three, and 
the ethnographic material described in Chapters Five and Six, the following discussion 
suggests that the politics of participation and community-based representation in 
fisheries governance should be analysed in relation to: i) broader fields of power ii) and 
micro-political dynamics. 
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7.7.1. Broader fields of power 
When analysing a particular fisheries governance process, it is vital to consider the 
broader national and global fields of power in which that process is embedded. To begin 
with, the researcher must situate the local field of fisheries governance within the 
national field of fisheries governance. This requires a focus on the power relations that 
structure this field. The researcher should consider which actors occupy positions of 
power, and should seek to identify the basis of this power. In particular, the researcher 
should attend to the regimes of ownership and control that characterise a particular 
fisheries context. The relative political-economic power of the state and industry should 
be a primary consideration when analysing local processes of small-scale fisher 
participation and community-based representation in the national fisheries governance 
context. The role of science is also crucial here, requiring the researcher to consider how 
scientific knowledge and discourse is used to support particular fisheries governance 
decisions, and to oppose others. At a more formalistic level, the researcher should 
consider the formal institutional framework, and the ways in which this framework may 
reinforce or challenge particular relations of power within the national and local field of 
fisheries governance.  
The national field of fisheries governance should also be situated within the broader 
national political economy. A principal consideration should be the state’s macro-
economic policy approach, which is fundamental in determining the nature of fisheries 
governance from the national to the local level. Macro-economic policy effectively 
supersedes fisheries law and policy, and as such, sets the political limits of possibility in a 
particular fisheries governance context. Specific attention should be focused on the 
extent to which macro-economic policy favours particular modes of fisheries production, 
as is the case in South Africa, where economic policy favours centralised, capital-
intensive, export-driven production, and the place it accords to community-based, small-
scale forms of production. The analysis of participation and community-based 
representation in small-scale fisheries governance processes has to include the specific 
priorities and parameters of the state’s macro-economic policy approach if it is to grapple 
with the role of power in these governance processes. 
A real politik analysis of participation and community-based representation in small-
scale fisheries governance also requires that the field of study be located within the global 
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system of capitalism. It is vital that the researcher considers how global structures and 
processes of capitalism shape the macro-economic policies of a particular state, and the 
national and local fields of fisheries governance that are being analysed. In particular, the 
researcher should focus on the extent to which the state’s autonomy is constrained or 
enabled by its position within this global system. This will enable the researcher to gain a 
critical understanding of the nature and possibilities of participation and community-
based representation in fisheries governance at the local and national level, and the 
ability of small-scale fishers to utilise democratic practices to assert their rights to 
equitable access.  
7.7.2. Micro-political dynamics 
To bring power into the analysis of participation and community-based representation in 
small-scale fisheries governance processes, it is crucial that the researcher pays heed to 
micro-political dynamics. Even in apparently inclusive, non-hierarchical and 
collaborative engagement, the various actors continue to employ strategic practices to 
reinforce or contest the distribution of power and benefits in a particular field of fisheries 
governance – the researcher can uncover how power manifests in practice by attending 
to these micro-political dynamics. To begin with, the researcher should consider the 
specific set of material and symbolic powers - or capitals - that each individual actor possesses. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, each actor draws on a specific composition of knowledge, 
skills and resources as the basis for their engagement in fisheries governance processes. A 
real politik analysis of participation and community-based representation requires that 
the researcher attends to the composition of each actor’s set of powers, and how their set 
of powers relate to the powers of other actors.  
It is therefore crucial that the researcher considers how community-based representatives 
and community-based representative organisations are positioned in relation to their 
‘constituency’. In particular, the researcher should consider the extent to which the 
representative is analogous with the fishers they claim to represent. This requires that the 
researcher investigates the community-based representative’s composition of powers or 
capitals, for example, their cultural capital (knowledge, skills and experience) in the 
fisheries field. In small-scale fisheries contexts that resemble that of Ocean View, key 
questions might include: does the representative personally catch fish, how long have 
they been involved in fisheries-related activities, and to what extent does their livelihood 
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depend on these activities? The researcher should also attend to the representative’s level 
of cultural capital in the bureaucratic field, in terms of formal education, literacy and 
verbal communication skills, and how this set of knowledge and skills compares with 
that of their small-scale fisher constituents. Another critical aspect is the level of 
economic resources that the representative has access to, relative to the fishers they claim 
to represent. And finally, the researcher should consider the network of social 
relationships - or social capital - that the representative can draw on in their engagement 
in fisheries governance processes, specifically in terms of relationships with government 
officials, party political actors, and industrial fishing company representatives. 
Determining the extent to which the representative shares a similar composition of 
capitals (powers) as their fisher constituency is critical because this will enable the 
researcher to uncover the extent to which the representative’s interests and agendas may 
be aligned or in conflict with those of their constituency. 
In the context of participation, it is equally important to consider the relative powers that 
each actor possesses. Contrary to the orthodox perspective, which assumes that the 
various actors ‘leave their weapons at the door’ before engaging in participatory 
encounters, a real politik analysis of participation in fisheries governance requires the 
researcher to identify the specific set of material and symbolic powers (or capitals) 
possessed by state fisheries managers, fisheries scientists, industrial fishing company 
representatives, conservationists, fishers, and fisher representatives. A real politik 
analysis also calls for the researcher to consider how the powers of each actor support or 
undermine the powers of other actors during participatory encounters. Though 
participation often presents the appearance of a momentary flattening of power relations, 
the researcher must look behind this appearance to uncover the ways in which 
participatory processes are shaped by power asymmetries.  
A real politik analysis of power in participation and community-based representation in 
small-scale fisheries governance also requires a close focus on the micro-political practices 
through which the various actors gain and exercise their differential powers. It is through these 
practices that power manifests, and in a sense, becomes visible to the researcher. In the 
context of community-based representation, the researcher should interrogate a 
particular representative’s claims to legitimacy. This requires the researcher to consider 
how a particular individual came to occupy the position of representative: was this the 
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result of a democratic process, or did the representative capture their position through 
strategic manoeuvring.  
The strategic exploitation of information and economic relationships are crucial in this 
regard, and can potentially serve as a means for a community-based representative to 
gain and exercise power in the local field of small-scale fisheries governance. In terms of 
information, the researcher should determine how the representative has accumulated 
information about the history and culture of the local fishing community: does it appear 
that the representative has internalised this information through years of personal 
experience; or has representative amassed this information vicariously, as a strategic 
means to bolster their claims to be embedded in, and knowledgeable of the fishers they 
claim to represent? Another key aspect regarding the strategic use of information relates 
to the community-based representative’s position as a mediator between their fisher 
constituency and government officials, fishing company agents, NGOs and other 
external actors. A real politik analysis requires the researcher to consider the degree of 
access that a particular representative has to fisheries policy and management-related 
information, relative to their fisher constituents, and to other representatives in the 
community. Having identified those representatives who appear to have privileged 
access to fisheries policy and management-related information, the researcher must 
determine how these representatives obtained this access, and how they use this 
information; in particular the researcher should ask: to whom do the representatives 
disseminate information to, and how do they use selective emphasis and omission in this 
process?  
The exploitation of economic relationships is another micro-political practice that must 
be included in the real politik analysis of community-based representation. It is crucial 
that the researcher pays attention to the economic relationship (if any) between the 
representative and their fisher constituents. If the representative’s role includes, for 
example, negotiating and administering marketing arrangements with commercial fish 
buyers, or obtaining fishing quotas and permits on behalf of their constituents, then the 
researcher should investigate whether the representative exploits this relationship to 
secure obligations of loyalty and compliance, or to intercept the benefits associated with 
the provision of marketing and administrative services. The researcher should also be 
cognisant of the strategic use of monetary loans as a means to enlarge their constituency, 
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to establish obligations of loyalty, and to minimise dissent among their fisher 
constituents. In those cases where fisher constituents owe money to their community-
based representative, the researcher is compelled to investigate how this debtor-creditor 
relationship is, or is not exploited by the representative. 
In the context of participation, it is equally important to consider the micro-political 
practices that pervade these ostensibly democratic encounters. With regard to formal 
participatory events, a real politik analysis requires first and foremost that the researcher 
considers which actors determine the terms of the participatory process, and what those 
terms are. For example, in the case of invited participatory events, the researcher has to 
attend to the official agenda for the event, who devised the agenda, and what its 
parameters are (in relation to the issues that are included or excluded). Another critical 
dynamic to consider is the micro-political practices of facilitation. The researcher must 
pay close attention to the questions of who facilitates the participatory event, and the 
manner in which facilitation is conducted. It is especially important that the researcher 
observes how the facilitator polices the boundaries of acceptable discussion (as 
determined by the parameters of the official agenda): which lines of discussion do the 
facilitators terminate, which lines of discussion do they allow, and how do facilitators 
police these boundaries without being seen by participants to be silencing democratic 
and rational engagement?  
Another aspect of the micro-political practices of formal participatory processes is that of 
symbolic performance. In this regard, the researcher can gain insight into the 
manifestation of power in participatory processes by focusing on the dramatic 
performances that are enacted by actors in the participatory space. To this end, the 
researcher must pay particular attention to the discourse, body language, and tone of 
voice through which these dramatic performances are enacted, and how these 
performances are used to symbolically reinforce or contest the relations of power in the 
participatory space, and in the broader field of fisheries governance.  The researcher 
cannot assume that participatory encounters are exclusively based on the rational 
exchange of information, but rather, they must confront the subtle performative aspect of 
these encounters.  
Intertwined with the micro-political practices of symbolic performance, are the micro-
political practices associated with the discursive contest to define reality. During 
221 | P a g e  
 
participatory encounters, the researcher must pay close attention to the ways that actors 
put forward different depictions of the same objective phenomena (for example the status 
of fisheries resources, or the distribution of fishing rights), and how the different actors 
compete to have their specific depiction recognised by the other actors as being a rational 
and definitive representation of the factual reality of the issues under discussion. 
Particular focus should be placed on analysing: how these different depictions of reality 
conflict or correspond with each other; the course of action implied by specific depictions 
of reality; and how these depictions of reality reinforce or undermine the interests of the 
various actors in the participatory space. 
In the context of participation and community-based representation in small-scale 
fisheries governance, a real politik perspective can contribute towards bringing power to 
the centre of the analysis. From this perspective, political, economic and ideological 
forms of power, and the strategic practices through which these forms of power manifest, 
are fundamental in determining the nature and outcome of fisheries governance 
processes. By attending to micro-political dynamics, and the broader fields of power in 
which these dynamics are embedded, the researcher is better equipped to grapple with 
the tensions between power and democracy that characterise fisheries governance 
processes, and societal attempts to distribute access and benefits associated with the 
marine commons. 
7.8. Conclusion 
This thesis has sought to confront an oversight in prominent contemporary theories of 
fisheries governance with regard to the issue of power. In a reflection of the broader 
discourse of neoliberalism, these theoretical approaches appear to pay insufficient 
attention to the workings and effects of power, while promoting an apolitical vision of 
politics that emphasises collaborative, synergistic engagement between multiple and 
divergent actors. Viewing fisheries governance processes through this apolitical lens, the 
observer is pre-disposed to underestimate the extent to which these processes are 
determined by hierarchical power relations and micro-political strategic practices.   
While this critique of the ‘new governance’ approach has been made extensively in other 
fields of social endeavour, the contribution of this research has been to apply this critique 
to the field of fisheries governance. In an attempt to address this oversight in recent 
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approaches to fisheries governance theory, this thesis has explored the role of power in 
political processes associated with the democratisation of fisheries governance processes 
in post-apartheid South Africa. Through a study of small-scale fisher participation and 
community-based representation on the Cape Peninsula, this thesis has revealed some of 
the material dimensions of power which receive minimal attention in contemporary 
theoretical approaches to fisheries governance, as well as the more subtle symbolic 
dimensions of power, which appear to receive even less attention in these theoretical 
approaches. The case of small-scale fisher participation and representation on the Cape 
Peninsula illuminates how structural power relations and micro-political practices can 
fundamentally shape the nature and outcomes of fisheries governance processes.  
Drawing on this research of small-scale fisher participation and community-based 
representation on the Cape Peninsula, and the theorising of Bourdieu and other critical 
scholars, this thesis has offered a real politik perspective as a means to bring power firmly 
into the analysis and theorising of fisheries governance, and ultimately, to contribute 
towards more equitable and effective policy making and management processes. From a 
real politik perspective, the observer is compelled to retain a critical position regarding the 
potential for ostensibly democratic mechanisms such as political representation and 
public participation to confront radically unequal power relations and the strategic 
practices that buttress these power relations. This is a necessary step on the path towards 
more equitable and sustainable utilisation and management of the marine commons. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 - Coastal and marine fauna on the Cape Peninsula: species 
featured in text 
 
 abalone (Haliotis midae) 
 alikreukal (Turbo sarmaticus) 
 black mussels (Mytilus galloprovincialis) 
 chokka (Loligo vulgaris reynaudi) 
 dassie (Procavia capensis) 
 hottentot (Pachymetopon blochii) 
 klipspringer (Oreotragus oreotragus) 
 limpets (Patella spp.) 
 mullet (Liza richardsonii) 
 snoek (Thyrsites atun) 
 tortoise (Homopus areolatus) 
 west coast rock lobster (Jasus lalandii) 
 white mussels (Donax serra)  
 yellowtail (Seriola lalandi) 
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Appendix 2 - Participatory and other fisheries-related events 
 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 2010. Road show on the SSF policy, 
Hangberg Community Hall, 27 September 2010. Cape Town. 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 2010. Road show on the SSF policy, 
Ocean View Community Hall, 29 September 2010. Cape Town. 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 2010. Road show on the SSF policy, 
Simonstown Library, 30 September 2010. Cape Town. 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 2010. Road show on the SSF policy, 
Kalk Bay Trinity Church, 1 October 2010. Cape Town. 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 2011. Consultation meeting for nearshore 
west coast rock lobster right holders, Hangberg Community Hall, 6 July 2011. Cape 
Town. 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 2011. Consultation meeting for nearshore 
west coast rock lobster right holders, Ocean View Community Hall, 7 July 2011. Cape 
Town. 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 2011. Consultation meeting for nearshore 
west coast rock lobster right holders, Kalk Bay Trinity Church, 8 July 2011. Cape Town. 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. Workshop on west coast rock lobster data 
management, Fisheries Science Research Centre, 4 November 2011. Cape Town.   
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 2012. Workshop to review legislation for 
wild-capture and aquaculture fisheries, 15-on-Orange Hotel, 29 June 2012. Cape Town. 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 2012. Road show to review legislation for 
wild-capture and aquaculture fisheries, Imizamo Yethu Community Hall, 19 July 2012. 
Cape Town. 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 2013. Road show on the general policy 
for the allocation of commercial fishing rights, The Good Hope Centre, 23 April 2013. 
Cape Town. 
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Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 2013. Road Show on the SSF policy 
implementation plan, Langa Community Hall, 19 August 2013. Cape Town. 
Masifundise Development Trust. 2010. Roundtable discussion on the SSF policy, Belmont 
Conference Centre, 7 October 2010. Cape Town. 
Masifundise Development Trust. 2011. Roundtable discussion on the SSF policy, District Six 
Museum, 30 September 2011. Cape Town. 
Masifundise Development Trust. 2012. Roundtable discussion on the SSF policy at the 
District Six Museum, 30 October 2012. Cape Town. 
Masifundise Development Trust, World Wildlife Fund-South Africa. 2011. Roundtable 
discussion on the SSF policy, Belmont Conference Centre, 29 March 2011. Cape Town. 
Masifundise Development Trust, Artisanal Fishers Association-South Africa, Coastal 
Links Network. 2011.  Rally for small-scale fishers, Kalk Bay Trinity Church, 23 March 
2011. Cape Town. 
Masifundise Development Trust, Coastal Links Fisher Network. 2011. National workshop 
for small-scale fishers, Tullip Hotel, 11-13 October 2011. Cape Town. 
Masifundise Development Trust. 2013. National Workshop on the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation’s Voluntary Guidelines for Small-scale Fishing, The Ritz Hotel, 14-16 
February 2012. Cape Town. 
National Marine Protected Area Management Workshop, Struisbaai Recreational Fishing Club, 4-
5 November 2011. Struisbaai. 
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 2010. Public 
Hearings on the transformation of the fishing industry in South Africa, Parliamentary 
Chambers, 14-15 June 2011. Cape Town.  
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 2010. Public 
Hearings on the amendment of the Marine Living Resources Act (1998), Parliamentary 
Chambers, 15-16 October 2013. Cape Town.  
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South African National Parks, Department of Environmental Affairs, Department of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. 2011. Workshop on the Karbonkelberg Restricted 
Zone, between management agencies and Hangberg community representative, 28 January 
2011. Cape Town. 
‘Too Big to Ignore’ Network (TBI). Workshop on small-scale fisheries in South Africa, Centre 
for the Book, 6 September 2011. Cape Town.  
West Coast Rock Lobster Industry Association. 2012. Meeting for nearshore west coast rock 
lobster right holders, Ocean View High School Hall, 10 February 2012. Cape Town.  
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Appendix 3 - List of group discussions and structured interviews  
Ocean View  
Structured interviews = 38  
1. AOVF Rep 2 (28/09/12)* 
2. OV Fisher 1 (03/07/12)*  
3. OV Fisher 2 (22/10/12)*   
4. OV Fisher 3 (23/10/12)  
5. OV Fisher 4 (23/10/12) 
6. OV Fisher 5 (23/10/12) 
7. OV Fisher 6 (24/10/12)*  
8. OV Fisher 7 (24/06/12) 
9. OV Fisher 8 (24/06/12) 
10. OV Fisher 9 (27/09/12) *  
11. OV Fisher 10 (27/09/12) 
12. OV Fisher 11 (14/05/12) 
13. OV Fisher14 (26/06/12) 
14. OV Fisher 15 (8/03/12) 
15. OV  Veteran Fisher 1(02/11/12) *  
16. OV Veteran Fisher 2 (02/11/12) 
17. OV Veteran Fisher 3 (21/01/11)  
18. OV Veteran Fisher 3 (26/06/12)*  
19. OV Veteran Fisher 4 (26/06/12)* 
20. OV Veteran Fisher 5 (21/01/11) 
21. OV Veteran Fisher 5 (15/02/11) 
22. OV Veteran Fisher 5  (8/12/11)* 
23. OV Veteran Fisher 5 (24/01/12) 
24. OV Veteran Fisher 5 (03/02/12) 
25. OV Veteran Fisher 5 (03/04/12) 
26. OV Veteran Fisher 5 (03/05/12) 
27. OV Veteran Fisher 6 (02/07/12) 
28. OV Veteran Fisher 7 (02/07/12) 
29. OV Veteran Fisher 8 (22/10/12) 
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30. OV Veteran Fisher 9 (23/10/12) 
31. OV Veteran Fisher 10 (23/10/12) 
32. OV Veteran Fisher 11 (24/06/12) 
33. OV Veteran Fisher 12 (24/06/12) 
34. OV Veteran Fisher 13 (13/07/12) * 
35. OV Veteran Fisher 14 (13/07/12)* 
36. OV Veteran Fisher 15 (13/07/12)* 
37. OV Non-Fisher 1 (02/07/12) 
38. Roving Rep 2  (8/03/12)*                    (Life histories*) 
Group Discussions = 4 
1. Ocean View (09/02/12): OV Fisher 12, 13; OV Veteran Fisher 7, 16, 17, 18.   
2. Ocean View (8/03/12): OV Fisher 15, 16, Roving Rep 2. 
3. Ocean View (23/10/12): OV Fisher 3, 4, 5.  
4. Ocean View (28/09/12): OV Fisher 9 and five other fishers.  
Hangberg 
Structured interviews = 8 
1. HGB Veteran Fisher 1 (09/04/12)* 
2. HGB Veteran Fisher 2 (09/04/12)*  
3. HGB Veteran Fisher 3 (09/04/12)*  
4. HGB Veteran Fisher 4 (09/04/12)*  
5. HGB Fisher 1(06/04/12)* 
6. HGB Fisher 2 (12/04/12) 
7. HGB Fisher 3 (01/08/12) 
8. HGB Fisher 3 (09/08/12) 
 
Group Discussions = 2 
 
Hangberg (09/04/12): HGB Veteran Fisher 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. 
Hangberg (12/04/12): HGB Fisher 1, 2, 4, 5. 
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Imizamo Yethu 
Structured interviews = 12 
1. IY Fisher 1 (09/04/12)  
2. IY Fisher 2 (09/04/12)  
3. IY Fisher 3 (09/04/12)  
4. IY Fisher 4 (11/04/12)*  
5. IY Fisher 5 (06/04/12)*  
6. IY Fisher 5 (10/04/12) 
7. IY Fisher 6 (11/04/12)* 
8. IY Veteran Fisher 1 (06/04/12)* 
9. IY Veteran Fisher 2 (06/04/12)* 
10. IY Veteran Fisher 3 (10/04/12)* 
11. IY Veteran Fisher 4 (11/04/12) 
12. IY Veteran Fisher 5 (11/04/12) 
 
Group Discussions = 4 
 
1. Imizamo Yethu (06/04/12): IY Veteran Fisher1, 2, 4; IY Fisher 5, 9. 
 
2. Imizamo Yethu (07/04/12): IY Veteran Fisher 1, 2, 3, 4; IY Fisher 5, 9. 
 
3. Imizamo Yethu (11/04/12): IY Veteran Fisher 1, 2, 4; IY Fisher 5. 
 
4. Imizamo Yethu (12/04/12): IY Veteran Fisher 1, 2, 4. 
 
